K. HAFTER Nov2017

Ex-general accused of war crimes is being groomed by EU leaders to become Libya's next strong man. What could go wrong?

From a security standpoint, the presence of certain heavily armed militant factions in post-2011 Libya deeply unsettles European governments. Although Daesh (ISIS) lost its stronghold in Sirte at the hands of Misratan militias in late 2016, Daesh remains a relevant force in Libya, underscored by its killing of two Libyan National Army (LNA) soldiers at a checkpoint near Ajdabiya on October 25. Other extremist militias such as Libya Shield, Ansar al Sharia in Benghazi, Ansar al Sharia in Darnah, and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb have also contributed to fears of Libya becoming a hub for global terrorists to plot attacks against Europe.
Since Libya’s bifurcation in mid-2014, Haftar and the LNA, loyal to the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR), have received foreign support from Russia and several Arab states to the east of Libya. Yet Haftar—despite refusing to recognize the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli as Libya’s legitimate government—has worked to convince Western powers that he represents Libya’s most realistic hope for a stable and secular future. It appears that such efforts have been paying off politically as more European statesmen have made moves which serve to legitimize Haftar.
More than any other Western government, France, which mainly sees the Libyan crisis through a counterterrorism prism, has directly and indirectly supported Haftar. Despite the International Criminal Court’s warrant for Mahmoud Mustafa Busayf al Werfalli (a Libyan general who serves in the LNA) on war crimes charges, Paris has worked closely with Haftar’s most important Arab state sponsors—Egypt and the UAE—to provide the LNA with support. Last year, officials in Paris admitted that three French soldiers died conducting an "intelligence-gathering mission" near Benghazi, which experts saw as further evidence of French help for the LNA.
On July 27, President Emmanuel Macron hosted talks between Haftar and the GNA’s head, Fayes al Serraj, to break Libya’s political impasse. Leaders of the rival Tripoli and Tobruk-based governments signed a 10-point statement, committing both to holding a ceasefire and national elections “as soon as possible.” Yet in the eyes of many Libyans, including Guma el Gamaty, the meeting in Paris provided Haftar with more potential to achieve a “takeover” of Libya by way of an election at a time when the ex-CIA asset is enjoying more popularity. There is growing suspicion that France’s underlying goal is to work with Egypt and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to establish Haftar as Libya’s new dictator.
By virtue of geography, Italy has had to engage Libya on migration and terrorism issues. Rome—more than any other Western capital—has backed the GNA and opposed moves to legitimize Haftar politically. Yet within Italy’s leadership there has not been a consensus on the question of what role Haftar should play in Libya’s future and how Rome should engage the “renegade general.”
Signalling a possible shift in Italy’s policy, In September Haftar met with Italy’s Defence Minister, Roberta Pinotti, and Italian security chiefs in Rome. Mattia Toaldo expertly posited that Haftar’s visit to Rome illustrated the growing influence of Interior Minister Marco Minniti, who joins other voices in Italy’s government in advocating that Italy and Haftar establish more cooperative relations to tackle the numerous issues facing Italian-Libyan relations.
Under the banner of fighting “terror,” the United Kingdom has supported Haftar too. In August, British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson visited Haftar in Benghazi and credited the LNA with combatting “umpteen militias… in lawless areas of Libya.” London’s chief diplomat urged Libya’s strongman to adhere to the Paris ceasefire and to work with the UN to achieve peace in Libya. Yet Johnson’s Benghazi visit was illustrative of the West’s shift toward recognizing Haftar.
The West’s growing recognition of Haftar as a political force to contend with in Libya stems from the GNA’s failure to govern Libyan territory beyond certain parts of Tripoli in contrast to the HoR/LNA’s control of roughly half of the North African country. At the same time, given how little appetite there is among the US and European public for the deployment of Western forces to Arab countries to fight wars and battles on the ground, the Europeans are looking for local actors in the Middle East and North Africa to engage in the bloodiest of battles against militant radicals such as Daesh.
Haftar appeals to powers in the East and the West who see him as a strongman capable of creating an effective bulwark against violent extremism in Libya. Clearly the LNA’s ousting of militant forces from Libyan cities has been received well in other Arab states, plus Russia and Europe too, where leaders are hedging their bets and not expecting the UN-backed GNA to succeed. Yet with the LNA accused of war crimes, there are certainly moral costs associated with supporting the “renegade general.”
Moreover, if Haftar wages a bloody campaign to usurp control of Tripoli as the next step in establishing a military dictatorship over the entire country, would this actually defuse the threats of radicalism and address the widespread despair that provides terrorist groups with the necessary oxygen to sustain their violence? To say the least, that appears highly doubtful. In devising a comprehensive approach to tackle the numerous challenges that the Libyan conflict poses to Europe, Western governments must consider the implications of Haftar becoming Libya’s next strongman and be careful about their actions’ potential to accelerate such a development.

