Khalifa Haftar launched September 11, 2016 a military offensive against the militia of Ibrahim Jadhran rallied with Presidential Council of Tripoli. With the capture of five oil terminals on the border of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, the old general is committed outside its traditional settlement area of Cyrenaica, in a direct confrontation with the authorities in Tripoli officially recognized by the Western powers .
The lightning offensive launched on September 11, the first day of Eid al-Adha, by the forces of General Khalifa Haftar is a major milestone in the evolution of the situation in Libya. Less than two years after the launch of its "Operation Al-Karama" ("Dignity") to eradicate political, skilled opponents without distinction of "Islamic terrorists", General Haftar decided this time to attack militia of his former ally Ibrahim Jadhran supported by Tripoli Presidential Council recognized by UN. If this attack is consistent with the refusal of the General Haftar to recognize Sarraj Presidential Council, it nonetheless constitutes a break with the situation before.
General Haftar troops were indeed stationed far to fight the "Islamists" in Benghazi, Derna and Ajdabiya in Cyrenaica. By this foray into the essential oil and taking its five oil terminals on the border of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, the old General is therefore now committed outside its traditional settlement area of Cyrenaica, in a direct confrontation with the authorities in Tripoli officially recognized by the major Western powers.
This pledge-taking comes as the implementation process of Sarraj GNA sponsored by the international community is totally blocked in its current form. In the opinion of UN representative Martin Kobler, trust and the hopes raised by the arrival of Sarraj Presidential Council largely dissipated. Among the causes of this alienation, denial of Tobruk Parliament to ratify the Presidential Council establishment, its inability to meet the legitimate expectations of the Libyans in security and economic matters and the general feeling that it was imposed by 'foreign compromised' Conciliation dynamic
While positive dynamics between East and West were still possible in December 2015 a few weeks before the entry into force of Sarraj Presidential Council, these perspectives are increasingly hypothetical, because of the very different trajectories of the two regions.
Cyrenaica, we see day after day, go to a militarization of both institutions and political practice. In August, General Abderrazak Nadhouri, Chief of Staff of LNA (Libyan National Army) and military governor of the region, deposed the elected mayors of Benghazi, Ajdabiya and Kufra to replace them with colonels. Many witnesses state of the return of practices of the old regime in police matters: under surveillance, intimidation or direct threats to the families of suspected opponents, preventive detentions and media controls.
This is hardly surprising in view of the presence of many former military officers and security services that resumed service in the ranks of LNA. General Haftar course is the cornerstone of this process that could be called back to military authoritarianism on the model of what is at work in Egypt Marshal Abdel Fattah al-Sissi. But the system could not win without the support and commitment of tribal traditional social structures nor the feeling of regionalist belonging, very powerful in Cyrenaica.
In Tripoli, the population is very diverse, the development of a strong urban culture and external influences - including Ottoman - helped weaken the weight of tribal affiliations. In contrast, Cyrenaica is still characterized by significant weight of these traditional structures. Number of notable major eastern tribes saw in the establishment of the provisional government of al-Bayda in 2014 and the establishment of LNA General Haftar, an opportunity to reaffirm the role of social control.
They had been marginalized during the 2011 insurgency - they had rallied after it started - by the rise of the revolutionary militia leaders close to the brotherhood of Muslims and former Brothers of the Islamic Group Libyan fighter (LIFG). Playing on the strong sense of regional identity, cohesion of the twelve major tribes "nobles" of Cyrenaica, their related tribes and the traditional mistrust of Tripolitania, General Haftar won the support of traditional structures. What is reflected in particular by a strong rallying youth to his army. Thus, a significant proportion of the population of Cyrenaica is acquired or cannot afford to oppose him, except the cities of Darnah, Ajdabiya and Benghazi.
These three cities are in fact characterized by more diverse population, a large proportion of them from towns in the west. They also have the most powerful of Islamist militias, formed in the early days of the insurrection of 2011. The position of the tribes is nevertheless not monolithic, sometimes with internal divisions. Thus a number of militia leaders and the tribe of officers Awaguir based in Benghazi and its neighborhoods, did they allegiance to Sarraj government.
