Arab Millennial Will Be Back

Three and a half years ago, the world was riveted by the massive crowds of youths mobilizing in Cairo’s Tahrir Square to demand an end to Egypt’s dreary police state.  We stared in horror as, at one point, the Interior Ministry mobilized camel drivers to attack the demonstrators.  We watched transfixed as the protests spread from one part of Egypt to another and then from country to country across the region.  Before it was over, four presidents-for-life would be toppled and others besieged in their palaces.
Some 42 months later, in most of the Middle East and North Africa, the bright hopes for more personal liberties and an end to political and economic stagnation championed by those young people have been dashed.  Instead, a number of Arab countries have seen counter-revolutions, while others are engulfed in internecine conflicts and civil wars, creating Mad Max-like scenes of post-apocalyptic horror.  But keep one thing in mind: the rebellions of the past three years were led by Arab millennial, twenty something who have decades left to come into their own.  Don’t count them out yet.  They have only begun the work of transforming the region.
Given the short span of time since Tahrir Square first filled with protesters and hope, care should be taken in evaluating these massive movements.  During the Prague Spring of 1968, for instance, a young dissident playwright, Vaclav Havel, took to the airwaves on Radio Free Czechoslovakia and made a name for himself as Soviet tanks approached.  After the Russian invasion, he would be forbidden to stage his plays and 42 months after the Prague Spring was crushed, he was working in a brewery.  Only after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 would he emerge as the first president of the Czech Republic.
Three and a half years into the French Revolution, the country was only months away from the outbreak of a pro-royalist Catholic peasant revolt in the Vendée, south of the Loire Valley.  The resulting civil war with the republicans would leave more than 100,000 (and possibly as many as 450,000) people dead.
Preparing the Way for a New Arab Future
There are of course plenty of reasons for pessimism in the short and perhaps even medium term in the Middle East.  In Egypt, Ahmad Maher, a leader of the April 6 Youth, famed for his blue polo shirts and jaunty manner, went from advising the prime minister on cabinet appointments in the summer of 2011 to a three-year prison term at hard labour in late 2013 for the crime of protesting without a license.  Other key revolutionaries of 2011, like dissident blogger Alaa Abdel Fattah and leftist activist and organizer Mahienoor El Masry, are also in jail, along with many journalists, including three from Al Jazeera, two sentenced to seven years in jail and one to 10, simply for doing the most basic reporting imaginable.
When it comes to youth revolutions, however, it’s a pretty good bet that most of their truest accomplishments will come at least a couple of decades later.  The generation of young Arabs who made the revolutions that led to the unrest and civil wars of the present is in fact distinctive -- substantially more urban, literate, media-savvy, and wired than its parents and grandparents.  It’s also somewhat less religiously observant, though still deeply polarized between nationalists and devotees of political Islam.
And keep in mind that the median age of the 370 million Arabs on this planet is only 24, about half that of graying Japan or Germany.  While India and Indonesia also have big youth bulges, Arab youth suffer disproportionately from the low rates of investment in their countries and staggeringly high unemployment rates.  They are, that is, primed for action.
“Youth” as a category is always going to encompass very diverse populations, but it’s the self-conscious activists claiming to act in the name of their generation who make youth movements.  Not all age cohorts in modern Arab history have created organizations on the basis of generational aspirations and discontents (as some of the Baby Boomers did in the 1960s in the United States).  However, the Arab youth born roughly between the years 1980 and 2000, who came into their own in the new century, have organized a plethora of generationally based movements, many named for the dates of their initial demonstrations, including April 6 Youth, Revolutionaries Libya 17, and Reunion.
In the brief period when they were riding high, they routinely spoke of themselves self-consciously as "youth" and made demands no less self-consciously in the name of their "generation."  The two most famous of those demands were "the people want the fall of the regime" and (especially in Egypt) "bread, freedom, and social justice."  Many of these groups are now banned by counter-revolutionary generals or by restored and ascendant secret police, while others have faded away in the face of the rise of paramilitary forces and militias -- the very opposite of engaged youth movements and deadly to their open-minded values.
Even banished or suppressed, however, their contributions to political life in the region should not be discounted.  And where they still exist, they matter.  In the summer and fall of 2013 in Tunisia, for instance, youth organizations allied with the country's major labor union to pressure the government, led by a party of the religious right, to step down in preparation for new elections and to allow principles like women's equality to be put into a new constitution.
Three Achievements of the Arab Spring
Two or three decades from now, the twentysomethings of Tahrir Square or the Casbah in Tunis or Martyrs' Square in Tripoli will, like the Havels of the Middle East, come to power as politicians.  For that we have to wait.  In the meantime, we can at least try to understand just what their movements have meant for the region.  Those tea leaves are, after all, in plain sight and ready to be read.
Here are three of their achievements that seem likely to be lasting, whatever the upheaval in the region:
1. The emergence of dynasties and family cartels as the leadership of the Arab republics has been rejected.
Back in 2000, sociologist Saad Eddin Ibrahim coined the phrase jumlukiyyah, a melding of the Arabic words for "republic" and "monarchy." This phenomenon of "monarpublicanism," he pointed out, was the dynastic principle that then governed the leadership succession in much of the Middle East.  Unlike in republics elsewhere in which unrelated presidents and prime ministers are supposed to succeed one another in accordance with the popular will, Ibrahim suggested that the way Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father Hafez in Syria was a bellwether for the region.
Saif al-Islam Gaddafi seemed poised to eventually take over from his mercurial father, Muammar, in Libya.  Hosni and Suzanne Mubarak were said to be grooming their younger son Gamal to step into the presidency after the old man passed from the scene in Egypt.  In Yemen, President for Life Ali Abdallah Saleh was promoting his son Ahmad, a general in the army, as his successor.  Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali 's presidential palace was being eyed by his wife, social climber Leila Trabelsi, and his son-in-law, billionaire Sakher El Materi.
Ibrahim was jailed by a petty and vindictive Egyptian regime simply for being a sociologist and observing the reality around him (even if he was ultimately acquitted of wrongdoing).  One goal of the youth movements in Egypt and elsewhere was distinctly Ibrahimist: to destroy the principle of monarpublicanism, turn out those presidents-for-life, and ensure that their children did not succeed them.  All of them were to be made accountable for their family crimes after free and fair elections.
Because of those youth revolutions, Hafez al-Assad of Syria was the sole republican monarch who passed his country on to his son -- and even then, Bashar has been able to cling to power in just half of his country and only by resorting to atrocities so extensive that they amount to crimes against humanity.  Elsewhere, the crown princes of the corrupt old republics are often in exile, court, or prison.  Saif al-Islam Gaddafi is on trial in Tripoli.  Tunisia is attempting to extradite Sakher al-Materi from the Seychelles Islands.  Gamal Mubarak is on trial for stock exchange manipulation.  General Ahmad Ali Saleh, the son of the deposed dictator, is being investigated on charges of embezzlement, while his father, accused of plotting a coup, has lost much of his remaining power.
Youth opposition to the emergence of royal dynasties in the Arab republics sprung not just from a distaste for the betrayal of republican political principles but from a conviction that such ruling families had become corrupt, nepotistic cartels.  As the U.S. embassy in Tunis observed in 2006, "In Tunisia’s small subset of commercial actors, it seems at least half of the elite are rumoured to be somehow related or connected to the President."
In such circumstances, licenses for companies, jobs in the state bureaucracy, and other economic opportunities were monopolized by and for the ruling family and its circle of cronies.  The protesters saw this level of corruption as a brake on economic growth, leaving those outside the charmed circle doomed to work as menials, to unemployment, or to exile abroad.  Worse, if the plans for non-royal succession were implemented, these exclusionary, corrupt, and stagnant systems would be perpetuated many decades into the future.
Jumlukiyyah is now in the junk heap of history.
2. The age of presidents-for-life and complete lack of political accountability is coming to a close.
Even in neo-authoritarian Egypt, the new constitution allows a president only two four-year terms.  In some Arab countries, politicians have begun showing a willingness to step down when the public demands accountability or in order to uphold the rule of law or simply to avoid looking like the autocrats who had been angrily overthrown.  In response to a public outcry, Tunisian Prime Minister Ali Larayedh of the ruling Renaissance (al-Nahdah) Party, the largest in parliament, did so in early January in favor of a technocratic cabinet, which could be expected to fairly oversee new parliamentary elections.  It was the first voluntary civilian succession in the country’s history.
This May in Libya, a complete security mess, the minority Muslim Brotherhood faction in parliament and its allies attempted to put one of their own in the prime ministerial slot. They claimed that conservative businessman Ahmad Maitig had been elected with the requisite 120 votes; the nationalist opposition insisted he had only collected 113.  When the issue went to Libya's supreme court and it ruled against him, Maitig relinquished his claim, citing the need to uphold the rule of law, and joining the ranks of Larayedh and other leaders who declined to cling to power and risk further polarization of their fragile societies.
Iraq stands in contrast, and serves as an object lesson in this regard.  Arab Spring protests broke out there in both Sunni and Shiite areas in early 2011.  In response, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki initially pledged not to seek a third term.  He soon thought better of the promise.  Nonetheless, Sunni Arab youth in Fallujah and elsewhere continued to use techniques borrowed from the Tahrir movement to highlight their marginalization in Shiite-dominated Iraq.
Early in 2013, Maliki’s troops shot down Sunni demonstrators coming to Fallujah, which led to further youth protests and demands for accountability for those deaths.  The government responded with more force.  Had Maliki accommodated the demands of those demonstrators, in both Sunni and Shiite areas, he might have been able to forge new forms of national unity.  Instead, by crushing the civil youth movements, he left the door open to the radical insurgents of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.
3.  A more multicultural vision of how society should work is now on the Arab agenda.
Previous generations of Arab leaders and movements were often blind to the ways in which pride in the heritage of Arabic-speaking peoples could shade into discriminatory attitudes toward non-Arabs in Muslim-majority states.  Sometimes such societies had difficulty treating non-Muslims as equals.  Many youth activists were (and remain) dedicated to a more multicultural vision of Arab society.
The attempt of elected Egyptian President Muhammad Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood to rule through a clique of fundamentalists (who constitute a minority of Egyptians) deeply offended activist youth.  Morsi rejected the idea of a government of national unity despite his narrow margin of victory and instead filled high offices with fundamentalist allies.  Last year, he was overthrown, at least in part because millions of youth and workers again took to the streets.  In the aftermath, explicitly religious or sectarian parties have been banned -- though the military, which backed the mobilization of the young against Morsi, is again ascendant and has now turned on them, too.
The 2011 youth movement in Egypt also sought Christian-Muslim unity.  In Tahrir Square on Fridays, Coptic Christian youth would stand guard while Muslims prayed.  On Sundays, Muslim activists protected Christians as they held open-air masses.  Youth activists were disgusted when Muslim Brotherhood rule meant the bringing of blasphemy charges against Coptic schoolteachers.  Even North Africa's most serious ethnic divide, between Arabs and minority Berbers or Amazigh, shows signs of beginning to be ameliorated in Morocco under the pressure of the 2011 protests.
Like much of the rest of the Arab Spring, the urge of the millennial generation across North Africa and the Middle East for a more multicultural world seems far from realization, but they have put it on a future Arab agenda.  Its moment will return.
Waiting for the Arab Summer
Analysts have tended to focus on the high politics of the Arab youth revolutions and so have missed the more important, longer-term story of a generational shift in values, attitudes, and mobilizing tactics.  The youth movements were, in part, intended to provoke the holding of genuine, transparent elections in which the millennial were too young to stand for office.  This ensured that actual politics would be dominated by older Arab Baby Boomers, many of whom are far more interested in political Islam or praetorian authoritarianism.
The first wave of writing about the revolutions of 2011 discounted or ignored religion because the youth movements were predominantly secular and either liberal or leftist in approach.  When those rebellions provoked elections in which Muslim fundamentalists did well, a second round of books lamented a supposed "Islamic Winter."
The "Islamic Winter" paradigm has now faded in the countries that experienced the youth revolutions, with the reassertion of the military and the nationalists in Egypt and the severe reversals the religious militias have faced in central Syria.  In Libya, Muslim fundamentalist candidates could not get a majority in parliament in 2012.  Similar processes have long been in train in Algeria.  Even in Tunisia, where the religious right formed the first post-revolution government, they were only able to rule in coalition with secularists and leftists.
In the meantime, many of the millennial activists who briefly turned the Arab world upside down and provoked so many changes are putting their energies into non-governmental organizations, thousands of which have flowered, barely noticed, in countries that once suffered from one-party rule.  In this way, they are learning valuable organizational skills that -- count on it -- will one day be applied to politics.  Others continue to coordinate with labour unions to promote the welfare of the working classes.  Their dislike of nepotism, narrow cliques, and ethnic or sectarian rule has already had a lasting impact on the politics of the Arab world.  So don’t for a second think that the Arab Spring is over, no matter the news from Libya, Egypt, Iraq, or elsewhere.
Over the next two or three decades, as they come into their own politically, expect big changes in the region.  Someday, there will undoubtedly be an Arab Summer and the youth of this era will be honoured for what they did against all odds.  Mubarak’s hired thugs attempted to ride them down with camels.  That regime isn't there anymore and the millennial are biding their time.  We haven't heard the last of their generation.