SEIF E LIBIA?

È intenzione di Saif al-Islam Gheddafi immediatamente assumere la presidenza?

Su Libya against superpowermedia ^[1] un notevole articolo di Richard Galustian era ^[2 pubblicato. Galustian suggerisce ciò che si è verificato dopo il fallimento di tutti i negoziati, si avvicina ad un piano in cinque punti interessanti per la Libia. Una breve versione:

1. Le Nazioni Unite dovrebbero fare le valigie e lasciare il palco libico. Dopo sei anni di loro fallimento, hanno zero credibilità tra i libici.
2. I Fratelli Musulmani deve essere classificato come organizzazione terroristica. i membri del LIFG devono essere esclusi dal diritto di partecipare alla vita politica.
3. L'embargo sulle armi contro la LNA deve essere sollevato per consentire generale Heftar può combattere i jihadisti.
4. Prima di tenere elezioni nel 2018 o 2019 tecnocrati devono essere formati. Come primo ministro, sarebbe Mahmoud Dschibril ^[3] e Abu Zaid Omar Dorda ^[4] in considerazione. I posti ministeriali dovrebbero prendere per persone qualificate dal parlamento a Tobruk.
5. Saif al-Islam dovrebbe essere nominato per il presidente "costituzionale"; come una figura unificante, senza potere esecutivo, bravo nel suo lato consiglieri tecnocratiche. Questo è importante per miteinzubinden le tribù e la popolazione normale. Perché Saif al-Islam popolarità è fuor di dubbio.

I jihadisti devono lasciare il paese per la Turchia, che ha un governo dei Fratelli Musulmani. Aggiungendo se il tutto a causa della debolezza delle Nazioni Unite e l'UE solo con l'aiuto di Donald Trump.

Galustian teme che - la Libia non deve essere stabilizzata presto - questo richiederà un effetto domino catastrofico sui paesi del Nord Africa, probabilmente in Tunisia, hanno prima.

Si Prepara Saif al-Islam Gheddafi ad un'offensiva Tripoli?

Un articolo libyatimes ^[5] è preoccupato con i piani di Saif al-Islam Gheddafi. Si dice che Saif al-Islam Gheddafi si stava preparando a Tripoli offensivo. Saif al-Islam ha avuto campo militare nella zona Wirschefana dove si affollano i combattenti da tutto il paese . Anche all'interno della capitale ha avuto sostenitori, per i quali sarebbe possibile aprirgli porte. Così potrebbe avere successo la cattura incruenta di Tripoli.

Tuttavia, la questione se Saif al-Islam in realtà intende militarmente occupare Tripoli, dal momento che avrebbe potuto vincere qualsiasi elezione facilmente immaginare. Tutti i libici avrebbero rispettato la nuova Libia 'le forze politiche attuali, che hanno la colpa per il disastro in corso, completamente disilluso. Le grandi tribù della Libia sono sostenitori maturati dal vecchio regime - e rappresentano la stragrande maggioranza degli elettori.

Ma come potrebbero consentire le potenze occidentali che la Libia restituisce a Gheddafi al potere ? Come potrebbe giustificare il bilancio delle vittime fornito loro nei loro paesi se ora tutto è tornato come una volta? Così Gheddafi potrebbe rimanere l'ultima scelta per far valere la sua pretesa di potere verso l'Occidente con la forza.

In Libia ci sono due movimenti Jamahiriya, anche la nuova fondazione Fronte Popolare per la Liberazione della Libia e il Movimento libico Movimento Nazionale del Popolo , nella maggior parte ha raccolto quelli vecchia guardia'. Saif al-Islam, deve anche essere in grado di tenere insieme questi due movimenti.

Saif al-Islam Gheddafi e il mandato di cattura internazionale

Il quotidiano al-Bayan [6] ha riferito che cercano parti sia internazionali e regionali per convincere il Consiglio di sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite dal lasciare seguire la decisione, Saif al-Islam Gheddafi penalmente ritirarsi. Questo gli avrebbe permesso di partecipare in Libia nel processo politico. Fonti diplomatiche hanno confermato all'unanimità che Saif al-Islam è sostenuto da una maggioranza significativa. Se questo non viene preso in considerazione, ciò porterebbe alla prosecuzione della crisi attuale. La maggior parte dei ceppi sia nel Sud e in Occidente e nella regione centrale così come alcune tribù e membri della legislatura in Oriente hanno promesso Saif al-Islam pubblicamente il loro sostegno.

