ANALYSIS & ADVISES BY GROUP OF ITALIAN RESIDENTS IN LIBYA - 14.1.2015 YES, PUBLISHED 2 YEARS AGO!!

ANALYSIS AND ADVISES BY A GROUP OF ITALIAN RESIDENTS IN LIBYA - 14.1.2015 YES, PUBLISHED 2 YEARS AGO!!

Despite the flood of news and images that reach us daily, reality on the ground remains little intelligible.
We know a society accustomed for centuries to survive in a paternalistic management of public affairs and that, accustomed for decades to depend on government handouts, is not inclined to get involved in the violence of which is for the most part of it.

We know also multiplicity of local actors and external sponsors competing for power management and energy resources of the country; a sort of conflict between gangs out of control and continually fluctuating alliances according to the interests of a party.

But we do not know today in Libya who really represents who. Therefore we cannot identify the interlocutors reliable enough. Daesh (Islamic State) has its deadly communication strategy but in fact it is quite clear its texture, its real military capacity, its international links, its local roots and its grip on the Libyan society.

We do not know whether this phenomenon is new or it is not a mutation of an Islamist fringe object of repression since Gaddafi time.
Given these conditions sending military forces in Libya is impossible, both for purposes of maintaining a peace, which is not even basically outlined, and interposing between among patchy warring sides.

Simply lack the space, not only negotiating but mostly operational, to include an external presence for national reconciliation govt and the rebuild of state structures.

The fact that the situation in Libya is so complicated as to require weighting in decisions and patiently waiting for changes, clarifying the existing framework, does not mean that Italy at the moment cannot do anything. Quite the contrary.

First Italy must exert greater assertiveness in all the "boring" multilateral international: the UN in the first place, but also NATO and the EU. At UN must continue, and increase, Italy's support to the efforts of Leon for the start of a dialogue between all (?) warring parties in Libya.

Then Italy must demand inclusiveness to all actors i.e.:

• warring factions and militias representatives -none excluded-
• institutions officials
• khabilas chiefs
• municipalities
• all significant and influential exponents of civil society
• In this exercise of dialogue and peace should be involved also the leadership of Senussiyya and its exponents accredited to the Libyan society.

Italy must act for an urgent resolution aimed at reduce greatly any support to militias through embargoes designed to exclude any possible external support.

This should include, among other surveillance on hydrocarbon exports, financial reserves (foreign ones included) as well as related cash flows.

The fight against international terrorism should be a catalyst to reach consensus within the Security Council and should allow the renewals of those relationships which have been compromised by the implementation of Resolution 1973 (which led to armed intervention in Libya in 2011) .
At NATO it appears necessary to invoke by Italy at the earliest Article IV of the Treaty.

Under this article each Ally, which feels under threat, may refer the situation to the agenda of the Atlantic Council for the definition of a common policy.

There is no doubt that Libya chaos reverberates negatively both on our country security and on Alliance.  southern flank.

Finally, in EU Italy must act to overcome the minimalist vision that inspired "Triton". It must be a broader political design leading to an authentic European sharing of burdens and responsibilities in the management of migration flows, which is clearly a phenomenon are not certain contingent and of short duration.
Similar assertiveness should be exercised by Italy in bilateral relations with all stakeholders and external sponsors to Libya, which may have some influence on the warring factions.

It is not necessary to stop the political and diplomatic work done by Italy so far on the ground in Libya.

The common history, the fact of being the last one to close diplomatic and most of Italian interests in that country followed through a network of contacts and connections which must be carefully maintained and cultivated by all means available: intelligence to "suasion" economic, to renew the social fabric of this country.
The increased assertiveness of Italy, to be effective, however, must be accompanied by an absolute linearity in foreign policy that avoids the false notes and dissonances that have recently been highlighted. Such a policy must then be supported by a broad bi-partisan support of political forces in parliament. The ultimate goal for Italy at last to be a UN resolution that allows, when conditions will allow, the entry of an international force in Libya to support reconstituted Libyan institutions. This force shall in no case have a Western and, even less, Italian characterization.

