The UN special envoy, Martin Kobler, celebrated a few days ago the Skhirrat agreements and the formation of the Al Sarraj government. But what do we actually celebrate? These agreements have not been complied with for a year.
Is the Al Sarraj government likely to win?
It is difficult, Al Sarraj has no legitimacy. This lack of legitimacy is due to several grievances against the first UN special envoy who still have a resonance, and several breaches of the Skirrak agreements. The first special envoy, Bernadino Léon, made several mistakes. That is to say, shipments of mails to the United Arab Emirates, support of Marshal Haftar, revealing his strategy during the dialogue, his search for work with the UAE, the rush of the European Union to take by hand the new Prime Minister in Egypt, another Haftar support. At such a crucial moment, it had to be avoided. Not to mention, the partial choice of certain deputy ministers by himself, and which triggered a great rage in the West. All this has tainted UN credibility. This, in my view, could have been overtaken by the reduction in the number of deputy ministers, a claim from the West, which was later taken over by the East, and which could have served as a basis for the revival Of the dialogue. But the second special envoy, Martin Kobler, did not opt for this choice. His team even slammed the door to protagonists who came to solicit him. Upon his arrival, it was already known that the legitimacy of the future government would be hampered. Especially since, thereafter, the forcing prevailed. It was also very difficult then to follow the dazzling Martin Kobler, because of his multiple actions quite nervous and therefore precipitous. Following the refusal of the two presidents to send delegates to the dialogue, the special envoy imposed deputies belonging to the two delegations of the two parliaments, without their approval by the parliaments, in order to validate the UN draft. First break. If it was voted on 17 December, this method created chain reactions. Including the emergence of a sovereignist movement in Tunis where parliaments on both sides expressed their willingness to unite outside the UN framework. Then to Malta through the two presidents of parliaments. The government of Al Sarraj, despite the efforts of Martin Kobler could not be validated, it is still not by the parliament of Tobrouk hindered, in particular by the refusal of federalist deputies. And by forcing UN. Martin Kobler may have wanted to enter into a dialogue with the two presidents, and the doors that were opening were shattered.
It follows from the sprains to the Skirrat agreements to install at all costs the new government and its during the National Council. This one, installed by a militia, does not already meet the criteria defined by these agreements. This body has, moreover, given a legislative function, an initiative which is disapproved both by Prime Minister Al Sarraj and by Martin Kobler, since normally this body should only be consultative. Then the installation of the government in Tripoli is seen as another sprain, as this government started working without any validation from the parliament of Tobruk. He wants to establish the 2016 budget without any vote from the parliament of Tobruk ... The question of the militias instituted guardians of the Al Sarraj government is also a sprain ... that is trying to solve, currently, painfully, and in a way Curious, the special envoy, via the establishment of a presidential guard. Beyond that, it is the question of the integration of Haftar which created a blockage. And on this point, the UN strategy has even been counterproductive. Under Bernadino Léon, his integration was still feasible. The New York accords went in its direction. With the arrival of the new special envoy, there was no longer any question of it, when it was necessary to integrate it in priority to the army. One even tried to oust him by one of his relatives. This had the effect of tightening the East and confirming to its supporters the bias of the special envoy in favor of the Turko-Qatar-GB axis in favor of the Misurata-Islamist alliance.
The Special Envoy has, moreover, committed a serious error in his strategy. In attempting to revive the oil windfall in favor of the Al Sarraj government, Libya being on the brink of collapse, he tried to put himself in the pocket, and to impose Ibrahim Jadran, guardian of the oil installations in the East, Master singer of the worst kind already imprisoned for his traffics by Gaddafi. The militiaman had become, in no time at all, the new "boss of petroleum", under monstrous blackmail conditions, which would have impacted the Noc itself (!). Martin Kobler pressed on a touch that gave Haftar the unexpected opportunity to storm the oil wells and facilities of the East, which he watched, thus passing the coveted bit of fat to the hands of the Brother enemy. In other words, a flop. Since then, the promoted general Marechal, who could not be integrated into the army, dreams of directing Libya, if he was plebiscite. And this has resulted in a new cycle of East-West violence. Today, we talk about the integration of Haftar. One year lost. And damage to the dialogue.
What about France?
She said nothing about the sprains of the Skhirat agreements. She supported the UN strategy opting for the integration of Islamists into the game, while they are a minority politically. She supported the non-integration of Haftar, a strategy that has been reviewed since ... What can be deplored is also its lack of dynamism to extract Libya from this chaos. When the protagonists of the two governments, when Bernadino Léon broke down in dialogue, wanted to meet in Paris, long before the formation of the Al Sarraj government, the response of the Quai was clear "Libya is not a priority "(!!), while migrants arrived on Europe and the dialogue skated (!). We wanted the UN ..... Either. The protagonists then worked to bring back to the negotiating table the Western members who had left. The radicals of the CGN had suddenly become silent, as were the federalists of the East who were already pointing their nose. Bernadino Léon then came to compose a government ... we know the continuation. I think that meetings made by Libyan actors themselves, but supervised by the UN, could make it easier to reconcile things. The UN could then validate a process of reunification through key actors, which are currently neglected.
We will see, then, what will be the new strategy of Martin Kobler, which is, for the moment, a failure, with the arrival of Trump, who declares himself, in an exaggerated way, anti-Muslim, anti-Islamist. This, in my opinion, would not suffice, the skein having become complex today. And exaggerated rancor. The Libyan actors are at an impasse and neutralize each other. So it will be necessary for Martin Kobler, who has put himself back on many actors, to return, initially, to the agreements of Skhrirrat. Then, also bring back to the reason some actors of the West who have flouted the agreements, and finally integrate Haftar to the army if he now wants it .... Declare a ceasefire . No doubt, to reconsider the copy of the number of presidential advisers, a too heavy structure, where the duties of the deputy ministers, not determined, encroach on that of the Prime Minister. To solve the problem of the function of the Council of State. It should, perhaps, integrate some Libyan actors who have the favor of East and West, a thing already proposed at the very beginning of its mission. But will these actors want it today, in view of the image that the special envoy has forged, called by the Libyans "The King of Libya"? He is accused of grafting Al Sarraj, a landscaping architect by training, to the point of being his liner, placing orders in his place, as well as holding press conferences ... having been too fast and not Fairly clear-sighted. But the special envoy is so discredited that it is unclear whether he will be able to redress the bar ... If he does not succeed in getting this government accepted, he will have to opt for a more flexible solution . It is not with rigidity of action that the UN will succeed in being accepted, especially after 42 years of banishment of the organization by Gaddafi, which did him well ... This leaves traces still in some. ... and especially after a disastrous intervention .... and a difficult dialogue conducted drum beating. The Libyans need to re-familiarize themselves today with the organization, in spite of its faults, and not to face an omnipotent "machine" and, moreover, to pass its orders.
The record of the Skirrat agreements is not glorious. Today we have three governments, that of Al Sarraj, recognized by the community, that of Al Thini and Gweil, which has recently resurfaced and has extended its hand to the East, without results for the moment. And who stretched out his hand to the East, without results for the moment. Tripoli is today the prey to strong tensions, due to the play of the actors and certain UN initiatives, the constitution of a presidential guard. It is not known if there will actually be fighting, as the balance of power is not won, but in any case the militias are preparing for it. In other words, the UN mission has divided more than it has united the actors.
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