Solo i gruppi jihadisti sarebbero andati contro Saif al-Islam Gheddafi.

Nel portare la pace in Libia non c'è modo per Saif al-Islam Gheddafi di condurre al passato

Qualora l'Occidente e in particolare l'UE siano in realtà pronti ti a una pacificazione della Libia, non c'è modo di Saif al-Islam Gheddafi per passare davanti. Questa è una pillola amara da ingoiare i neo-colonialisti. Ma sarebbe ancora più amara quando il caos in Libia e la minaccia jihadista destabilizzato non solo i vicini africani della Libia, a non portare l'elevato numero di migranti con gli attacchi islamici quindi i governi europei, l'UE nel suo insieme, a vacillare.

[1] https://libyaagainstsuperpowermedia.org/2017/10/27/the-solution-for-libya/

[2] Richard Galustian è un analista economico e di sicurezza che soggiorna in Libia dal 2011

[3] Mahmoud Jibril : iniziata sotto Fondo di sviluppo economico del Paese di Gheddafi. Combattuto per una liberalizzazione dell'economia libica. Registrato nel 2011 presto gli insorti ed era in transizione ministri degli esteri del Consiglio. Oggi è la festa dell'Alleanza delle forze nazionali prima (Forze Alleanza Nazionale Partito).

[4] Abu Zaid Omar Dorda : sotto Gheddafi ministro degli esteri, il primo ministro 1997-2003 inviato in Libia presso le Nazioni Unite, il presidente della Commissione Infrastrutture e capo dei servizi segreti esteri libico. Dopo l'assassinio di Gheddafi, è stato imprigionato a Tripoli per marzo 2017 prigione di al-Hadba.

[5] http://www.libyatimes.net/news/56-exclusive-saif-s-last-stand

[6] https://rcmlibya.wordpress.com/2017/10/26/saif-al-islam-returns-to-politics-in-libya/

Why Libya Needs a Makeover of Its Peace Deal 31

The currency crisis is undermining Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj’s efforts to unite a country fractured by five years of conflict following the 2011 ouster of Muammar al-Qaddafi.

Photographer: Abdullah Doma/AFP via Getty Images

Libya’s fundamental challenge since the 2011 downfall of Muammar Qaddafi was supposed to have been overcome: competing seats of power acting on their own. But a United Nations-brokered 2015 peace accord created a unity government in name more than in reality, and today Libya is effectively partitioned. So now the UN is having another go, holding talks aimed at an improved agreement. The negotiations will be tortuous. Adding urgency to the search for a deal are a collapsing economy, a resurgence of Islamic State in the country, and the plight of tens of thousands of refugees stuck in Libya or awaiting perilous sea journeys to Europe.

1. What’s different this time?

In essence, the UN’s new plan aspires to be more inclusive. Unveiled by UN envoy to Libya Ghassan Salame in September, it seeks to amend the 2015 pact -- known as the Libyan Political Agreement -- by engaging not just Libya’s two rival legislatures but also armed factions and civil society groups that were marginalized before. A month-long round in Tunis ended Oct. 21 with no date set for the next. If the parties reach a broad agreement, a national conference would be convened to select candidates for reconfigured executive bodies. Salame aims to deliver, within a year, a schedule for a referendum on a new constitution that’s still being drafted, as well as legislative and presidential elections.

2. Why did the first agreement fail?

The deal was intended to merge two rival administrations -- one based in the capital Tripoli, the other to the east in Tobruk -- and rebuild state institutions. But it excluded powerful players, including some of the militias that led the uprising that toppled Qaddafi, and critics said it smacked of a solution imposed by the international community. One of its most contentious components was Article 8, which required all top officials to step down once the agreement came into force. And the pact failed to address the knotty issue of who would lead the national army. The eastern leadership, including influential military commander Khalifa Haftar, who now controls some of Libya’s biggest oil facilities, has refused to endorse it.

3. Did negotiators make progress in Tunis?

Not really. Saad Ben Shrada, a member of the Tripoli legislature, said delegates did agree on scaling down the Presidential Council -- the executive body that is supposed to fulfill the functions of the head of state and which is currently led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj. It will go from nine members to three, one drawn from each of Libya’s main geographical regions. But there was no accord on how they would be selected, he said. Others described a lack of flexibility among key players. Another Tripoli legislator, Omar Bshah, summed up difficulties presented by the expanded participation: “When you satisfy old spoilers, new ones appear.”