Background - Libia: quadro sociale interno        ETNIE E TRIBU' 

Per comprendere la società libica, che è caratterizzata da un debole senso di appartenenza nazionale, è impossibile prescindere dall’osservazione e dallo studio delle dinamiche tribali. Innanzitutto è importante definire cosa si intenda con il termine tribù: si tratta di una divisione sociale tipica di una società tradizionale che si compone di gruppi di famiglie o comunità che condividono valori e norme.

La Libia si è sempre distinta come un paese fondato su alleanze tribali. Le principali tribù del paese sono al-Awagir, al-Abaydat, Drasa, al-Barasa, al-Fawakhir, al-Zuwayya, al-Majabra in Cirenaica; Warfalla, Awlad Busayf, al-Zintan e al-Rijban in Tripolitania; al-Qaddadfa, al-Magarha, al-Magharba, al-Riyyah, al-Haraba, al-Zuwaid, al-Guwaid Syrte; al-Hutman, al-Hassawna, Toubou e Tuareg nel Fezzan.

A fare da contraltare a questa storica divisione interna alla Libia vi è l’eccessiva enfasi che spesso circonda questa struttura sociale così eterogenea. Infatti, sebbene esistano più di 150 tribù stabilitesi in Libia, soltanto una quarantina sono quelle che possiedono un reale potere politico istituzionalizzato e un’egemonia sopra una porzione considerevole di territorio. Anche l’urbanizzazione degli ultimi decenni e tutto ciò che ha comportato in termini di mutazioni sociali ha causato una diluzione della forza delle identità tribali; questo fenomeno risulta invece edulcorato nelle zone più remote della Libia, là dove l’urbanizzazione non ha portato effetti sconvolgenti e le tribù giocano ancora un ruolo centrale nel processo di identificazione degli individui come per esempio nelle province dell’est e del sud del paese.

A seconda del periodo storico, l’identificazione clanico-tribale ha assunto un’importanza diversa: sotto Idris Senussi le tribù erano il perno della potere monarchico e i capitribù avevano il ruolo di diretti consiglieri del monarca.

Con la rivoluzione di Gheddafi viene smantellato questo sistema e si impone una nuova gestione del potere che passa esclusivamente tra le mani dei componenti della tribù del dittatore e le due alleate (Warfalla e Magarha).

Alla morte di Gheddafi, almeno nei primi mesi di agitazioni e conflitti, le tribù hanno riacquistato potere e influenza nel mantenimento di un ordine, seppur precario; le elezioni democratiche del luglio 2012 hanno portato due principali elementi di novità: se da una parte le tribù hanno avuto un facile e diretto accesso a cariche pubbliche eleggibili, dall’altra non tutte hanno avuto successo e sono riuscite ad eleggere rappresentanti.

Provando a dare uno sguardo sul futuro, le tribù potrebbero giovare il ruolo di stabilizzatrici in un contesto di forte instabilità politica e vuoti di potere che non permettono all’economia del paese di ripartire. Nel passato esse sono state protagoniste nel processo di redistribuzione dei guadagni derivati dall’estrazione petrolifera dal governo al popolo.