Western support and the Italian course will be needed but should be provided respecting the Arab and African connotation that this force should have.
Acting otherwise would raise old anti-colonial sentiments, never dormant, with the effect sure to compact the warring factions, not towards objectives of national reconstruction, but against the West and Italy in particular.

ANALISI E CONSIGLI DA PARTE DI UN GRUPPO DI ITALIANI RESIDENTI IN LIBIA – 14.1.2015  SI', PROPRIO 2 ANNI FA'
Nonostante il profluvio di notizie e di immagini che ci giungono quotidianamente la realtà sul terreno rimane poco intellegibile.
Conosciamo una società assuefatta da secoli a sopravvivere in una gestione paternalistica della cosa pubblica e che, abituata da decenni a dipendere da elargizioni governative, è poco incline a lasciarsi coinvolgere nelle violenze delle quali non è per la maggior parte partecipe. Sappiamo ancora di una molteplicità di attori locali e sponsor esterni in competizione tra loro per la gestione del potere e delle risorse energetiche del Paese; una sorta di conflitto fra bande fuori controllo e continuamente oscillanti nelle alleanze a seconda degli interessi di parte.
Ma non sappiamo oggi in Libia chi veramente rappresenta chi. Di conseguenza non riusciamo ad individuare degli interlocutori affidabili abbastanza. Dell’autoproclamato Stato Islamico conosciamo la sua micidiale strategia comunicativa ma in realtà non ci è chiara la sua consistenza, la sua reale capacità militare, i suoi collegamenti internazionali, il suo radicamento sul territorio e la sua presa sulla società libica. Non conosciamo quanto questo fenomeno sia nuovo e quanto non sia invece una mutazione di sempiterne frange islamiste oggetto di repressione già dai tempi di Gheddafi.
In queste condizioni l’invio di forze militari in Libia risulta improponibile, sia per scopi di mantenimento di una pace che non è nemmeno tendenzialmente delineata sia di interposizione fra schieramenti a macchia di leopardo.
Semplicemente mancano gli spazi, non soltanto negoziali ma soprattutto operativi, per inserirvi una presenza esterna per una riconciliazione nazionale e per ricostruire le strutture statali. Il fatto che la situazione in Libia sia così complicata da richiedere ponderazione nelle decisioni e pazienza in attesa di evoluzioni chiarificatrici del quadro esistente non implica che l’Italia al momento non possa fare nulla. Tutt’altro.
Innanzitutto deve esercitare una maggiore assertività in tutti i “fora” multilaterali internazionali: l’ONU in primis, ma anche la NATO e la EU. A livello ONU deve continuare, e semmai aumentare, il sostegno dell’Italia allo sforzo di Leon per l’avvio di un dialogo fra tutte (?) le parti in lotta in Libia. Come corrispettivo deve essere pretesa (?) l’inclusività a tutti gli attori: dai rappresentanti delle fazioni in lotta -nessuno escluso- ai rappresentanti delle istituzioni, dalle municipalità fino agli esponenti più significativi e più influenti della società civile libica. In questo esercizio di dialogo e di pacificazione dovranno essere coinvolti anche la dirigenza della Senussiya e i suoi esponenti più accreditati presso la società libica.
Sempre in ambito ONU, l’Italia deve agire per una risoluzione urgente volta ad anemizzare il sostegno alle fazioni in lotta mediante embarghi mirati a escludere ogni possibile supporto esterno. Questa deve prevedere fra l’altro la sorveglianza sulle esportazioni di idrocarburi, il controllo delle riserve finanziare giacenti all’estero nonché i relativi flussi finanziari. La lotta al terrorismo internazionale dovrebbe fungere da catalizzatore per raggiungere il consenso in ambito del Consiglio di sicurezza e dovrebbe consentire di riannodare quei rapporti che sono stati compromessi con l’attuazione della risoluzione 1973 (che ha consentito l’intervento armato in Libia nel 2011).
A livello NATO appare necessario invocare quanto prima da parte dell’Italia l’articolo IV del trattato. Ai sensi di questo articolo ogni Alleato che si sente sottoposto a minaccia può sottoporre la situazione all’ordine del giorno del Consiglio Atlantico per la definizione di una politica comune. Non vi è dubbio infatti che il caos libico può riverberarsi negativamente sulla sicurezza del nostro paese e del fianco sud dell’Alleanza. Infine a livello europeo l’Italia deve agire per superare la visione minimalista che ha ispirato “Triton”. Occorre infatti un disegno politico di più ampia portata che porti ad una autentica condivisione europea di oneri e responsabilità nella gestione dei flussi migratori, che con tutta evidenza sono un fenomeno non certo contingente e di breve durata.
Analoga assertività deve essere esercitata dall’Italia nei rapporti bilaterali con tutti gli attori e sponsor esterni alla Libia, che possono avere una qualche influenza sulle fazioni in lotta. Con tutte le cautele del caso è necessario infine non interrompere il lavoro politico e diplomatico sin qui svolto sul terreno libico dall’Italia. La storia comune, il fatto di essere stata l’ultima rappresentanza diplomatica a chiudere e gli interessi italiani tuttora presidiati in quel paese testimoniano una rete di contatti e di collegamenti che devono essere mantenuti e coltivati con tutti i mezzi disponibili: dall’intelligence fino alla “suasion” economica, per riannodare il tessuto sociale di quel paese.
La maggiore assertività dell’Italia, per essere efficace, deve però essere accompagnata da una assoluta linearità nella politica estera che eviti le stonature e le dissonanze che recentemente si sono evidenziate. Una siffatta politica deve poi essere sostenuta da un largo supporto bi-partisan delle forze politiche presenti in parlamento. L’obiettivo finale per l’Italia infine dovrà essere una risoluzione ONU che consenta, quando le condizioni lo renderanno possibile, l’ingresso in Libia di una forza internazionale di sostegno alle ricostituite istituzioni libiche. Tale forza in nessun caso dovrà avere una caratterizzazione occidentale e tantomeno italiana. Il sostegno occidentale e quello italiano ovviamente saranno necessari ma dovranno essere forniti rispettando la connotazione fondamentalmente araba e africana che questa forza dovrà avere.
Agendo altrimenti si susciterebbero antichi sentimenti anticolonialisti, mai sopiti, con l’effetto sicuro di compattare le fazioni in lotta, non verso obiettivi di ricostruzione nazionale, ma contro l’occidente e l’Italia in particolare.