In Tripoli, the diversity of the social fabric and local elites is reflected in the plurality of the political landscape, the fluidity of alliances, the ability to dialogue, reconciliation and - last - engage in combat. Local elites consist of leaders of Islamist and tribal militias, officers of the former regime who joined the insurgency, tribal or from the urban middle class notables, businessmen and former opponents of the Islamists Gaddafi converted into political regime. The fragmentation of large power poles - including the cities of Misrata, Zawiya, Zintan and even to some extent - and sometimes rival militias in Tripoli contributed to the birth of a culture of compromise and negotiation that is reflected in the position of Saraj Presidential Council.
Reconciliation processes were conducted successfully in Jebel Nafusa recent months. Direct contact, even unimaginable a few months ago, even being between certain armed factions of Zintan and Misrata. And if tensions become regular sporadic clashes between armed groups, the various parties have so far managed to avoid a resumption of fighting in the capital. If we cannot deny the antagonism between armed Islamist groups connotation and armed groups belonging rejecting any "ideological", the majority of players have so far ensured to preserve the coexistence based on the dynamic equilibrium of forces. The situation in Tripoli is thus characterized by multiple poles of power, flexibility alliances between them on the basis of their current interests and the internal fragmentation of the power poles.
An international diplomatic failure.
Two separate "political cultures" are therefore taking shape between Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, which do not contribute to the emergence of a consensus in the form that could be in the future governance of Libya. Instead of launching a virtuous circle, the establishment of Sarraj Presidential Council has instead helped create new dividing lines in an already highly fragmented landscape. For particularly neglected negotiation and seeking a compromise prior to the benefit of the accelerated implementation of Presidential Council, the major powers have thus lost their bet at this stage that arrival of Presidential Council would trigger in a virtuous logic. Instead, they can welcome what was for them its primary function: resume enclave of Sirte fighters rallied to Islamic State requesting the direct militaryWestern support. The question is still about to be settled militarily only by the militias of Misrata after three months of fighting.
Militarily, the direct support of Egypt, the UAE and France have not allowed the forces of General Haftar to control Derna and some Benghazi and Ajdabiya neighborhoods, but it was probably a large utility to launch its offensive of September 11 against the oil terminals.
In this regard, the French position seems particularly unreadable. While at the diplomatic level, France officially supports GNA, it provides in same time military assistance in the form of advisors to its rival General Haftar. Reacting to revelations of the involvement shown in newspaper Le Monde in February 2016, the Ministry of Defence had then denied any direct support in Cyrenaica. He finally had to acknowledge in July, after the death of three men of French special force of General Directorate for External Security (DGSE) in the crash of a helicopter shot down in a combat zone near Benghazi.
Contrary to what was asserted politicians, the leaders and French media almost unanimously last few months discussed the inevitability and imminence of a new intervention in Libya, the Libyans had no need of foreign intervention to resume Sirte. The figure written repeatedly from the assessments of Western intelligence services, IS 6 000 fighters in Sirte occupying a territory of 200 km have once again proven false, the actual numbers probably never exceeded 1,500 fighters.
The action of General Haftar causes already a change in the balance of power between East and West and within the Presidential Council itself. If the intention of the authorities is to boost quickly oil exports resumed from Crescent terminals, this will allow them to enhance their prestige in Cyrenaica and increase the weight of their representatives in Presidential Council. This action also indirectly reactivate existing fault lines in Cyrenaica between pro-Haftar factions of some cities of Jebel Nafusa (including Zintan, Roujban and Warchafana) and cities and tribes supporting the Presidential Council.
Militarily, we cannot now exclude offensive against oil terminals launched by defense brigades in Benghazi and Ajdabiya which include Islamist fighters and opponents of General Haftar of both cities. Even if it seems unlikely that major militias from Misrata the OEI fighter in Sirte for three months opened a new front, others could instead launch attacks against the forces of Haftar in the oil increasing but military escalation risks which are not excluded.
After this action the authorities have the political leverage of a Presidential Council undermined by internal divisions and weakened by its inability to improve the situation of the population. Under these conditions, one can legitimately wonder about the future of Presidential Council in its current form and composition.