FATTORE RELIGIOSO  

La Libia non ha e non ha mai avuto una forte identità nazionale perché le identità tribali e regionali hanno sempre rappresentato le principali fonti di identificazione del popolo libico e costituiscono ancora oggi un grande ostacolo alla costruzione di un’identità libica.

Come avvenuto in molti altri paesi del mondo islamico, anche in Libia la matrice religiosa è stata utilizzata come collante nazionale e, dunque, posto come fondamento identitario comune. Sia Idris Senoussi che Gheddafi costruirono la loro legittimazione politica su basi religiose, sebbene non fecero uso dei medesimi mezzi.

Se Idris Senussi, discendente di una famiglia di eredi del Profeta Maometto e a capo della confraternita senussita, riuscì ad utilizzare il fattore religioso come strumento di coesione nazionale, Gheddafi impose in chiave personalistica una propria rilettura dell’Islam strumentale al proprio progetto politico.

La personale rilettura dell’Islam da parte di Gheddafi provocò non soltanto la rabbia degli Ulema ma anche l’accusa di eresia da parte della Fratellanza musulmana. Dal canto suo, Gheddafi bollò come reazionarie tutte le accuse che gli furono rivolte in nome del rispetto della tradizione della legge islamica. La caduta di Gheddafi ha aperto una nuova stagione per l’Islam in Libia, riportando alla luce simboli e tradizioni a lungo dimenticate.

A differenza di altri paesi dell’area, la Libia non ha mai sofferto di grandi fratture confessionali perché è sempre stato un paese sunnita, nel quale tuttavia sono presenti piccole comunità cristiane. Ciononostante, sin dai primi mesi del 2012 alcune frange salafite ha lanciato una serie di attacchi contro obiettivi e interessi non solo occidentali nella regione ma anche contro simulacri e altri simboli religiosi del sufismo, una tendenza del musulmanesimo sunnita ampiamente diffusa nel paese prima della Jamahiriya.

Sebbene questi atti non siano riconducibili alla volontà della maggioranza del popolo libico, essi sono sintomatici dell’intenso dibattito che si sta consumando tra una vecchia generazione di salafisti che si sono gradualmente integrati nel sistema politico e una nuova generazione che invece rifiuta l’assimilazione al sistema democratico vigente. Infatti dalla rivoluzione del 2011 sono stati numerosi i casi di militanti islamisti residenti all’estero prima del 2011 che negli ultimi mesi sono tornati a casa e, appena tornati presso le loro famiglie, hanno provato a reintegrarsi nel tessuto sociale islamico del paese proponendo una retorica marcatamente estremista, rifiutando ogni partecipazione alle chiamate elettorali e organizzando invii di volontari e aiuti in Tunisia, Siria, Sinai e Gaza.

Proprio l'accresciuto peso politico assunto da questi gruppi indusse già nel 2011 l'allora presidente del consiglio nazionale transitorio libico Mustafa Jalil a dichiarare la necessità di introdurre la Sharia come principale fonte di ispirazione per la riscrittura della nuova Costituzione evidenziando il desiderio del popolo libico di costruire un’identità nazionale a partire da una credenza religiosa condivisa.  

Sempre negli ultimi anni, il Congresso Generale del Popolo, seguendo la graduale tendenza estremista, ha deciso di considerare la Sharia come l’unico punto di riferimento legislativo. Il fatto di porre la Sharia al di sopra della Costituzione presuppone una logica giuridica che impedirebbe agli organi legislativi di promulgare leggi contro la Sharia perché non potrebbero essere considerate come effettive per l’effetto della gerarchia tra fonti del diritto.

LIBYAN CHAOS JUNE 2014

An invitation is being sent by the leadership of the Senussiyyah movement — the largest Muslim sect in Libya — to the leaders of all 40 or so Libyan tribes to meet on June 19 and 20, according to primary sources in Benghazi, Libya.

The purpose of the meeting is to hold a “prayer for peace and unity”. The purpose specifically stated in the invitations is not a call to discuss how to achieve peace, but merely to gather to “pray for peace”. The concept was stated as an opportunity to get the tribes to a point where they could merely meet in civil circumstances.
The Senussi family inside Libya is working together on the meeting at the Zawia Baida, the “white monastery” in Bayda (fourth largest city in Libya), northern Cyrenaica, but the principal architect is Prince (Sayyed) Idris al-Senussi.

The process, as stated privately by the principals, was to begin harmonizing the tribes so that they could ultimately (but soon) effectively begin work to oppose, and remove, the radical jihadist/salafist/takfiri elements who were brought in to Libya by external powers (mainly the U.S., Qatar, and Turkey) to fight Gadhafi.

Even at the time, in early 2011, their introduction was opposed by the tribes of Cyrenaica. Now the jihadist groups in Libya have, to a large extent, rallied around the Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood) to create a “Free Egyptian Army” (FEA), modeled on the “Free Syrian Army”, which has been supported by the U.S., Qatar, and Turkey. The FEA, based in Cyrenaica, is reportedly poised for attacks on Egypt.

The Cyrenaicans began their “counter-coup” in February 2011 against the 1969 coup by Moammar Gadhafi against the Government of King (Sayyed) Idris I (al-Senussi) and against the 1952 Constitution. The Cyrenaican commencement of the conflict against Gadhafi used the old Libyan (royal) flag and specifically called for the revival of the 1952 Constitution, which had been approved by the United Nations and all 140 tribes.

Gadhafi at that time declared that anyone who discussed the Constitution would be executed. That Constitution agreed that the head of state of Libya would be a Senussi, given that the Senussi were not a Libyan tribe, but, as sharif (descendants of the Prophet), would provide a neutral, non-tribal leader who would represent the interests of all Libyans. In, and since, 2011, the U.S. has not discussed this issue because of the general State Dept. hostility toward all traditional forms of governance.

Several tribal leaders, involved in planning the prayer gathering at the traditional founding place of the Senussiyyah movement in Libya (the Zawia Baida), have already indicated that they would participate. An invitation would go to all tribes, the source confirmed, including the Qadhadfa, the tribe of Gadhafi, and the tribe of Qadhafi’s former partner, Maj. ‘Abd al-Salam Jallud, the Megarha.

The French Government, which is in close touch with Sayyed Idris al-Senussi, has indicated that it supported the gathering and the possible (and intended) outcome, which was the implied leadership it would return to the Senussi.

The government of Saudi Arabia, which is also in close contact with Idris, has also reportedly indicated it would support a Senussi-led revival of control in Libya, or would recognize a partition of Libya. This, despite the traditional hostility of the Wahhabi movement to the Senussi movement (but not surpassed by their common opposition to the Qatari-promoted salafists and Ikhwan in Libya, which now threaten Egypt, which is of profound strategic importance to Saudi Arabia in the absence of a close U.S.-Saudi relationship.

Many elements in the Senussi and pro-Senussi tribes of Cyrenaica and Fezzan have indicated that they were at the point where they would be ready to declare separation from Tripolitania if unity did not emerge soon. Cyrenaica and Fezzan have the bulk of the Libyan resources. Sayyed Idris has been in close contact with the Elysee Palace for some time, and French sources appear to confirm that they would support a separate state (of Cyrenaica, or Cyrenaica plus Fezzan) if it was to declare itself.

Sayyed Idris has committed to working to a) stop the illegal flow of weapons out of Libya from the former Gadhafi stockpiles, particularly to Syria, and southward to Chad, Niger, and Nigeria; b) stop the illegal flow of immigrants from Africa to Europe via Libya; and c) work with Egypt to stop the use of Libya has a safe haven for Ikhwan/salafist fighters (such as the “Free Egyptian Army”).

Sayyed Idris has indicated that he would attempt to meet before the “prayer gathering” with the President of Niger, Mahamadou Issoufou, to discuss the situation, and possibly with Chadian President Idriss Déby Itno.

Significantly, Sayyed Idris’ grandmother was reportedly of Chadian origin. It was understood also that Idris could also try to visit Nigeria before the gathering to meet with President Goodluck Jonathan and other officials. He reportedly had intermediaries working to set up the Nigerian meeting, but it is not known yet whether these contacts have initiated an attempted contact.