LIBYA AND TRUMP

Surprising as it may be stateside, U.S. President-elect Donald Trump is wildly popular in Libya. Since 2014, the civil war in Libya has been in a stalemate as rival factions, including the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli and the House of Representatives in Tobruk, each backed by an assortment of militias, fight for control. 

In 2015, things looked particularly dire in Libya; some cities have fallen entirely under jihadi control and most of the country’s oil terminals had been taken offline. But since mid-2016, there have been some positive developments too: Libya’s oil production is rebounding and the Islamic State (ISIS) has been evicted from Sirte, which was its largest patch of territory outside of Iraq and Syria. But the political roadblocks to reconciliation remain. A new war is brewing in Libya’s south and the GNA is on the verge of collapse. On January 2, its deputy prime minister, Musa al-Koni, resigned live on Libyan television. The next day, the Libyan National Army (LNA), which is aligned with the House of Representatives in Tobruk, bombed a civilian aircraft in Jufra airbase that was transporting senior officers from Misrata, which is home to militias that support the UN-backed government. This is a dangerous escalation and is likely to prompt extensive counterattacks.

The moment is truly ripe for alternative mediation efforts—outside of the existing UN framework. For the last few months, the LNA and forces aligned with it have finally gained control of the oil fields, pipelines, and terminals, which are needed for Libya to pump its way to something approaching financial solvency. These developments are wildly popular even among Libyans opposed to the LNA and the House of Representatives. Faced with an east consolidating around the LNA, the western factions, including the Misratans, have an incentive to come to the table now before their position degrades further. The LNA, on the other hand, can now pump oil via its behind-the-scenes deal with the National Oil Corporation and thus, has limited incentive to push a bloody fight for Tripoli if negotiations are a possibility. Trump should seize the opportunity as he has the potential to shift the dynamic in previously unimaginable ways. 