Meanwhile, voices are heard in the country to criticize UN Support Mission in Libya and ask for the departure of its chief Martin Kobler, which may well be de facto one of the next victims of this collateral military operation on the oil.
The lightning offensive launched on September 11, the first day of Eid al-Adha, by the forces of General Khalifa Haftar is a major milestone in the evolution of the situation in Libya. Less than two years after the launch of its "Operation Al-Karama" ("Dignity") to eradicate political, skilled opponents without distinction of "Islamic terrorists", General Haftar decided this time to attack militia of his former ally Ibrahim Jadhran supported by Tripoli Presidential Council recognized by UN. If this attack is consistent with the refusal of the General Haftar to recognize Sarraj Presidential Council, it nonetheless constitutes a break with the situation before.
General Haftar troops were indeed stationed far to fight the "Islamists" in Benghazi, Derna and Ajdabiya in Cyrenaica. By this foray into the essential oil and taking its five oil terminals on the border of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, the old General is therefore now committed outside its traditional settlement area of Cyrenaica, in a direct confrontation with the authorities in Tripoli officially recognized by the major Western powers.
This pledge-taking comes as the implementation process of Sarraj GNA sponsored by the international community is totally blocked in its current form. In the opinion of UN representative Martin Kobler, trust and the hopes raised by the arrival of Sarraj Presidential Council largely dissipated. Among the causes of this alienation, denial of Tobruk Parliament to ratify the Presidential Council establishment, its inability to meet the legitimate expectations of the Libyans in security and economic matters and the general feeling that it was imposed by 'foreign compromised' Conciliation dynamic
While positive dynamics between East and West were still possible in December 2015 a few weeks before the entry into force of Sarraj Presidential Council, these perspectives are increasingly hypothetical, because of the very different trajectories of the two regions.
Cyrenaica, we see day after day, go to a militarization of both institutions and political practice. In August, General Abderrazak Nadhouri, Chief of Staff of LNA (Libyan National Army) and military governor of the region, deposed the elected mayors of Benghazi, Ajdabiya and Kufra to replace them with colonels. Many witnesses state of the return of practices of the old regime in police matters: under surveillance, intimidation or direct threats to the families of suspected opponents, preventive detentions and media controls.
This is hardly surprising in view of the presence of many former military officers and security services that resumed service in the ranks of LNA. General Haftar course is the cornerstone of this process that could be called back to military authoritarianism on the model of what is at work in Egypt Marshal Abdel Fattah al-Sissi. But the system could not win without the support and commitment of tribal traditional social structures nor the feeling of regionalist belonging, very powerful in Cyrenaica.
In Tripoli, the population is very diverse, the development of a strong urban culture and external influences - including Ottoman - helped weaken the weight of tribal affiliations. In contrast, Cyrenaica is still characterized by significant weight of these traditional structures. Number of notable major eastern tribes saw in the establishment of the provisional government of al-Bayda in 2014 and the establishment of LNA General Haftar, an opportunity to reaffirm the role of social control.
They had been marginalized during the 2011 insurgency - they had rallied after it started - by the rise of the revolutionary militia leaders close to the brotherhood of Muslims and former Brothers of the Islamic Group Libyan fighter (LIFG). Playing on the strong sense of regional identity, cohesion of the twelve major tribes "nobles" of Cyrenaica, their related tribes and the traditional mistrust of Tripolitania, General Haftar won the support of traditional structures. What is reflected in particular by a strong rallying youth to his army. Thus, a significant proportion of the population of Cyrenaica is acquired or cannot afford to oppose him, except the cities of Darnah, Ajdabiya and Benghazi.
These three cities are in fact characterized by more diverse population, a large proportion of them from towns in the west. They also have the most powerful of Islamist militias, formed in the early days of the insurrection of 2011. The position of the tribes is nevertheless not monolithic, sometimes with internal divisions. Thus a number of militia leaders and the tribe of officers Awaguir based in Benghazi and its neighborhoods, did they allegiance to Sarraj government.
