On March 25, the international peace process aimed at ending Libya’s civil
war concluded its latest round of talks in Morocco on schedule. Both sides have
agreed to continue the dialogue, despite predictions that it might collapse.
This is encouraging news, coming as it does at a moment when the rising
influence of the Islamic State (IS) reminds Libyans of the high price of
continued disunity. Even as the country’s rival governments — the
internationally recognized one based in the eastern city of Tobruk, and the
self-declared Islamist government in the capital of Tripoli — continue to fight
each other, IS forces are drawing attention with attacks on oil and gas installations, which have included taking Western hostages
and beheading Libyan guards. So far, though, the IS threat is failing to bring
Libyans together as the United Nations and Western governments have hoped. (In
the photo, the head of the Islamist government in Tripoli speaks
during the funeral of a field commander.)
Optimists can take heart from the fact that the two competing sides have at
least been trying to talk.
Optimists can take heart from the fact that the two competing sides have at
least been trying to talk. The U.N.-brokered dialogue began in September 2014,
and it has continued intermittently since then, though beset by huge
difficulties. There are two major issues at stake: the composition and
authority of a possible unity government, and the problem of how — and under
whose command — this government would restore security and peace.
The U.N. Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) has issued the participating
parties a
set of proposals describing a potential
deal. UNSMIL recommends creating a presidential council that would fulfill the
role of president and head of government, while retaining the internationally
recognized parliament in Tobruk as the country’s legislature. The U.N. also
suggests setting up a state council, consisting of leading representatives of
society, that would play an advisory role if an agreement were reached. Two
additional councils, one for local municipal authorities and one for national
security, would be formed at a later stage. These proposals represent a good
compromise between the two sides’ positions, and offer an excellent basis for
forging a political settlement.
The devil, as always, is in the details. The two competing camps have already
started to interpret UNSMIL proposals to suit their own ends. Mohamed Emazeb, a
member of the Tripoli delegation to the talks, has announced that the former
General National Congress (GNC), which is based in Tripoli, would be part of
this power-sharing arrangement. Abubakder Buera, a member of the Tobruk
negotiating team, has countered by saying that there is no place for the former
GNC in the outcome of a potential deal.
Given such sentiments, there’s good reason to presume that these
differences may prove insurmountable even despite the UNSMIL’s ambitious
recommendations. The delegates will now head back to Tobruk and Tripoli for
consultations with their respective camps. If this latest push for a settlement
fails, the U.N. and the Western governments that backed the revolution that
overthrew the Qaddafi regime will face some tough choices.
If the dialogue collapses, Libya will be beyond any easy solutions.
If the dialogue collapses, Libya will be beyond any easy solutions. The
options then available to the international community could include putting
Libya under a U.N. mandate, meaning that vital institutions — such as the
Central Bank, the National Oil Corporation, and the Libyan Investment Authority
— would be under U.N. administration and oversight. On March 16, Spanish
Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Garcia-Margallo told reporters that the EU should
consider such
measures to push the parties back to the table in the
event the talks should fail. This would essentially transform the country into
a direct ward of the international community, a role that the U.N. is
undoubtedly keen to avoid. This scenario would probably also entail military
intervention by the West, perhaps led by Italy, to halt the rise
of IS. The intervention could include targeted air
strikes on IS targets and the establishment of peacekeeping forces to
protect vital oil and gas infrastructure as well as to help secure the borders
of the country. Another option would be to create an Arab-Muslim military
coalition, likely led by Egypt and Algeria, that would intervene to restore
security and prevent the flow of arms and extremist fighters.
Even if the competing sides do agree on a deal, the resulting unity
government would confront daunting challenges. The most obvious would be
restoring security and combating terrorism. Given that a number of armed groups
oppose both the negotiating progress and the very principle of compromise, a
future government would find itself in immediate and direct confrontation with
those who refuse to cooperate with disarmament and security reform initiatives.
(Many of these militias are currently on the government payroll, a fact that
has contributed substantially to the deterioration of public finance over the
last three years.)
It’s worth noting that past attempts to integrate the militias into the
army and security forces have failed miserably, largely because successive
central governments have given in to pressure from militias and their leaders
rather than implementing professional, efficient training and
reintegration programs. This precedent set by previous governments will be a
big problem for anyone who attempts to disarm the militias on a national level.
A better approach would be to tackle the issue of disarming the militias on
regional and local levels instead, since local groups and authorities are
better positioned to influence groups operating in their cities or
regions.
The other immediate challenge is the economy. The steep fall in oil prices,
a corresponding drop in production levels, and terrorist
attacks on vital oil infrastructure are all
exacerbating an already yawning budget deficit, compounding the woes of an
economy already battered by war. A unity government will also have to deal with
the issue of porous borders, which are being exploited by extremist groups and
arms smugglers.
In short, even if the warring sides can come to an agreement to end their
conflict, that won’t translate into a quick fix for all the country’s problems.
But at least
it would be a start.
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