At least initially, Trump will find it fairly easy to engage a wide range of local actors. Supporters of Libya’s most powerful military figure, Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar—who heads the LNA and is backed by both Russia and Egypt—believe that Trump will favor them as part of his new administration’s geostrategic realignment toward Russia. Conversely, opponents of Haftar, who are tired of the stagnant negotiations with the UN-backed unity government, believe that Trump may breathe fresh life into the talks or else pursue more effective alternatives to building a functioning government, eradicate what remains of ISIS, and find new ways to jumpstart the Libyan economy.

In short, at least on the Libyan streets, Trump comes into office far more popular than a President-elect Hillary Clinton would have been. The former secretary of state’s emissaries are associated with the status quo and with the Misratan faction. Furthermore, few areas of the world were more neglected during President Barack Obama’s second term than Libya. Yes, Washington was instrumental in coordinating the airstrikes that ousted ISIS from its stronghold in Sirte. But the United States has failed to exert leadership over the political and economic aspects of Libya’s transition.

There is good reason for the Trump administration to pay attention to Libya sooner rather than later, as the conflict is evolving in ways that threaten U.S. interests. Neighboring states such as Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia, are facing contagion from Libya’s ongoing civil war, increasing the chance that what remains of ISIS’ faction in Libya will flee and entrench itself elsewhere in the Maghreb. Russia is providing ever more political support to Haftar and could easily outflank Western policymakers by recognizing him and his allies in the House of Representatives as Libya’s legitimate government. This could create another frozen conflict or else end with a Russian-backed regime over all of Libya. Although Trump appears capable of making a broad geostrategic deal with Russia, there is no reason to think he wants to give Moscow more leverage before such a deal is made.

But Washington still has leverage—if it chooses to use it. Only the United States can offer full entry into the global economy and give international legitimacy to the various Libyan factions. Russia and its ally, Egypt, would only generate dependency and further marginalization.

WHAT WASHINGTON CAN DO

The United States currently recognizes the GNA as the only legitimate government of Libya. Unfortunately, the GNA governs nothing in Libya. Its writ does not even extend to Tripoli, where it is currently situated. It is entirely dependent upon militias to provide its security. Hence, it cannot govern without favoring their interests.

Proposals to prop up this pseudo-government with a foreign armed and trained presidential guard will only add another uncontrollable militia to the mix. Instead, the Trump administration should acknowledge that no faction, including the GNA, has a unique claim to political legitimacy in Libya. Haftar’s LNA and the opposing forces from the city of Misrata comprise the two most powerful blocs. At present, Haftar is consolidating power in the east and south of the country. Although Misratan hegemony over the west is weakening, it remains unlikely that Haftar’s forces can overpower Misrata and the allied militias anytime soon. If developments are left to follow their course, a de facto separation appears likely to calcify. A negotiated power-sharing solution among the militias, rather than the powerless politicians of the GNA or any other pseudo government must be forged from the bottom up.

The United States is vital to such a settlement. It could offer access to international oil markets for Libyan crude and international recognition for any true unity government. It could also hold out the promise of aid for reconstructing the war-torn neighborhoods of communities that join the new order. This cannot happen, however, as long as Washington insists on the GNA as the sole legitimate government to the exclusion of Haftar and others. The rump General National Congress, an interim governing body whose mandate ended in 2014 but continues to assert its legitimacy, and the House of Representatives should be ignored in favor of direct engagement with Haftar’s representatives and moderate Misratan leaders. In Libya, it is the militia leaders, not the politicians, who rule the roost.