General Haftar’s stated goals may appear clear. But what is really unfolding in Libya is more murky, suggesting a number of scenarios that also involve regional and international powers,

“Operation Dignity”, the military campaign led by forces under the command of retired General Khalifa Haftar against Islamist militia groups in Benghazi, has brought the Libyan conflict to a new crossroads. That it has drawn the support of some military forces and some influential tribes in both the east and the west suggest that it is more in the nature of an attempt to alter the nature of the dominant relations in the interim authority by means “military/social” alliances or by a movement to build up a minimum level of social support for a military drive to impose political change. Otherwise put, we are looking at a sophisticated version of the type of military coups d’etat that occur in Africa.

Initially, the aim of “Operation Dignity”, as Haftar and his supporters billed it, was to purge Libya of the militant Islamist groups the threat of which has proliferated inside the country and in the region as a whole. It then expanded to include political aims related to the nature of the current interim authority. Haftar now demands a freeze on the activities of the General National Congress (GNC), the formation of an emergency government, the creation of a civil assembly of judges to administer the state and supervise general elections. The broadening of the objectives reflects the political motives behind “Operation Dignity”. It seeks to build up a challenge to the mounting grip of the Islamist alliance (the Muslim Brotherhood, the former jihadist forces now involved in the political process and the Libyan Shield militias, which are made up of Islamist fighters the majority of whom hail from Misrata) over the interim government, especially since this alliance’s success at narrowing the leverage of the liberal leaning National Forces Alliance by using militia pressure to force through a political isolation law in advance of the elections of July 2012.

More recently, the Islamist majority extended the term of the GNC, which had been set to end in February, until December 2014. Then they succeeded in ousting prime minister Ali Zeidan and in appointing a new prime minister (Ahmet Maetig), said to be close to the Islamists, in spite of the challenge in the Supreme Constitutional Court against the voting process. Unfortunately, the Islamists’ growing political clout was unaccompanied by remedies for the many problems that have plagued the interim phase, such as the secessionist trends in the south and east, the proliferation of militias and political violence, and the inability to build a national army strong enough to monopolise the performance of the country’s security functions.

The importance of the Haftar drive derives from the fact that it seeks to alter the balances in the domestic conflict by means of a broad alignment of forces united behind a single aim: confronting the Islamists in both their Muslim Brotherhood and jihadist factions. Towards this end, Haftar has capitalised on his popularity among former officers of the Libyan army, the regional anxiety of the mounting threat of Islamists in eastern Libya and his network of international relations. Haftar spent 20 years in the US after rebelling against the Gaddafi regime during the Libyan-Chadian war in the 1980s.

In addition, after about two months of campaigning for support in eastern cities, Haftar succeeded in bringing on board a number of tribes in the east, such as Al-Obeidat, Al-Baraesa, and the armed wing of the federalist movement in Cyrenaica that manned the blockade of the oil exporting ports. In the west, he has the support of the Zintan tribes, the traditional foe of the Misrata tribes, and the Sawaeq, Qaqa and Madani brigades in Tripoli. The operation has also precipitated rifts in the national army. For example, the Tobruk air force brigade and the commanders of the Special Forces in Benghazi and of the military police and aerial defence forces in Tripoli have come out in support of the Haftar operation.

This alignment around Haftar, although still in the process of coalescing and lacking a political framework, prompted the caretaker government of Abdullah Al-Thinni to propose suspending the activities of the GNC until general elections are held at the end of June. The GNC snubbed the initiative at first but then backtracked and announced that general elections would be held in June 2014. However, it also began to prepare for the likelihood of a protracted battle, especially around Tripoli, assigning the task of protecting the capital to the Libya Shield Central forces, which are allegiant to the Islamists.

An anxious regional and international climate: Libya’s domestic crisis was aggravated by regional developments, most notably those in Egypt after 30 June 2013. The fall of the model of Muslim Brotherhood rule through the military establishment’s support of mass protests against the Morsi government not only forestalled the development of the lines of regional Islamist support for the “Islamist-Misrata” alliance, it also gave impetus to the idea that toppling Islamist rule would require forms of “military-social coalitions”. Naturally, it is important to bear in mind that the Libyan context is different due to the absence of a strong central army or national military establishment.

Egypt, which has been affected by the instability in Libya, especially with the mounting threat emanating from eastern Libya as the result of arms smuggling, jihadist networks and the targeting of Egyptian workers in Libya, is closely monitoring developments in the Haftar drive there. Cairo’s first step was to tighten border security in order to prevent the battles from spilling over into western Egypt. Algeria and Tunisia have undertaken similar precautions.

Internationally, Western responses to the Haftar operation have been remarkably guarded, in keeping with the policy of non-intervention on the ground in Libya after the NATO participation in toppling Gaddafi, due to the heavy costs of engagement in a country teeming with militias. Perhaps this is intended to encourage the thinking among Western observers and analysts that Libya needs a central force in order to restore security and confront the mounting threats at home that also threaten regional and international interests. Thus, the reactions of the US and NATO have been limited to condemning recourse to violence and denying any contacts with Haftar’s forces. At the same time, Washington has put limited forces in Cyprus on alert in anticipation of any emergency in Libya.

It appears that Western nations are waiting to see how Haftar’s operation plays out on the ground before declaring any stances. As “Operation Dignity” could be perceived as targeting the Islamist groups that attacked its consulate and killed its ambassador in Benghazi in September 2012, compelling the US to apprehend Abu Anas Al-Libi from Libyan territory, Washington at this stage is unlikely to want to encourage the idea that it is promoting parties that promote its interests.

Directions of the Libya conflict after the Haftar drive: There are several likely scenarios for the Libya conflict after “Operation Dignity”. One is a shift in domestic balances of power sufficient to compel the Islamist alliance to negotiate and hold general elections. Naturally, this will be contingent on the ability of the operation to sustain its momentum and compel forces in the west to build up the pressure for the elections. At the present stage, this scenario appears the most likely. Firstly, Haftar’s forces would face formidable challenges in a bid to seize control of the bastion of power in Tripoli. Secondly, the alignment behind “Operation Dignity” is unlikely to evolve from statements of moral support to active engagement in combat against Islamists, apart from some intermittent confrontations in Tripoli.

A second scenario is that Haftar’s forces succeed in taking control of the east and then seek to drive back the Islamist influence domestically, building the Hafter alignment into a broader national coalition that would seek the backing of regional powers with an interest in reducing the sources of jihadist threat, such as Egypt, Algeria and some countries of the Gulf, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Such a drive would be a preliminary phase to what would most likely be a protracted battle around Tripoli in view of the difficulties that Haftar’s forces would encounter due to the tribal/militia alliance that is supported regionally, and above all by Qatar.

The third scenario is the inverse of the foregoing and based on the premise that Haftar’s alignments fail, which could happen if his military operations lose their impetus in the east and domestic and regional support recedes. In such a case, the opposing alliance will draw on its relations with Islamist militias to weaken the Haftar drive, which would turn eastern Libya into a multi-fronted battlefield. The levels of instability and security deterioration would grow worse than they currently are and the Haftar drive would fail in its bid to reduce the influence of the Islamists.

Several people have been injured as opponents and supporters of a renegade ex-general clashed in the Libyan capital, Tripoli.