4. Where does this leave the unity government?

Sarraj’s Government of National Accord, established in Tripoli in early 2016, has struggled to make much headway. Without armed forces under his direct control, the prime minister has had to rely on allied militias to achieve his few victories -- such as driving Islamic State from the coastal city of Sirte. The militant group has since made inroads elsewhere in Libya, presenting a major security risk for the country and its neighbors. Sarraj has also been widely blamed for a slumping economy. He will probably stay on as the search continues for a new framework, despite disagreements over whether his mandate remains valid.

5. Can Haftar seize power?

The former Qaddafi-era officer shows no signs of backing down. He gained greater political legitimacy after a Paris-brokered meeting with Sarraj in July, and has been working to portray himself as the only man capable of leading a united Libya. The opposition to him is splintered and unlikely to present a comparable challenger. Haftar’s backers have launched a petition in the east promoting him as the future president. However, to win an election, he’d have to win over major parts of Libya’s center and west, home to 70 percent of the population, many of whom despise him for his previous allegiance with the Qaddafi regime. It’s unlikely Haftar could rally the armed forces he’d need to seize control of the country.

6. What’s at stake?

Six years of fighting have exacted a heavy toll on Libya, which sits atop Africa’s largest proven reserves of crude oil, its main source of revenue. In August, the central bank estimated that shutdowns of oil production facilities over the past three years had cost the nation more than $160 billion. Gross domestic product will be around $13.9 billion in 2017, or about 15 percent of its 2012 levels, according to the central bank. Services such as health, education and electricity have been hit, and delays in paying state salaries have fueled anger. Libya’s breakdown has also resonated far beyond its borders, with the chaos enabling a booming smuggling network that trades in people, drugs and weapons.

The Reference Shelf

• The International Crisis Group’s analysis of the ongoing U.N.-backed efforts.
• Security Council Report chronology of key events in Libya.
• Testimony about Libya’s chaos by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace fellow Frederic Wehrey before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
• Bloomberg chart showing Libya oil output fluctuations.
• Guide to the main players in Libya’s political arena.

QuickTake explainer on Libya.

TAHER ALSUNI INTERVIEW 27.10.2018

El-Sonni: Stable Libya 'five to 10 years' away

With three rival governments and the reluctant host to thousands of migrants making their way to Europe, Libya is in chaos. Will it ever unite for democracy? Taher El-Sonni meets Tim Sebastian on Conflict Zone.

Taher El-Sonni on Conflict Zone

"It is something that [a government cannot] easily handle on its own, even if we are united. It needs support from all over," El-Sonni told Conflict Zone, regarding his country's many troubles.

Six years on from the revolution that overthrew the decades-long dictatorship of Colonel Gaddafi, Libya's problems can hardly be overstated: with no legitimate central government, violence common and terrorism a continual threat, the conclusion of many - including in recent months France’s Foreign Minister - is that Libya is a failed state.

One million people in waiting

On top of all this, the main route for African migrants heading to Europe is through Libya.

"The situation of migrants crossing Libya was appalling during Gaddafi's era, but it has become diabolical since," said Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, in September.

While stating his desire to establish centers to process migrants in Libya before people took "crazy risks when they are not all eligible for asylum", Emmanuel Macron in July put the number waiting to cross the Mediterranean there at between 800,000 and 1 million people.

Fewer migrants have died crossing the Mediterranean in 2017 than at the same time last year, but deaths in proportion to people successfully making the journey to Europe have almost doubled

For those that did manage to set off from Libya's coast, their treatment at the hands of the country's coastguard also came under fire from Al Hussein: "Like the militias onshore, [they] also sometimes beat, rob and even shoot the migrants they intercept."

Was this a situation El-Sonni – who worked for the UN for 17 years, specializing in crisis management – recognized?

"We don't shoot migrants. What we're doing is trying to apply our sovereign rules and regulations and by saving their lives and bringing them back. This is an international agreement. This is an EU-Libya agreement."

The EU's SOPHIA military operation, which involves the Libyan navy and coastguard, aims to "identify, capture and dispose of vessels and enabling assets used or suspected of being used by migrant smugglers or traffickers" in the Southern Central Mediterranean.

The EU says SOPHIA has saved 40,000 lives off the coast of Libya since it began in June 2015.

But there is grave concern too from the UN and NGOs for the lives of those thousands of migrants stranded in Libya.