And these real military stakeholders are eager to be invited to international conferences. When asked, they have come to Tunis or Geneva to meet with UN officials. They frequently go to Abu Dhabi, Doha, and Moscow to meet their current political patrons. The United States should now engage with them directly. Further, moderate Misratan leaders have shown that they are willing to work with the United States to achieve mutual aims. Washington should ensure that the Misratans, for one, are rewarded for the instrumental part their fighters played in defeating ISIS in Sirte by making sure that their control over their local affairs is not threatened.

The West could also help craft a proposal for political decentralization, since all factions see the current conflict as a zero-sum competition for absolute power in Libya. Devolving most authority to cities (not regions, which has been tried and has failed) along with oil revenue—prorated based on population size—would ease the competition for control of Tripoli. Although it is true that some municipalities are themselves divided, several local conflicts is better than one national conflict or three regional ones. Also, decentralization will help Libyans build local governance capacity—something sorely needed if the country is to rebound economically.

Trump’s signature policy towards Libya should be the appointment of a presidential envoy—akin to the Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS, a position currently held by Brett McGurk. Only a presidential envoy can make the United States primus inter pares among Western nations in setting and coordinating policy towards Libya. Up to and until now, the British, French, Italians, and the UN have all exercised leadership in some capacity when it comes to Libya. Washington has only taken control when it comes to airstrikes and counterterror policy. It was a bit player in the negotiations to broker a unity government or to deal with postwar reconstruction. This muddled leadership has led to poorly coordinated and incoherent policy. If the United States wants to end the civil war Libya, it must no longer lead from behind. It must actually lead

WAS GADAFI NOT SO BAD?

The death of Libya

The conflict in Libya is far from over and its consequences do not seem to be limited simply to Libya. Indeed, the night of Sunday 2016, a Turkish cargo from Spain was attacked repeatedly from the Libyan coast, off the port of Tobruk. This attack, which caused the death of a Turkish sailor but also the wrath of Turkey is not an isolated case. Indeed, in January 2015, a Greek tanker was attacked by a Libyan warplane killing two . In addition to this, Libya has become a hotbed of Islamic terrorism receiving fighters from terrorist groups based in Syria and Iraq. All these events are symbolic of the total disintegration of the Libyan state. 
October 20, 2011, Gaddafi was captured alive and then shot dead by members of the rebellion that started in February of the same year. Since then, Libya has descended into chaos. Gaddafi's Libya was obviously not a model of democracy or respect for human rights but the "Revolutionary Guide" has allowed Libya to maintain consistency despite its tribal character and eventful history.
THE END OF THE "SYSTEM Gaddafi" ... 
Gaddafi that reads its Green Paper in which he details his vision of democracy & politics Gaddafi had managed to establish a precarious balance in Libya by a mixture of coercion, redistribution of wealth from oil, clientelism but also through agreements and alliances with most of the Libyan tribes. This is what is called the "Covenant of the Green Paper" .
The tribes played an extremely important role in the Gaddafi regime. Indeed, membership in a tribe could help achieve very favorable social positions. Indeed, Gaddafi had managed to set up a social ladder according to the tribe of belonging. Former Libyan head of state was thus able to control the tribal system by developing alliances games and a wealth redistribution network to consolidate its power. Gaddafi had therefore succeeded in establishing an alliance network built around his own person, but not a real state. In addition, Gaddafi has used a highly developed and brutal repressive apparatus. This unit, composed of the armed branches of some tribes, has benefited from significant capital investment from the regime, allowing it to survive for forty-two years of the "reign" of Gaddafi.
However, the gradual erosion of political, authoritarian but redistributor ended the Gaddafi regime. For if in the 1970s and 1980s, progress has benefited the entire Libyan population in terms of infrastructure but also social aid, the following two decades have seen a slow deterioration of the redistribution system. Thus, Gaddafi's Libya was unable to resist changes in oil prices, the near absence of economic take-off at too undiversified economy, embargoes and waste of resources at too ambitious foreign policy. Finally, the 2008 economic crisis and rising raw material prices during the same period have worsened the situation.
All these elements have led a revival of the tribes. In 2008, several tribes battled them already threatening the unity of the Libyan state. But in 2011, with the Tunisian and Egyptian revolts, tribes regained their original function and some of them were opposed to Gaddafi. So there has been a "retribalisation" of Libyan society.
... A GOOD THING OR A BAD?  Power struggles in Libya
The result of this revolution does not seem to be really positive for Libya. Since the fall of the Libyan leader, the country was crossed by numerous separatism waves. To the east of the country, Cyrenaica region, a federalist movement had emerged quickly after the end of the revolution. To the west, the Berber tribes claimed the recognition of their identity while in the south of the country, the Tuareg and Toubou have also had separatist tendencies.
A real civil war has settled since the end of the Libyan revolution. Indeed, many of the militias "thuwar" (revolutionaries) have benefited from the institutional vacuum left by the fall of the Gaddafi regime. These "heroes of the Libyan revolution" have therefore taken the place of a missing police and army, and control strategic buildings and districts within major Libyan cities, but also some important oil sites.
Finally, the Libyan government appears to have given way to a struggle between various militias, tribes and two self-proclaimed governments. The first, based in Tobruk in the east, the government said "official" as recognized by the international community, and is supported by the army. The second is not recognized by the international community and is based in Tripoli in the west. It is especially supported by the Islamist militia coalition Fajr Libya.
Ultimately, it is clear that Muammar Gaddafi was a dictator disrespectful of human rights. However, the current situation in Libya leads us to wonder about the effects of Western intervention in 2011 . Indeed, if this was necessary to prevent potential massacres of civilians, it is legitimate to question the merits of the decision to slaughter Gaddafi and neglect the reconstruction of Libyan society after the end of the intervention military. Especially since Europe is the first to be hit by the collapse of the Libyan state which has become a hub for illegal immigration  but also of international terrorism.