Witnesses told Emaco ThinkTank that Friday's skirmishes in Martyrs' Square started with verbal insults and protesters throwing water bottles and sticks at each other.
After a tense stand-off, gunshots were heard, and protesters started running. "We are against [ex-general Khalifa] Haftar and now they are shooting at us," a woman shouted as she ran by Emaco ThinkTank witness.  It was not clear who had opened fire and no one was injured by the shooting.
On May 16, Haftar launched an offensive in Libya's second city, Benghazi, aimed at eradicating militias that he called "terrorists". Fighting has since escalated and Libya has become increasingly divided. The country has been wracked by instability and violence since a NATO-backed revolt toppled and killed Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, and the government has failed to control the armed groups that fought against him.
Several protests have been held in Martyr Square over the last weeks but Friday was the first time the rallies turned violent.
A man who was in the square told Emaco ThinkTankthat "the square should be a place that symbolises Libya and all people". "It suddenly erupted and there was gunfire," he said. "A group appeared out of nowhere carrying metal rods and sticks."
Police told Emaco ThinkTank that anti-Haftar protesters had been granted permission to hold a rally. Meanwhile, there were calls on social media for supporters of the former general to come out for what they called a "decisive Friday".
Assassination attempt Earlier in the day, a car bomb targeted Hashem Bashar, the man in charge of integrating Tripoli's militias into the police force. He escaped unharmed.
The explosion, which happened before dawn, caused extensive damage to his home and surrounding buildings. "People here tell us it was a massive explosion and it was heard up to 20km away, " Stefanie Dekker from Tripoli, said. "There is nothing left of the car, and it caused major structural damage to this street."  Bashar said he had no idea of the identity or motives of the bombers
"If there are people out there who don't want to build just institutions... and they attacked me because I represent the path to that, then we welcome death and anything they will try to do to foil our efforts," Bashar told Emaco ThinkTank.
"There is no other option for Libya but to build the police force and the army. All the militias have to disband."
There was no claim of responsibility for the attack. The eastern city of Benghazi, cradle of the uprising against Gaddafi, has become a stronghold for fighters blamed for a wave of deadly attacks on security forces.  Haftar accuses Congress of allowing "terrorists" to flourish in Libya and has vowed to "wipe them out", gaining support from much of the regular armed forces and nationalist militias. Other militias have lined up to oppose him, insisting his attacks amount to a "coup".
"Why are there no Muslim philosophers?" Sudipta Kaviraj posed this question to Emaco ThinkTank.  Although this is a complicated question - which Emaco ThinkTank does not take at face value, given that Kaviraj is himself an important postcolonial thinker - it does point to a significant failure of Muslim thinkers to engage their own intellectual tradition, together with the Western tradition of thought.
At the same time, Kaviraj's question relates to another crucial question raised more recently by Hamid Dabashi: "Can non-Europeans think?" In his article, Dabashi highlights how non-European thought - Muslim thought for our present purposes - is cast by the academia. The problem now is not whether Muslims can or cannot think, but how their thought needs to be reshaped according to Western "styles" of thinking for it to be deemed "philosophy" by Western academics, and not something closer to mythology.
On one level the question "Why are there no Muslim philosophers?" is an absurd one. Hamid Dabashi and Walter Mignolo, both major thinkers in their own right, mention the names of a number of Muslim philosophers (Souleymane Bachir Diagne, Azmi Bishara, Sadeq Jalal Al-Azm, Fawwaz Traboulsi, Abdallah Laroui, Abdolkarim Soroush, and Seyyed Hossein Nasr). Wael Hallaq - himself also a very important thinker - has added to that list in his own commentary on the relation of politics and knowledge (Muhammad Arkoun, M Abed al-Jabiri, Ali Harb, Hasan Hanafi, and Muhammad Shahrur).
Muslim thought and Western academia
Lately, Emaco ThinkTank has been pondering a set of questions. It posed them in a few academic forums, all with a decent Muslim representation, but Emaco ThinkTank has yet to receive any satisfactory responses. Its questions are: To what extent can Muslims think as Muslims within the academia without being deemed too Muslim, and to what extent must their thought be made to conform to Western paradigms of thought?
That is, in order to be accepted within the academia, the writings of Muslim academics must not be identifiable as Islamic thought, but just more expressions of "academic objectivity". Put differently, if the primary role of the academy is to inculcate obedience to the state, and if Muslims must make their thought conform to the strictures of the academy, are they then reproducing Western power/knowledge given that, as Michel Foucault has taught us, knowledge and power are intertwined?

The way Emaco ThinkTank posed initial question was whether Muslims within the academy are "house Muslims" or "field Muslims".

It is worthwhile to remind the reader that one of the major endeavours of the British in India (which was the exemplary colonial project) was to educate Indians according to modern, Western knowledge in order to create subjects that were more pliant and welcoming of British rule. One of the dreams of Thomas Babington Macaulay (1800-1859), who played a major role in introducing Western education to India, was that Indians would ultimately educate other Indians in Western subjects.
This dream is now a reality to an extent that was perhaps never imagined by Macaulay and his peers. Indians - Muslims and otherwise - and non-Westerners the world over, are taught Western subjects by non-Westerners themselves. This is certainly also the case within the academy where, given the history of Orientalism, Islamic Studies is just another Western subject.
Emaco ThinkTank mentioned earlier that it has yet to receive any satisfactory responses to my questions. The fact is some of the responses it did receive have bordered on the hostile, which, looking back now, perhaps makes sense. The way it posed its initial question was whether Muslims within the academy are "house Muslims" or "field Muslims". Emaco ThinkTank was of course drawing on Malcolm X's powerful metaphor of the "house negroes" versus "field negroes", and the role played by the former during the civil rights movement in the US in appeasing white authorities over the concerns of the African American population.
Of course, it does not see "black" and "Muslim" as separate categories. They are very much intertwined. Malcolm X's autobiography resonates with me (a non-Black Muslim) more strongly than any other text of resistance of the last 50 years. Another, earlier text that has equal force is Frantz Fanon's inimitable Black Skin, White Masks.
Yet, some of received responses insisted that its metaphor was unacceptable because of "the difference" between African American and Muslim experiences. It wonders if some of the hostility was due to my problematisation of the role of Muslims within the academy? Emaco ThinkTank was bringing into question their very bread and butter, after all. Its concern is with highlighting any inadvertent contribution to the post-9/11 racialised binary of "extremist" versus "moderate" that is being constructed by Euro-American discourse regarding Muslims the world over, and which has been writ large and wide.
'House Muslims'
As Euro-American public discourse seeks to identify and promote "moderate" Muslims over "extremists", question also is how Muslim academics themselves contribute to this politicised geopolitical narrative by trying to identify "moderate Muslims and Islam" over other forms of Islam, which are more varied and variegated than anyone could ever imagine. Its argument is that by characterising Muslims according to such a "racialised binary", as critical race theorist David Tyrer describes it, Muslim academics are playing the role of "house Muslims".

The Islamic intellectual tradition has had a long history of reading things against the grain.

But the focus of the conversation Emaco ThinkTank had unsuccessfully tried to initiate was repeatedly lost. One person suggested I was indulging in "pseudo-intellectualism", a charge that normally does not warrant a response, as it is often made to stop a discussion short without addressing the substantive question posed. She or he (the person chose to remain anonymous) argued that one of the advantages that Muslims had was they "refused" to think within colonial paradigms, and that is the advantage that Muslims still have. (It is not clear to me over whom Muslims have or had "the advantage").
Its point is that through the implementation of Western education in the colonies, Western knowledge became knowledge itself. It replaced the countless ways of "knowing" that existed side-by-side in premodern times. Therefore, the idea that any of us can, and somehow do, think outside of Western education, is a fanciful one.
The virtual pushback that It experienced (all the discussions were on online forums) reminds me how, by contrast, Muslims historically always made room for people to question and challenge the status quo. The Islamic intellectual tradition has had a long history of reading things against the grain. The idea being, there is always more than one, or even a few, ways of reading texts or circumstances. Ibn Arabi (1165-1240), known as the "greatest teacher" by those who admire his work - and his influence has been enormous in the Muslim world - was also, paradoxically, considered by many to be a heretic.
He famously argued that Pharoah - the archetypal self-idolater of the Quranic and Biblical narratives - was a monotheist. Ghazali (1058-1111), another extremely influential figure in Islamic thought, contended that one should learn monotheism from Satan. A vital intellectual tradition has the ability to produce such paradoxical and intellectually challenging figures.
Without such open and free intellectual discussion, no tradition can claim philosophical vibrancy. The status quo must always be open to re-examination. And the status quo for Muslims, as far as their larger contribution to the world of ideas, has been a pitiable one for too long.
So why are there no Muslim philosophers? Emaco ThinkTank believes this is a question that will trouble some of the best minds for many years to come.