Dr Joanne Liu, International President of Medecins Sans Frontieres, also in September wrote that the "detention of migrants and refugees in Libya is rotten to the core. It must be named for what it is: a thriving enterprise of kidnapping, torture and extortion."

6 YRS AFTER GADDAFI

The six years since the Libyan people's successful uprising to end Muammar Gaddafi's rule have seen the country divided between rival governments, various armed groups, ethnic militias, and a renegade general.

A once united rebel front has now broken into innumerable armed factions loyal to their home cities, political or religious ideology, or foreign backers.

Libya Today: From Arab Spring to failed state

The conflict has claimed the lives of thousands of fighters and civilians alike, slowed the country's economic development, and given space for groups, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) group, to establish a toehold in the country.

Regional powers, such Egypt and the UAE have become deeply involved in the country's complex conflict by backing renegade General Khalifa Haftar, and carrying out air raids against his opponents.

The country's deterioration has led many inside and out of the country to question whether the country was better off during Gaddafi's 42-year-long reign.

'Dream of return'

For one group, however, there is no hint of regret over the late leader's demise.

The self-styled "Brother Leader" left little room for dissenting political expression, and those who dared align themselves with opposition political movements risked imprisonment or death.

Spurred by the atmosphere of repression, thousands of Libyans fled the country seeking new homes in other Arab states or further afield in Europe or the US.

They included members of the Muslim Brotherhood, monarchists, and leftists.

Most spent decades in exile and expected never to see their homeland again, until the uprising of 2011, during which thousands returned to their country to join the rebel cause.

"Alhamdulillah (thank God), I got the opportunity to go and I partook in what was happening," said Belal Ballali, a British resident of Libyan origin, referring to the 2011 revolution.

Ballali and his family fled the country after his father was placed on a wanted list by the Libyan government and spent the following 32 years in exile, living between Scotland and the central English city of Birmingham.

For much of that period, Ballali did not believe the former regime's rule would ever end and thought Gaddafi would end up dying a natural death.

"We used to dream about going back to Libya and that was always high in our hopes but to think that Gaddafi would be gone in the way he went was unexpected," he said, adding his first inkling of hope came after the Arab uprisings that began in late 2010.

"To see what happened in Tunisia and in Egypt, there was obviously hope there but the reality was that due to his known brutality- he had crushed opposition in the past- I didn't think that this would ever materialise."

The dream did materialise, thanks in part to a NATO-led aerial campaign against Gaddafi forces, which saw the capital, Tripoli, fall to the rebels a little over six months after the uprising began.

Gaddafi fled to his stronghold of Sirte, but surrounded by rebels and hunted by NATO aircraft, an attempt to break out of the city in a large convoy failed with fatal consequence for the leader.

His killing was followed by a sense of optimism for Ballali but Libya's rebuilding process broke down several years after Gaddafi's death, fuelled by an abundant supply of weapons and young men without the prospect of a job due to the country's war-battered economy.

The division and the chaos didn't come directly after the death of Gaddafi or the success of the revolution...it was only when General Khalifa Haftar had his failed coup in Tripoli that he initiated the battles in Benghazi and the situation in Libya quickly began to deteriorate

Belal Ballali, former Libyan exile

"I felt relief that this could be the end of the war, that there would be no more bloodshed, and (there would be) hope, hope for the future."

The investigative researcher in his early forties said Gaddafi's death was not the direct reason for today's division and trouble in Libya and instead blamed the ambitions of renegade General Khalifa Haftar.

"The division and the chaos didn't come directly after the death of Gaddafi or the success of the revolution," he said.

"For a period of two and a half years, there was relative security given the number of guns on the street and generally speaking people were quite happy.

"It was only when General Khalifa Haftar had his failed coup in Tripoli that he initiated the battles in Benghazi and the situation in Libya quickly began to deteriorate."

'Patriotism'

Libyan diaspora communities are replete with similar stories and sentiments.

Mohamed Mukhtar's family fled Libya in 1999 during a wave of arrest by the Gaddafi regime and settled in the northern English city of Manchester.

Imbued by what he described as a feeling of patriotism and a yearning to return to his homeland a free man, he joined the rebel cause shortly after the uprising began.

Unlike Ballali, however, Mukhtar was certain a struggle to overthrow Gaddafi would eventually happen long before the 2011 revolution.

"Because I was brought up in a household that was strongly opposed to Gaddafi, we would always go to protests in London against the regime," he said, adding: "I really believed that regime had to go sooner or later, whether I was 20 years old or 50, I really wanted to be part of that.

"Libya is my eternal home, I was really moved by the oppression of my people, I wanted to achieve great goals and there is nothing greater than freeing your people."

