Since Colonel Gaddafi’s fall from power four years ago, Libya’s
political situation has been deeply unstable. What started as a
fragmented movement to remove Gaddafi from power has developed into a
civil war where no group holds a monopoly on power.
With no central authority to manage even the basic functions of government for Libya, dealing with hundreds of thousands of migrants is bound to be a difficult task.
‘Large parts of the country remain ungoverned, or under the control of local militias or criminal gangs – this is particularly the case in the vast Southern regions,’ says Ethan Chorin, a former diplomat who has written two books on Libya.
For the moment, the country is divided between east and west. Legal governing legitimacy belongs to the House of Representatives (HOR), now based in Tobruk. Libya Dawn, a rival coalition of Islamists, anti-Gaddafiists, and militias from the coastal town of Misurata, controls the ‘General National Congress’ (GNC), an unelected entity based in the West.
GNC members split from the HOR after losing heavily in the June 2014 elections and a recent UN mediation effort, known as the Leon Plan, failed to bring the two groups together.
‘In my view, [this was] because it conceded too much to Libya Dawn, without recognising the fundamental legal standing of the HOR – all the while failing to use its power to sanction those elements who disrupted or obstructed the process,’ says Chorin.
Militia power has been an obstacle to securing a stable government in Libya. In the aftermath of Gaddafi’s fall, anyone who claimed to be a member of the ‘thuwwar’, or 2011 revolutionaries, could receive generous subsidies, according to Chorin. These groups, with varied ideological, tribal, religious and criminal motives continued to grow in strength until what remained of central government could no longer contain them.
At the time, money was flowing very freely in Libya. The economy was the fastest growing in the world in 2012, with GDP per capita expanding at 70%. This was a rebound from a dramatic contraction during the struggle to remove Gaddafi.
Libya is almost completely reliant on oil revenue with 92 to 95 per cent of government income coming from hydrocarbons.
Among the militias, Islamist groups have come to prominence in the country’s politics.
‘The moderate-to-radical Islamist groups were not a major force in the early revolution, but climbed into power on the back of the government scaffolding created by non-Islamist coalitions in the wake of the Revolution while being completely rebuffed at the polls,’ says Chorin.
Potential leaders are hard to identify in the current situation. But a stable government isn’t likely to lie with one individual. Chorin suggests an international boost to the HOR is necessary.
‘General Khalifa Heftar, currently the commander of the Libyan National Army, is a controversial figure – if his aspirations to be the next Sisi [Egyptian president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi] can be reined in, legally and otherwise, he has potentially sufficient national following and strength to assist the HOR in consolidating control. This process wouldn’t be quick,’ says Chorin.
If the West and the international community provide generous, albeit conditional support for the HOR, Chorin believes there would be a chance to avoid complete collapse in Libya. That would mean lifting the arms embargo on the HOR and substantial development assistance, advisory, and development aid.
Until that happens, the chances for a stable Libyan government and a permanent solution to the refugee crisis are low.
END
With no central authority to manage even the basic functions of government for Libya, dealing with hundreds of thousands of migrants is bound to be a difficult task.
‘Large parts of the country remain ungoverned, or under the control of local militias or criminal gangs – this is particularly the case in the vast Southern regions,’ says Ethan Chorin, a former diplomat who has written two books on Libya.
For the moment, the country is divided between east and west. Legal governing legitimacy belongs to the House of Representatives (HOR), now based in Tobruk. Libya Dawn, a rival coalition of Islamists, anti-Gaddafiists, and militias from the coastal town of Misurata, controls the ‘General National Congress’ (GNC), an unelected entity based in the West.
GNC members split from the HOR after losing heavily in the June 2014 elections and a recent UN mediation effort, known as the Leon Plan, failed to bring the two groups together.
‘In my view, [this was] because it conceded too much to Libya Dawn, without recognising the fundamental legal standing of the HOR – all the while failing to use its power to sanction those elements who disrupted or obstructed the process,’ says Chorin.
Militia power has been an obstacle to securing a stable government in Libya. In the aftermath of Gaddafi’s fall, anyone who claimed to be a member of the ‘thuwwar’, or 2011 revolutionaries, could receive generous subsidies, according to Chorin. These groups, with varied ideological, tribal, religious and criminal motives continued to grow in strength until what remained of central government could no longer contain them.
At the time, money was flowing very freely in Libya. The economy was the fastest growing in the world in 2012, with GDP per capita expanding at 70%. This was a rebound from a dramatic contraction during the struggle to remove Gaddafi.
Libya is almost completely reliant on oil revenue with 92 to 95 per cent of government income coming from hydrocarbons.
Among the militias, Islamist groups have come to prominence in the country’s politics.
‘The moderate-to-radical Islamist groups were not a major force in the early revolution, but climbed into power on the back of the government scaffolding created by non-Islamist coalitions in the wake of the Revolution while being completely rebuffed at the polls,’ says Chorin.
Potential leaders are hard to identify in the current situation. But a stable government isn’t likely to lie with one individual. Chorin suggests an international boost to the HOR is necessary.
‘General Khalifa Heftar, currently the commander of the Libyan National Army, is a controversial figure – if his aspirations to be the next Sisi [Egyptian president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi] can be reined in, legally and otherwise, he has potentially sufficient national following and strength to assist the HOR in consolidating control. This process wouldn’t be quick,’ says Chorin.
If the West and the international community provide generous, albeit conditional support for the HOR, Chorin believes there would be a chance to avoid complete collapse in Libya. That would mean lifting the arms embargo on the HOR and substantial development assistance, advisory, and development aid.
Until that happens, the chances for a stable Libyan government and a permanent solution to the refugee crisis are low.
END
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