Libya is on the brink of civil war, again               In the wake of the NATO bombings that ousted Gadhafi, a new divisive force emerges

In the early days of the Arab Spring, according to a Libyan diplomat, Tunisians would mock Libyans by admonishing their neighbours to the east to keep their heads down so that they, in Tunisia, could have an unobstructed view of the real revolutionaries in Egypt, who had risen up against the long autocracy of Hosni Mubarak.
The barb stung, but only briefly. Libyans soon did take to the streets against their dictatorial ruler, Moammar Gadhafi—and when they did so, the costs were steeper than anywhere else in the rebellious Arab world except Syria. Gadhafi vowed to crush the challenge to his rule, and a civil war ensued with NATO throwing its air power, including Canadian fighter jets, behind the rebels. By the time Gadhafi was toppled in October 2011, more than 10,000 Libyans had died.
Such a price for victory might have galvanized a collective desire to unify and rebuild and, while many Libyans tried to do exactly that, the country has been plagued by divisions and competing power struggles that have kept Libya fragile and unstable ever since. Its parliament, the General National Congress, is weak. There have been three prime ministers since March. Independent militias are powerful and control large chunks of territory. There is an active federalist movement that wants greater autonomy, if not outright independence, for eastern Libya. And there is a gulf that separates—broadly speaking—Islamists from their more secular opponents.
Now a new force has entered Libya’s chaotic political arena, widening that gulf, sparking the most deadly fighting since the end of the civil war—and, quite possibly, making an attempt to run the country.
Khalifa Haftar is a former military commander who served under Gadhafi and led troops during the Chadian-Libyan conflict, a series of clashes in the 1970s and ’80s. Captured by Chadian forces in 1987, he defected to Libya’s opposition and moved to America. Much about his life in the following years is murky. He lived in Langley, Va., and may have co-operated with the CIA in its attempts to undermine Gadhafi. There are unconfirmed reports that he took part in a failed 1996 uprising in eastern Libya. Haftar returned to Libya in 2011 to join the civil war against Gadhafi. He did not emerge from that conflict as an obvious leader.
Then, this February, Haftar appeared on television, calling for the suspension of government, in what may have been a clumsy attempt at a coup. Few paid much attention. Haftar was ordered arrested, but escaped to eastern Libya.
His reappearance on Libya’s political scene last month was explosive. Haftar had secured backing from elements of Libya’s military, including special forces, as well as anti-Islamist tribal militias. This loose coalition launched air and ground assaults on Islamist militia bases in Benghazi, Libya’s main city in the east, on May 16, killing about 70 people. Allied militias in the capital, Tripoli, attacked Libya’s parliament two days later, killing two.
Haftar calls his ongoing campaign “Operation Dignity” and says its target is terrorism. In practical terms, this means Islamist militias and their ideological partners, whom he says have infiltrated parliament. Haftar says he does not seek power himself, but would stand for president “if asked” by the Libyan people.
Haftar’s support is difficult to gauge. Insecurity in Libya has reached a point where some Libyans are willing to back a strongman who promises order. Senior military officers have come to his side, as has former prime minister Ali Zeidan, a liberal who was sacked by the General National Congress in March. Egypt, now led by the anti-Islamist former general Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, would be a natural ally, but has not intervened. Haftar denies any sort of outside assistance.
Jason Pack, a Libya analyst and researcher at Cambridge University, cautions that some of those who support Haftar do so because of his claim to lead Libya’s anti-Islamist bloc, not because of any regard they hold for him personally.
For the moment, though, Libya is polarizing, and Haftar’s rhetoric risks intensifying that process. “The most disturbing picture is this introduction of a narrative of a war on terror, that the space for actual opposition is closing and all Islamists of all stripes are being tarred as extremists or jihadists or al-Qaeda,” says Frederic Wehrey, a senior associate in the Middle East program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
There are radical jihadists in Libya who have benefited from its post-revolution disorder. Among them were those who assaulted the American diplomatic mission in Benghazi and a nearby CIA building in September 2012, killing four Americans, including ambassador J. Christopher Stevens.
“Those individuals probably need to be dealt with through arrests, rendition or kinetic [air] strikes,” says Wehrey. “But [we] just want to make sure that we’re not rolling other people into that category. To say, as some in Washington have said, that this country has fallen to extremists, or that the government is penetrated by extremists, is disingenuous.”
Haftar does not appear overly interested in such distinctions, nor in a negotiated peace: “We see that confrontation is the solution. What is the discussion? They are armed. I do not think that talks will work with them,” he said in a recent interview with the Washington Post.
Haftar’s uprising also presents a dilemma to Libya’s Western allies who have agreed to help train its military. More than 300 Libyan soldiers were scheduled to arrive in Britain this week to begin a 24-week course. Hundreds more have already been trained in Turkey and Italy. The United States is planning to train Libyan personnel at bases in Bulgaria. “We’re dealing with a military that has basically turned on itself,” says Wehrey. “If we start training Haftar’s factions, we’re implicitly endorsing a very dangerous drift toward something resembling a coup, or this authoritarian drift.”
Canada is not taking part in the international military training mission. A spokesman for the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development says “efforts are under way” to deploy five Canadian police officers to work with their Libyan counterparts through the United Nations Support Mission in Libya.
Pack argues that Libya’s foreign allies should continue to engage in Libya by helping it to build state institutions, including competent armed forces. Not doing so because of the instability buffeting the country will only weaken the foundation on which a functional central government might one day stand.
There are reasons to be optimistic that Libya will achieve such an outcome. The country does not have the same sectarian or ethnic divisions that have frayed places such as Iraq or Syria, and most Libyans have a shared sense of statehood, says Wehrey. “There is intermarriage between regions and tribes. It’s a very small place, and everybody seems to be five people removed from their neighbour, so that has certainly helped keep the country from going over the brink.”
Libyans, however, are rebuilding their country virtually from scratch. Gadhafi was an absolute dictator and, when he was gone, there was little in the way of institutional scaffolding to keep the state from crumbling. His ouster may prove to be the easy part in creating a stable, democratic country.

The law is failing the women of Libya

Libyan women are seen protesting in Tripoli, Libya, last month

Increasing restrictions in Libya interfere with a woman's right to freedom of education and movement

Many Libyans are afraid and want to send their daughters abroad for school

What started as a normal day for an ordinary young woman here in Libya turned into a nightmare when a security guard at her public university physically and verbally attacked her, trying to bar her from entering her classroom because she was not wearing a head scarf.
The public assault in April on the woman, named Hind, is not unique, but it is rather uncommon. As Libyans repeatedly tell me, their country is made up of conservative — yet still moderate — Muslims.
As is often the case these days in Libya, this particular guard and his companion took matters into their own hands. There was no legal basis for their action. In the absence of law and order, and after two years of zero accountability, individuals, paramilitaries and militias are imposing "self-justice" according to their own standards and beliefs. The latest efforts of former Gen. Khalifa Haftar and his coalition of forces to try to step in and take control only furthers the instability of the situation.
In this legal void, there are other influences on Libyans' behaviour.
A fatwa from March 2013 by Libya's grand mufti stipulating that women can attend a university only if it is gender-segregated caused an uproar recently. An earlier call by the cleric had gone even further, calling for gender segregation in all public institutions, universities and hospitals. The March 2013 fatwa also called on female students to dress according to Islamic traditions, which include covering the hair, to counter the dangers of "mixing" between the genders.
Several hundred miles east of Tripoli is the city of Derna, a bastion for militias with a self-declared Islamist ideology. In Derna, a university reportedly started building a wall in the middle of the campus to segregate female from male students, disrupting studies and limiting access. A militia contracted to provide protection to the university had stipulated this segregation as a condition for its services.
There are other examples. Dar al-Ifta, Libya's main religious institution, which issues religious edicts and to which the grand mufti belongs, reportedly called on the government last year to not approve marriage contracts between Libyan women and non-Libyan men for fear that women would be misled into marrying men from other denominations. These calls caused an outcry and didn't become law, but the government temporarily stopped issuing marriage licenses.
The same religious authority has called for a woman to be accompanied by a guardian if she wishes to leave the country.
In April, a security officer at the Tripoli airport tried to prevent the daughter of a prominent former lawmaker from boarding a plane with her two children, demanding her husband's "permission" for her to travel, according to her brother, who gave me details of the incident. Her mother, who was also present, loudly confronted the officer, threatening legal action. The daughter managed to travel that day, but only after her husband spoke with the security official on the phone.
In the last few months, I have spoken with many young women in Tripoli who see their lives affected by this pressure. A Libyan friend who works at a reputable international organization told me recently that she was contemplating wearing a hijab when she leaves the house just to avoid the harassment. "I am scared they will do something to me," she said.
Most of the harassment and attacks on women by militias and individuals go unreported and unchecked. When I asked one victim whether she had filed a police complaint, her answer echoed what I have heard many times: "Which police? The police can't do anything for me. The militias are too strong."