Like Ballali, Mukhtar blamed the "greedy" ambitions of politicians and foreign meddling after the revolution for ruining the transition to democracy.

I would tell those who think it was better under Gaddafi that if they were to taste one month under the Gaddafi regime, I'm 100 percent sure they would review that claim and take the side of the revolution.

Mohamed Mukhtar, former Libyan rebel

Nevertheless, he insisted those who said Libya was better under Gaddafi had no appreciation of the scale of repression under his rule.

"I would tell those who think it was better under Gaddafi that if they were to taste one month under the Gaddafi regime, I'm 100 percent sure they would review that claim and take the side of the revolution.

"The solution [to the ongoing crisis] isn't to bring Gaddafi back, it's to remember why we had a revolution in the first place"

For Ballali, despite the pain of seeing the ongoing carnage in his country, the troubles Libya is experiencing do not nullify the necessity of removing Gaddafi and he remains a strong believer in the uprising.

"I believe the revolution was a success, however, the extraction of a bad tooth will always be painful.

"But it still has to be extracted and Gaddafi had to be extracted."

END

FRENCH ATTITUDE TOWARD LIBYA - Oct 2017

Let me explain the aims of France on Libya's oil  The NATO mission in Libya, is not new, it was commissioned by the French government of President Nicolas Sarkozy who, a few days after the outbreak of the riots, asked for an urgent meeting of the Security Council of the United Nations to take appropriate measures against the suppression of uprisings by theregime. Muammar GheddafiA diligence, for many, due to reasons dictated by mere internal calculations rather than real will to put an end to the bloody action implemented by the Rais. The upcoming elections and popularity in the drastic drop in the President, the need to broaden the oil slice across the Alps and the will to put an end to the "annoying" treaty of friendship and 2008 Italian-Libyan cooperation are some of the aims that prompted France to act in Libya. It should take a step back. Tensions between the colonel and Paris are long-standing, just remember the contrasts in the long war of Chad, continued in the eighties and culminated in the attack of 1989 against the DC 10 of the French company Uta, exploded in the skies over Niger, killing 170 people.

The arrival of Sarkozy at the Elysee seemed to herald a new phase opening with the countries of the Southern Mediterranean and also with Libya. Emblematic of the role played by the French president, and then-wife Cecilia, for the release of five Bulgarian nurses sentenced first to death and then to life imprisonment on charges of infecting 400 children with the HIV virus at the hospital El -Fathi Benghazi. The nurses after eight years in captivity, were released in July 2007 thanks to the mediation of the Elysee couple who had visited Libya several times to talk to Gaddafi and his beloved daughter Aisha. The game was won by France against Romano Prodi who had spent to seek a diplomatic solution "to the incident". A few months after Gaddafi had planted, including thousands of controversy, its Berber tent in front of the Elysee, signing contracts worth over $ 10 billion that would have allowed France to sell an entire fleet fighter, manufactured by French aeronautics giant Dassault and a mega investment to build nuclear power plants in Tripoli and surroundings. In the wake of mended relations between France and Gaddafi Paribas had acquired at the end of 2010, 19% of the Sahara Libyan Bank, a rise of the BNP Paribas French subsidiary's capital in Libya equal to 146% of the previous funds available and guaranteeing transactions. On the other hand, there is little to be surprised. France sells arms to Gaddafi since the seventies, as indeed many other countries, including Italy.

In January of 1970 Paris signed a contract with the Tripoli government for the provision of a mirage jets. It was the beginning of a fruitful relationship, with ups and downs, has gone on for many years. However, there were still clutches. Libya did not give up intervening in African disputes, often in anti-french key, from the conflict in Sierra Leone until the conciliation interventions in Darfur, Kenya, Niger and Mali. Despite diplomatic efforts, the Rais had refused to enter the great French Union for the Mediterranean, considered a form of new colonialism. Not only that, the Libyan leader had not honored the agreements of 2007, preferring to respect the Italy-Libya treaty, by which pocketed annual checks for $ 250 million to spend on infrastructure, for the benefit of Italian companies.

Yet Sarkozy had tried everything, even involving the UAE, willing to train Libyan pilots for the French aircraft Rafale and co-fund the operation of renewing its fleet with the already mentioned Dassault.