In Tripoli, the diversity of the social fabric and local elites is reflected in the plurality of the political landscape, the fluidity of alliances, the ability to dialogue, reconciliation and - last - engage in combat. Local elites consist of leaders of Islamist and tribal militias, officers of the former regime who joined the insurgency, tribal or from the urban middle class notables, businessmen and former opponents of the Islamists Gaddafi converted into political regime. The fragmentation of large power poles - including the cities of Misrata, Zawiya, Zintan and even to some extent - and sometimes rival militias in Tripoli contributed to the birth of a culture of compromise and negotiation that is reflected in the position of Saraj Presidential Council.
Reconciliation processes were conducted successfully in Jebel Nafusa recent months. Direct contact, even unimaginable a few months ago, even being between certain armed factions of Zintan and Misrata. And if tensions become regular sporadic clashes between armed groups, the various parties have so far managed to avoid a resumption of fighting in the capital. If we cannot deny the antagonism between armed Islamist groups connotation and armed groups belonging rejecting any "ideological", the majority of players have so far ensured to preserve the coexistence based on the dynamic equilibrium of forces. The situation in Tripoli is thus characterized by multiple poles of power, flexibility alliances between them on the basis of their current interests and the internal fragmentation of the power poles.
An international diplomatic failure.
Two separate "political cultures" are therefore taking shape between Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, which do not contribute to the emergence of a consensus in the form that could be in the future governance of Libya. Instead of launching a virtuous circle, the establishment of Sarraj Presidential Council has instead helped create new dividing lines in an already highly fragmented landscape. For particularly neglected negotiation and seeking a compromise prior to the benefit of the accelerated implementation of Presidential Council, the major powers have thus lost their bet at this stage that arrival of Presidential Council would trigger in a virtuous logic. Instead, they can welcome what was for them its primary function: resume enclave of Sirte fighters rallied to Islamic State requesting the direct militaryWestern support. The question is still about to be settled militarily only by the militias of Misrata after three months of fighting.
Militarily, the direct support of Egypt, the UAE and France have not allowed the forces of General Haftar to control Derna and some Benghazi and Ajdabiya neighborhoods, but it was probably a large utility to launch its offensive of September 11 against the oil terminals.
In this regard, the French position seems particularly unreadable. While at the diplomatic level, France officially supports GNA, it provides in same time military assistance in the form of advisors to its rival General Haftar. Reacting to revelations of the involvement shown in newspaper Le Monde in February 2016, the Ministry of Defence had then denied any direct support in Cyrenaica. He finally had to acknowledge in July, after the death of three men of French special force of General Directorate for External Security (DGSE) in the crash of a helicopter shot down in a combat zone near Benghazi.
Contrary to what was asserted politicians, the leaders and French media almost unanimously last few months discussed the inevitability and imminence of a new intervention in Libya, the Libyans had no need of foreign intervention to resume Sirte. The figure written repeatedly from the assessments of Western intelligence services, IS 6 000 fighters in Sirte occupying a territory of 200 km have once again proven false, the actual numbers probably never exceeded 1,500 fighters.
The action of General Haftar causes already a change in the balance of power between East and West and within the Presidential Council itself. If the intention of the authorities is to boost quickly oil exports resumed from Crescent terminals, this will allow them to enhance their prestige in Cyrenaica and increase the weight of their representatives in Presidential Council. This action also indirectly reactivate existing fault lines in Cyrenaica between pro-Haftar factions of some cities of Jebel Nafusa (including Zintan, Roujban and Warchafana) and cities and tribes supporting the Presidential Council.
Militarily, we cannot now exclude offensive against oil terminals launched by defense brigades in Benghazi and Ajdabiya which include Islamist fighters and opponents of General Haftar of both cities. Even if it seems unlikely that major militias from Misrata the OEI fighter in Sirte for three months opened a new front, others could instead launch attacks against the forces of Haftar in the oil increasing but military escalation risks which are not excluded.
After this action the authorities have the political leverage of a Presidential Council undermined by internal divisions and weakened by its inability to improve the situation of the population. Under these conditions, one can legitimately wonder about the future of Presidential Council in its current form and composition.
Meanwhile, voices are heard in the country to criticize UN Support Mission in Libya and ask for the departure of its chief Martin Kobler, which may well be de facto one of the next victims of this collateral military operation on the oil.
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