ONE OF LIBYA ANALYSIS

Serious tragedies continue in Libya, in silence. If we perceive echoes here and there, we do not know the most disastrous ones.

Entire villages were emptied of their populations, groups were decimated, and hundreds of Libyans, when they were not slaughtered, were condemned to seek refuge in migrant camps.

A friend reveals this sad reality.

That of tribe dictatorship, dogma and money, the hegemony of militias, and crush of any attempt of civil society and opposition awakening.

Left to its uncertainties, Libya undergoes the law of jihadism, multiple alliances and allegiances, and the risk of fragmentation.

By building an oil revenue redistribution system based on a heritage status of this resource, Gaddafi was convinced that this model was capable to hold the Libyan society into the circle of allegiance.

This was one of his most tragic miscalculation, since it was originally a series of failures that the "Guide" has continued to commit in fighting the growth of the insurgency and the collapse of its political system.

Gaddafi was unable, at the dawn of the 2011 insurrection, to seize the profound changes that took place in his country and, in particular, the emergence of new relations that articulate one hand, the tribal realities the other one with the rise of new players from the rentier system margins.

A system that was no longer able to be the unalterable social cement dreamed by the Architect of the Jamahiriya.

Trafficking and informal market generated a pervasive globalization and caused deep imbalances that participated, paradoxically, to the consolidation of tribal powers outside the annuitant Gaddafi system, mainly in the communities excluded alliances formed around the " Guide".

These segments of the population, that the Jamahiriya had deliberately excluded from the redistribution of oil wealth, have distinguished themselves by the cohesion between their members and have resisted casualization, through their involvement in the parallel market and the economy shade.

This collective initiative spirit saved swathes of Libyan society, that the official authorities were relegated in destitution and enabled them to face new destructuring constraints.

Stresses that the corrupt and exclusionary system erected by the "Guide" was unable to satisfy.

Since the fall of the Jamahiriya, following the massive military intervention by the coalition, the country moved to the rhythm of the clashes, the main issues have no relation with democratic slogans of the uprising.

The objectives of the militias involved in the fighting were/are now the control of tribal territories, the occupation of the tracks of cross-border smuggling, presence in strategic sites and predation of resources.

These objectives are the common denominator of all armed factions, whether jihadists, tribal or ethnic.

Security challenges facing Libya in its post-insurgency phase are documented and aggravated by the structural weakness of the institutions resulting from the successive elections held in the country.

These institutions are illustrated by their inability to impose itself as the main levers of regulation of conflicts between various parties in the country.

Realising the weakness of the authorities and the perils that await their interests, the tribes hastened to acquire armed militias.

These ones were quickly hoisted the sovereign status of forces on the territories of the tribes.

The hegemony of armed groups is one of the main causes of the difficult reconstruction of the army in Libya.

The power of the militias within the political spectrum of the country and on tribal territories enables them to work to the marginalization of the military hierarchy with their last battalions stationed in Cyrenaica.

This sidelining of the army by successive governments is an interested concession on the part of a political elite without popular support, to increasingly powerful militias, but especially highly reviled by the people.

Alongside the tribal clashes between armed factions, a new form of violence now opposes local militias to jihadist groups.

This violence knows, since the beginning of 2015, a significant revival in the city of Sirte and in the vicinity of Tripolitanian coast, due to the inability of the new authorities to contain a major security risk, peril they had smoldered for more than two years, hoping to use this in their fratricidal wars against adversaries, the tribal confederation suspected of loyalty to the deceased 'Guide'. However, the jihadist threat is not ready to be contained within the borders of Libya, since the divisions and armed clashes between local tribes and terrorist groups are involved in the spread of violence generated by bonds customary revenge.

The extent of tribal ramifications and the presence of jihadist networks in Sahara-Sahel region are aggravating factors of violence in this part of the continent.

The rise of armed factions and their involvement in the spread of arms trafficking and crime in Libya highlight insecurity in the border regions of neighboring countries.

These regions are, for over two decades, precarious situations and deep crises as economic, security-food, especially in the southern steps of the Fezzan.