There would be, then, the issue of pan-African currency. In one of the emails sent to Hillary Clinton, and published by the US State Department on December 31, 2015, the official Sidney Blumenthal revealed, among other things, that Gaddafi wanted to replace the CFA franc, which is used in 14 former colonies, with a ' other coin pan-African initiative that would have risked creating economic independence of North Africa with the new currency. Another possible reason French interventionism emerge years after the death of Nasser. On March 6, 2015, the former interior minister, Claude Gueant, one of the closest collaborators of Nicolas Sarkozy, was placed in custody as part of investigations into the alleged financing of presidential campaign that brought Gaddafi to "Sarko" all 'Eliseo in 2007. Perhaps this is why the colonel, Become aware stabbed in the back, in an interview with Fausto Biloslavo in Il Giornale few months before he was killed, he said: "I think Sarkozy has a problem of mental disorder. He said the things that can pop out only by a madman. " Finally, to have given further impetus French intervention in Libya was probably the desire of France to strengthen its political influence in the region, promoting the image of a country not in collusion with the old autocrats, but ready to invest in demands for freedom and democracy of the people "on the southern shore."

On the other hand Paris had lost little time in Egypt and Tunisia, the lintels of their diplomatic strategy. What better occasion of Libya to recover credit in the Mediterranean on the boil? Maybe it should not venture too in other conjectures, but in any case, the examples could continue. This is enough, however, to understand French motives. The proof is that already on April 13, 2011 (ie before the death of Gaddafi) Sarkozy had received secretly General of the NTC, Fatah Younis - killed in Benghazi in still unclear circumstances in July 2011 - probably to discuss guarantees for future energy contracts. Conti at hand is much simpler: before hostilities began producing oil in Libya amounted to almost a million and 600,000 barrels a day, about 2% of world production. Of these about 52% was in the hands of 35 international companies, led by Italy's Eni, which in 2010 had excelled, with its 267,000 barrels per day, on Germany's Wintershall and Total, the French firm, respectively, to 79,000 and 55,000 barrels per day. Not surprisingly, Nicolas Sarkozy, after backing the NTC valiantly in the war of "liberation" of Libya, will be presented soon to ask for the bill under the watchful eye of the managing director of the Total group, Christophe de Margerie. Then the French newspaper Libération even talked of an agreement signed by the spokesman of the NTC, Mahmoud Shammam, ready to grant to France on 35% of the new Libyan oil contracts. News then denied by the parties, but at the very least insinuated a doubt.

The rest is recent history. After years of waiting guilty even Hollande's France decided to join the UN plan for the national accord government headed by Fayez al-Sarraj. Again, though, it is difficult to find in the intervention Elysée some consistency, unless you want to interpret in an optical mere national interest. France, with the classic, natural balancing act, at the UN had its willingness to support the Gna, but in the meantime continued to support Haftar and its regional sponsors.

It is the daily Le Monde to unravel the mystery in February 2015, revealing the existence of French special forces stationed in the base of Benina, near Benghazi, in support of the general Cyrenaica in actions against the Islamic State and other militias Islamists loyal to Tripoli. On the other hand the rapid Haftar army advanced towards Benghazi would not take place except with large external aid of the French (and English), but also Egypt's al-Sisi and at least the Saudis and UAE that in addition to providing weapons, they acted as guarantors on Egyptian payments. It outlined so more and more clearly the role of the French in the axis east of the Libyan conflict: the transalpine weapons, the Egyptian pivot, militias Haftar and guarantees of the Gulf. We could say "chapeau" flourishing business if these were not born on the ashes of collective agreements: UN that France had endorsed.

It now remains to ask the reasons for such diligence. Again just follow the oil route. The goal of the French is to gain access to oil reserves of Cyrenaica, resuming mining activities, widening the radius of those exploration started in 2011 after the fall of Gaddafi, maybe watching a little 'further towards the Sirte basin is full of resources. This is where, in the silence of the desert and away from prying eyes, French companies, as well as American, British, German and Spanish are investing large sums in exploration activities in Brega areas in the Gulf of Sirte, where they would present many British companies, Zillah, which sees a strong French activities, as well as Beida in Cyrenaica and Kufra, just to name a few. Sometimes things are much simpler than you think.

The fragile hope of a new peace process in Libya

   

on 5 October there was a terrorist attack claimed by the Islamic State group in Misurata, Libya. At least four people were killed in the city court, while there was an ongoing process. In a statement taken by the agency of jihadist propaganda Amaq the terrorist group said they wanted to hit "one of the strongholds" of the government of the Libyan National Unity recognized by the international community, led by what the Fayez Serraj.

It was long known that the terrorist group does not put a sign in attacks in the Libyan city. Misrata has been the target of a series of attacks in 2015, and in 2016 it was feared that he might be under attack again after a coalition of militias original city (under the protection of the government of Tripoli) It has fought for six months against the Is to regain control of Sirte.