IN 6TH YEAR SINCE NATO INTERVENTN . . .

Libya currently has no single, central government, there is no security, oil revenues have halved, and weapons flow out of the country.        In the 6th year since the NATO-led intervention in Libya resulted in the toppling of long-time leader Moammar Gadhafi, the North African country has descended into a noticeably worse position amid political chaos and a growing extremist threat.

                                       

ANALYSIS:                                       

Libya currently has no single government or central authority which controls the whole nation, there is no security, oil revenues are about 1/3, and weapons flow out of the country. Libya is torn apart by a civil war between rival militias which has been raging since 2014, after the internationally-recognized government relocated to Tobruk in the east, with General Khalifa Haftar as top commander of the armed forces, and Libya Dawn – an Islamist-dominated coalition - set up a rival government, known as the new General National Congress (GNC) in Tripoli.

                                       

By the end of February, hopes for peace vanished again after members of the parliament in Tobruk were reportedly "prevented" from voting on the make-up of a new unity government under a U.N.-backed plan aimed at bringing together Libya’s warring factions, which they said they supported. Since it was signed by some elements of the two opposing groups on Dec. 17, 2015, in Morocco, the U.N. plan has been opposed by hard-liners on both sides and suffered repeated delays.

                                       

Not even the logic of a power-sharing agreement has worked, said Dr. Khaled Hanafy Aly, a researcher in African affairs at Al-Ahram Center, referring to the peace deal that followed other U.N.-mediated efforts at creating a Government of National Agreement (GNA).

                                       

According to Karim Mezran, there are a few thousand militias fighting each other, each linked with some political attache. "Fragmentation" is the first word that comes into his mind to define the situation in Libya. The senior fellow described the country’s political outlook by first noting that in the east, while the majority within the parliament backs the U.N. accord, other lawmakers alongside powerful army chief General Haftar oppose the deal.

                                       

"A large number of parliamentarians in Tobruk would be happy to have the unity cabinet, but Gen. Haftar keeps pushing for a military solution, not a political one," said Mezran, who is also professor at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. "Haftar and his allies are the strongest voices, and they’re the ones who can spoil the agreement," he added.