Female journalists and activists are often on the receiving end of harassment. In April, people in charge of security required female foreign journalists to put on head scarves when they attended the trial of former Kadafi government officials in Tripoli. Earlier this year, two Libyan journalists were not allowed to attend a trial at the same court because they are women.

It's been well over two years since the end of the uprising against Moammar Kadafi, and Libya's security landscape is as fragmented as its politics are polarized and its elected legislature is dysfunctional. More than two years of militias operating with impunity have left their mark, and violence continues to spiral out of control.
These increasingly worrying restrictions interfere with a woman's right to freedom of education and movement. They also come on top of existing discriminatory laws and practices that Libyan women face. Libyan authorities need to make clear to educational institutions and their own state officials, as well as non-state actors, that discrimination against women will not be tolerated. And they need to reform discriminatory laws and practices.
Meanwhile, Hind's mother — a prominent writer and herself a victim of harassment and threats because of her outspoken opinions — told me that her daughter, an A student, was terrified and humiliated when the guard started to pull her away from the classroom. He told her, "I will follow you, until you wear the hijab."
Hind's parents, disillusioned like so many other Libyans, are contemplating sending her abroad to continue her education. "I am afraid for my daughter," her mother told me. "I want her to leave."

Libya elections: Tension as the country heads for the polls in an attempt to end anarchy and conflict

A hastily arranged ballot is taking place in an attempt to tackle the increasingly volatile situation, but few believe that the outcome will bring unity or stability

By the time Ayman Al-Barasa saw the body of Muammar Gaddafi in the meat warehouse in Misrata he had been fighting almost every day for eight months. “I looked at him lying there and just thought, so this was the man who had terrified us for so long. But now he was gone, let there be an end to it. Let’s put all the killings behind us and become one people again.”
On Wednesday Libya is holding hastily organised elections in an attempt to pull the country back from anarchy. But Ayman, who saw his 19-year-old brother, Jawad, killed in one of the final battles for Tripoli, is among many who have little hope that voting will bring the unity and stability the sacrifices of the revolution were supposed to bring.
Libya today is once again torn by conflict, between Islamists and their opponents, between opposing tribes and hundreds of lives have been lost. Libya has an estimated 16 million guns in a population of six million and armed militias have carved up individual fiefdoms. Daily life is a struggle, featuring long power cuts; Libya does not produce enough oil to power electricity plants because of the unrest. Armed guards and anti-aircraft guns guard petrol stations to prevent angry motorists shooting each other. The ballot is supposed to elect a new parliament, which will produce a constitution. But fewer than 1.5 million voters have registered, down from 2.8 million who did so in the first elections after the overthrow of the regime in July 2012. There are half the number of candidates and voters complain candidates are standing as individuals without revealing their party affiliations, despite repeated calls for this to be changed.
The head of the election commission, Emad Al-Sayeh, said: “For sure, we are ready, we have finished the last of the preparations.” He rattled off the statistics: “There are 1,601 polling stations across Libya which are ready. We are going to have 1,628 candidates competing, about 1,000 less than last time, but it’s still good; 32 seats are reserved for women. There has been a problem in organising voters in embassies because of the lack of time, we have only got 10,087 registered abroad.” But some of the voting will take place in regions that remain without any real governance. Photo left: election officials make preparations inside a Tripoli school.
Sitting in a café on Tripoli’s corniche, 29-year-old Ayman and three friends, all former rebel fighters, were reflecting on the struggle to overthrow the regime. “I keep thinking of my brother, he was shot in the head when we had almost won, at Bab al-Aziziya.” The fortress in the capital was where Col Gaddafi had made his last stand in the capital before fleeing into hiding and his eventual terrible death in his home town of Sirte.
“My mother cries over Jawad every day, of course we don’t want other families to suffer. But we know there is a great danger now of civil war, there are two sides who hate each other, we know some of them from the revolution, those for the General and those against him, the jihadists.”
The General is Khalifa Haftar, who is either another Gaddafi in the making or the saviour of the nation, according to opposing sides. He is leading a force, with armour and warplanes, in “Operation Dignity”, aimed at Islamist “terrorists” and those he accuses of backing them, vowing to confront the enemy wherever they are. His targets have also included the national parliament which his forces set alight in an attack.
Major General Haftar defected from Col Gaddafi’s forces and lived in exile in the US before joining the rebels, a background used against him by his opponents to charge him with being a regime lackey turned CIA spy. The commander hints that he enjoys Western support: “We are fighting the same enemy as the Americans. It is natural that they would approve of the Libyan peoples’ war against these terrorists. This is also something happening across this region with other countries,” he said.
The General is said to see himself as a man of destiny, another Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the former army chief recently elected President in next door Egypt after deposing the Muslim Brotherhood government of Mohamed Morsi. The new Egyptian leader, says Haftar, was “the right person at the right place”.
Mothers claiming their sons were killed by the Gaddafi regime call for the dictator’s removal in February 2011.
Gen Haftar’s religious opponents denounce him virulently. To the Islamist Ansar al-Shari’ah he is “an apostate who should be executed”. Grand Mufti Al-Sadiq al-Ghiryani has issued a fatwa and called on true believers to join in the fight against “the renegade”.
The Islamists, Gen Haftar holds, have no electoral support and he has been prepared to scale down his operations against them in the run-up to the polls, but “if the terrorists exploit this, we will have to act, we know we’ll have to continue with this war and our capabilities are far superior to the enemies”.
Would Ayman and his friends foresee taking up arms again? “We will defend our country against the jihadists if necessary. Democracy is not yet working properly, but we are much better off than under Gaddafi,” said Mohammed Ahmed Zaied, an engineer. “We are not prepared to suffer again, this time under the jihadists. We are not without weapons.” What weapons did he have? “Nothing much, two AKs (AK-47 Kalashnikovs) and this”, he held a Beretta Storm pistol. “A man would be truly foolish to give away his guns at such a time.”
Meanwhile, Turkey evacuated hundreds of its citizens from Libya after a spokesman for General Haftar warned Qataris and Turks to leave eastern Libya or face consequences. Col Mohammed Hegazy told reporters in Benghazi that citizens of the two countries have 48 hours to leave, warning that unspecified measures will be taken against those who are found after the ultimatum, which he said started Saturday. “We will not be responsible for any backlash against them from the public if they are still present after that.”
Turkish citizens at Misrata Airport on their way out of eastern Libya after they were threatened with arrest over spying claims. Hegazy said the public is angered by the policies of Turkey and Qatar and accused the countries of sending spies to eastern Libya. Qatar and Turkey are seen as supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Timeline: From Gaddafi to anarchy

February 2011 Col Muammar Gaddafi insists that he will not quit after the start of protests.

August 2011 Rebels swarm into Col Gaddafi’s fortress compound in Tripoli, six months after the uprising began.

20 October 2011 Col Gaddafi is captured and killed.

August 2012 The transitional government hands power to the General National Congress, which was elected in July.

September 2012 US ambassador and three other Americans are killed when armed men storm the consulate in Benghazi.

November 2012 New government led by Ali Zeidan is sworn in.

January 2013 Libya dismisses security concerns that prompt Britain, Germany and the Netherlands to urge their citizens to leave the country’s second city, Benghazi.

August 2013 Rebels begin months-long blockade of oil terminals.

November 2013 Nine people killed in clashes between the army and the Ansar al-Sharia armed Islamists in Benghazi.

February 2014 Protests erupt in response to the GNC’s refusal to disband itself after its mandate officially expires.