Second military sources,the terrorist group is reorganizing to Libya in three areas: south of Sirte, Cyrenaica around the oasis of Kufra, near the Egyptian border and in the Fezzan. "The Islamic State group can not control the territory, but there are sleeper cells in major Libyan cities," explains Mattia Toaldo European council on foreign relations.

   

For this the end of September US drone, took off from bases in Sicily, some bombed positions of the terrorist group. Without a credible peace project, however, the country seems destined to remain in chaos, torn between dozens of troops and at least two power groups.

The UN's proposal

On 20 September Ghassan Salamé that August is the UN envoy to Libya, presented a new plan for peace in the country, ahead of the end of the mandate of the Serraj Fayez to lead the national unity government, which expires in December of 2017. According Salamé "Libyans want a peace process led by themselves "and for that you need to change the political agreement signed in Skhirat, Morocco, December 17, 2015, to overcome the rivalry between the parliament and the Tripoli to Tobruk (installed in the east).

Libya is in chaos since 2011, after the revolt that led to the fall of Colonel Muammar Gheddafi and the armed intervention of NATO. In the village there are two governments and the two parliaments and dozens of militias vying for control of the territory and its resources. The United Nations has recognized and supported the government in Tripoli, headed by Fayez to Serraj, which has sought to extend its authority, without much success. The legitimacy of the government of Al Serraj is contested primarily by General Khalifa Haftar, head of the Libyan National Army, which claims the parliament in Tobruk, in Cyrenaica, and is expanding its influence in the country with the help of Egypt, United Arab States and Russia (and some good will on the part of France).

As a first step to start the peace process, Salamé wants to convene a table of negotiations in Tunis to draft a Libyan 2015. Amend Later the secretary general of the United Nations may convene a national peace conference put around a table the different Libyan groups that have been excluded or underrepresented in previous peace talks. The goal is to reconnect parliamentarians and political groups excluded from the earlier peace agreement and agree a common approach and deadlines leading to a constitutional referendum and new parliamentary and presidential elections. But doubts about the effectiveness and feasibility of this plan are numerous.

The role of Haftar

The Salamé plan is better than those of the past, believes Mattia Toaldo European council on foreign relations, because it "combines the negotiations between parliamentarians with a national conference, as he called himself, that it should involve civil society and the forces that have so far been marginalized in Libya ". Not all forces are in fact represented in parliament, starting with those who supported the former Gaddafi regime, but still continue to play a fundamental role in the conflict.

The Salamé challenge is not so much in Libya, where there is a strong desire for dialogue and peace, but in the other countries of North Africa and the Middle East participating in the negotiations. "One of the problems is Egypt, who may want to call into question the agreement expiring on December 17 and start from scratch. At that point the government Europe could be recognized by several Arab countries in addition to Egypt, as the UAE, "says Toaldo.

   

It is not very clear what is going to Sabrata

   

The plan presents several critical points: the interest of the parliamentarians of Cyrenaica who want to maintain the status quo, the December deadline that could be used by Egypt to promote the Cyrenaica, and finally agreements at negotiated at the regional level as well as national, because all countries in the conflict will want to participate in the peace talks. Finally what it's going on in recent weeks Sabrata "does not bode well" on the national peace plan, according Toaldo. Sabratha, a town seventy kilometers from Tripoli, is one of the main ports of departure of direct migrant boats in Europe and one of the human trafficking centers on the coast: in recent weeks the city has been the scene of fighting several intense intergroup armed its rivals for control of traffic of people.

"It is not very clear what is going to Sabrata: some sources claim that armed groups close to the general Haftar are fighting against the militia of Dabbashi clans, who control most of the town and the traffic in human beings", because they want to in jeopardy the Italian intelligence agreements, unveiled by some journalistic investigations,to stop the departures of migrants, says Toaldo. But this version does not seem entirely convincing: "Sabrata is traditionally very hostile to Haftar and it seems hard so that the General can extend its influence in the city and nothing can guarantee to foreign partners. It could just deal of fighting between rival militias (as Operation  room) that were cut off by the agreement with the Italians on migrants. "

What you should worry more, adds Toaldo, is the growing influence of Salafis in Sabratha and across Libya. "The Salafists have 28 radio stations throughout Libya, are conquering one by one all the mosques of Tripoli, are very important in the Haftar power structure and are also present in Sirte," explains Toaldo. "What is their plan for the future of Libya and those who finance them is not clear, however, I doubt that they are interested in cooperating to establish a liberal democracy," concludes Toaldo.