                                       

In the west, the head and members of the rival Tripoli-based GNC also oppose the deal. Its affiliated government, led by Prime Minister Khalifa al-Ghweil, has no intention of relinquishing power to the new GNA, as the Middle East fellow hinted.

                                       

To add to this, a third government led by Faiz Siraj hangs over the two rival administrations, which has the backing of Western powers. However, it is not recognized by any of the major powers inside Libya, and the international community looks paralyzed on what to do.

"The problem is not only the multiplicity of governments but the impasse in which conflicting interests make the existence of a central government difficult," Dr. Ali stated.

                                       

In the midst is the Islamic State group, which has capitalized on the power and security vacuum to set a foothold in Libya by establishing its presence around the central coastal city of Sirte, hometown of former Libyan leader Gadhafi. The extremist group has briefly seized territory in Sabratha, between Tripoli and the Tunisian border, and threatens to destroy what’s left of the country.

                                       

For Ali, the Islamic State group merely feeds on the east-west divisions without which it would be doomed to failure. He believes social and tribal grievances on the ground need to be addressed properly in order to prevent and stop affiliation of local militants with the group.

                                       

Yet, with media reports giving inflated numbers of Libyan fighters who have fallen to Islamic State group ranks, joined by foreign jihadists coming from Tunisia, Egypt, Somalia, Sudan and elsewhere, the group’s strength in Libya has been somewhat overestimated.

                                       

In Mezran’s view, the Islamic State group threatens more that territorial gain; it intends to completely destabilize Africa’s oil rich state. "It’s by no means territorial expansion in Libya," he argued. "ISIS’ (Islamic State Group) strategy there is to have a base where from it launches sporadic attacks to hit oil fields and Libyan cities like Tripoli and Benghazi."

                                       

The professor specified that the Islamic State group aims to destroy, not conquer, Libya’s oil facilities so as to prevent any possibility for a recognized government to draw from the oil industry, the key pillar of Libya’s economy, as well as reconstitute a state army and rebuild the country.

                                       

Libya’s oil production has collapsed to around 30 percent of its 2011 level. The country is at its most critical juncture since the overthrow of the Gadhafi regime with Central Bank reserves dwindling. Caught in the instability, the average Libyan has to put up with increased prices, lengthy fuel and power cuts and medicine shortages.

                                       

Libya is largely a quasi-failed state. "It’s not one big mess, it’s a whole set of many messes," Rafik Hariri Center observed. "There are institutions functioning in certain areas, then it’s total anarchy in other parts of the country."

                                       

Libya has also turned into a battleground for foreign powers, with Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, the UAE, giving open military backing to Haftar’s armed forces while Turkey, Qatar and Sudan are believed to have helped arm the Libya Dawn forces in Misrata.

                                       

For their part, Western governments, namely the U.S., Germany, the U.K., France and Italy have been considering direct military intervention against the Islamic State group in Libya. The new unity government, which Washington and its European allies are pushing to ratify, would effectively have the authority to call in international support, paving the way for a new NATO-led military intervention in Libya under the pretext of combating the Islamic State group.                          "The West bears responsibility for today’s Libyan crisis," the Al-Ahram Center researcher pointed out. "Failing to secure the country after Gadhafi’s death and disarm militias has turned Libya into a lawless state."

                                       

Dr. Ali maintained that Libya today poses a threat to regional security. In his opinion, nonetheless, another foreign intervention will attract many risks for two main reasons. The Libyan elite does not seem keen on inviting foreign military forces. Second, an international operation may create more problems than intended and could lead to an even more complex scenario.

                                       

Mezran thinks the Libyan crisis needs to be resolved before fighting the Islamic State group, which, he feels, should not be overblown as "the issue." "If [the] Western approach is just to hit ISIS (Islamic State Group) and forget what goes on in Libya, they’re trying to kill an octopus," the senior researcher noted.

                                       

Five years after the NATO intervention in Libya, which created a genuine disaster, another intervention is being prepared against the North African state. Whether that will materialize or not, failure to achieve political unity with an inclusive, participatory approach, could risk turning Libya into a failed state in future.