In the northern parts of Niger,Mali and, intermittently, Algeria and Tunisia, dissident groups taking advantage of the chaos in Libya and significant resources found in this country, to ignite sedition homes.

Their projects are made possible thanks to the involvement in the circulation of arms flows and networking banditry, smuggling and cross-border terrorism.

The synergy of the strategies inherent in players jihadism, networks of illicit trafficking, local cartels banditry and separatism is expected to enroll more and more in the realities of the Sahara-Sahel countries in favor of the magnitude of the crises that shake the States of the region.

Given this dynamic destabilization fusion, Daesh leaders have reached a strategic order of conviction; no victory is possible for the terrorist network if it faces structured armies or powerful ethnic or religious groups like Shia and Kurdish factions.

Therefore, the geostrategic configuration suitable for Daesh would confront local disunited militias, torn inextricable divisions of tribal and territorial order.

The facts of highly publicized weapons and recent victories Daesh and the considerable financial resources held by this organization in Libya have opened the way for the establishment of a jihadist grouping pole, much of which consists veterans of the war in Syria and Iraq.

Alongside these fighters, Arabs and seasoned majority to fight Daesh, with its immense drawn of Libya resources, is now able to mobilize more terrorists candidates from the countries of the Sahara-Sahel region and could therefore, work to destabilize neighboring regions whose populations suffer from poor conditions.

Does the defeat of Daesh need a new foreign intervention in Libya? The answer would be ‘yes’ if 2011 allied assault achieved its objectives and did not result in the collapse of the Jamahiriya and the outbreak of fratricidal war.

The existence of independent Libyan territorial entities of all forms of authority of the state, invested by terrorist groups, coupled with the absence of a national agreement among the warring parties on crucial issues like the sharing of resources and the organization of power and the persistence of a long tradition of hostility among tribes, help to transform any military action in a disaster of unfathomable implications.

Probable intensive aerial shelling, that would help the Western powers against local powers, would impose, for a time, to a large Libyan political spectrum, their vision for the institutional future of the country, but it would be impossible to maintain cohesion around a settlement dictated by bombs. The rejection of a foreign orderly political solution would inevitably lead to a partition of the country because the potential losers of armed intervention would be better equipped this time to impose their land claims.

Claims increasingly supported by tribal tensions and separatist temptations provinces.

On another level and in the shadow of fighting between militias, major cities are witnessing the birth of movements for social and political protest movements brought and led by young people from urban elites or disadvantaged and precarious strata.

This new dynamic is clearly away from traditional tribal institutional frameworks and political parties formed after the uprising.

The objectives of political dissent and social protest movements are focused on a real and effective participation of the popular strata in the negotiation of a new contract for the building of a more just Libya, free from arbitrariness and chaos militiamen .

It would be dishonest to close this book without mentioning ‘Chatwy’ these Libyan Bedouin poetry sweet texts .

The verses of poetry which are often borrowed from the Koranic numerous metaphors rhetoric to treat painful experiences of men of the desert, their pains, frustrations and deprivations.

In April 2016, the jailers of Tamynah prison in Misrata where the Jamahiriya supporters were imprisoned, discovered on the wall of a cell where was languishing poet and officer Ahmed Abdeljalil Maâdani and before his death this poem was written in blood letters (sorry for very poor translation from Arabic) :

Before closing the path of destiny

And go to meet his sacred face

I would like to make this donation secret

In asking you to remember the flames

Those who caress their incandescent languages

Your murderous hands and hearts extinguished Do you think this war

A left in the darkness of the winners and losers? Do you really buried the Guide?

Have you broken his memory?

By lights Allah threw in my being

And through His prophets will gather my last breath

I swear before His throne

You be hanging ignominy, generations yet

And at the bottom of your souls

Be tattooed your crimes

For before your treachery, there was only one Gaddafi. Today, there are hundreds

And the camel that gave you so much milk

You've abused to better exploit

Lonely, she can not give you that the blood you are Ignorant of His generosity

You decided to kill the taste for flesh You never thought the day after

When you are bitten by the fangs of hunger, It will be useless to regret his milk.