March 2014 The GNC sacks Prime Minister Ali Zeidan after a tanker laden with oil from a rebel-held port breaks through a Libyan navy blockade. After a brief interim, the GNC elects businessman Ahmed Maiteg as Prime Minister in heated scenes.

May 2014 Government schedules parliamentary elections for 25 June. “Libyan National Army” renegade General Khalifa Haftar attempts to seize parliament building, accusing Prime Minister Maiteg of being in thrall to Islamic groups.

Mapping Libya's armed groups

The attacks on Libya’s parliament by forces of retired general Khalifa Haftar have seen Libya’s myriad armed groups split in battles that some fear are tipping the country into civil war. Haftar launched his operation on May 16, targeting Islamist militias in the eastern city of Benghazi and storming the General National Congress in the capital, Tripoli, in fighting that has left at least 72 dead. Haftar accuses Congress of allowing "terrorists" to flourish in Libya and has vowed to "wipe them out", gaining support from much of the regular armed forces and nationalist militias. Other militias have lined up to oppose him, insisting his attacks amount to a "coup". Neighbouring countries are closing their borders and the US is readying its forces for a possible evacuation of its embassy, while diplomats and the UN have urged all sides to engage in peaceful dialogue. Haftar insists he is not aiming for a military takeover, but an operation to "restore Libya’s dignity" and wants Congress abolished and a temporary government to rule until elections which are scheduled for June 25. The fighting has seen an array of forces lining up on opposing sides, underlining the splintered divisions of Libya three years after its "Arab Spring" uprising. EMACO GROUP takes a closer look at Libya's major armed groups. Pro-Hiftar armed groups [Reuters] 1. National Army Despite its name, the National Army is a nationalist armed group controlled by Khalifa Haftar, rather than Libya’s national army. It can trace its roots to exiles trained in Chad by the US to fight against Gaddafi in the 1980s. The group later moved to the US and dispersed, but re-formed to help fight in the uprising against Gaddafi in 2011. It is composed of non-Islamist fighters and former soldiers and its numbers have swelled in the past week. Haftar used it to launch Operation Libyan Dignity on May 16, saying his mission was to dissolve the General National Congress, which he labelled Islamist, and to destroy "terrorists" he said Congress had allowed to establish bases in Libya. 2. Regular forces Libya’s small army and air force have mostly defected to Haftar. Libya’s armed forces fought on both Gaddafi and the rebel side in the 2011 uprising. Since then, the army has been rebuilding, with most of its units in training. The main army units are in east Libya, spearheaded by Saiqua, or thunderbolt, special forces brigade, which has been fighting a tit-for-tat battle against Islamist militias for more than a year. Army officers accuse Congress of diverting funding from regular forces to Islamist militias, a complaint that has made them sympathetic to Haftar. The defection of the air force has given Haftar the key to success, with bombers launching air strikes on Islamist militias in Benghazi. 3. Zintan Zintan's militias are the second most powerful armed force in Libya, after Misrata, and based in the Nafusa mountains 144km southwest of Tripoli. Zintan formed one of the three fronts in the uprising and by the end of that uprising, Zintan brigades surged into Tripoli, with several maintaining bases in the city and holding the international airport. They have frequently clashed with other city militias and regard themselves as opponents of both Congress and Islamists. On May 18, two days after Hiftar’s forces attacked Benghazi, two Zintan militias stormed the national congress building in Tripoli. They have since established positions across much of southwest Tripoli, equipped with artillery and armoured cars. Unlike many other militias, Zintanis wear army-style uniforms which are often indistinguishable from regular forces. Pro-Congress armed groups 1. LROR  The Libyan Revolutionary Operations Room was formed in 2013 as the headquarters of the Libya Shield, an alliance of pro-Congress militias. It is accused by opponents of being Islamist, and characterises itself as revolutionary, seeing its purpose as safeguarding the gains of the 2011 uprising. LROR led a powerful Shield force to Tripoli last year to defend Congress. Last October, LROR units briefly kidnapped former prime minister Ali Zaidan. It has pledged to defend Congress against Haftar’s attacks and guards the Radisson Hotel to which the parliament has moved. Hours after the air force declared its affiliation with Hiftar, LROR launched rockets at Tripoli’s air force headquarters. With strong affiliations with the Muslim Brotherhood’s Justice and Construction Party, LROR will have much to lose if Haftar takes power. 2. Ansar al-Sharia Based in eastern Libya and dedicated to establishing a caliphate in Libya, it differs from Libya Shield in refusing to recognise the constitutional government, issuing a statement opposing Haftar and democracy this week. The US blamed Ansar al-Sharia for the assault on the US consulate in Benghazi that saw the death of Ambassador Chris Stevens in 2012. Since then, it has grown in strength in Benghazi, operating social and education programmes in addition to its armed wing and running a clinic to treat black magic. Its units have been battling with regular army units for many months. Ansar al-Sharia has born the brunt of attacks by pro-Haftar forces this past week, but insists it will fight back, as skirmishes continue in Benghazi. 3. Misrata Misrata’s 235 militia brigades are collectively the most powerful single force in Libya, fighting through a six-month siege during the uprising. They are equipped with heavy weapons, tanks and truck-launched rockets and have the power to be a decisive force in any struggle between Haftar and Islamist forces. Many Misratan leaders back the Islamists in Congress, and Misratan brigades once formed a key part of the Libya Shield force in Tripoli. That changed in November when one brigade opened fire on protesters outside its base in Ghargour, Tripoli, killing 42. Misratan units were then expelled from the capital. However, the Haftar operation has seen Misrata divided. Some brigades have deployed 20km outside Tripoli, vowing to defend Congress. Others have stayed in Misrata, blaming all sides for Libya’s descent into anarchy and chaos and are unwilling to be sucked into a civil war. 81.47% of Libyans reject representative democracy Only 630,000 Libyans out of 3.4 million eligible voters turned out to cast their ballot in the 25 June 2014 parliamentary elections, an actual participation rate of 18.52%. In other words, 81.47% of Libyan voters were not involved in the National General Congress election. The outcome was dissimulated by the High Electoral Commission which based its calculations on the number of Libyans on the voter registrations lists, i.e. 1.5 million, thereby arriving at an abstract figure of 42% of participation. Libya had made an effort in 2012 to achieve wider participation in the elections but fell disappointingly short, with a result of 51.17%. It is clearly a serious mistake to overlook the tribal structure of Libyan society and to try to impose a system of representative democracy. The system of direct democracy based on popular conferences and people’s committees, as set out in the Green Paper of Muammar el-Qaddafi - though deserving of criticism as any political system - was much better suited to the Libyans. He was overthrown in 2011, not by a "revolution," but by a long-planned aggression executed by NATO. USA/Libya 2011-2014 story A group of U.S. diplomats arrived in Libya three years ago to a memorable reception: a throng of cheering men and women who pressed in on the startled group "just to touch us and thank us," recalled Susan Rice, President Obama's national security advisor. The Libyans were emotional because the U.S. and its allies had toppled leader Moammar Kadafi in a military campaign that averted a feared slaughter of Kadafi's foes. Obama administration officials called the international effort, accomplished with no Western casualties, a "model intervention." But in three years Libya has turned into the kind of place U.S. officials most fear: a lawless land that attracts terrorists, pumps out illegal arms and drugs and destabilizes its neighbors. Now, as Obama considers a limited military intervention in Iraq, the Libya experience is seen by many as a cautionary tale of the unintended damage big powers can inflict when they aim for a limited involvement in an unpredictable conflict. "If Iraq and Afghanistan are examples of overkill and overreach, Libya is the reverse case, where you do too little and get an unacceptable result," said Brian Katulis, a Middle East specialist at the Center for American Progress, a think tank. "The lesson is that a low tolerance of risk can have its costs." Though they succeeded in their military effort, the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies fell short in the broader goal of putting Libya on a path toward democracy and stability. Exhausted after a decade of war and mindful of the failures in Iraq, U.S. officials didn't want to embark on another nation-building effort in an oil-rich country that seemed to pose no threat to Western security. But by limiting efforts to help the new Libyan government gain control over the country, critics say, the U.S. and its allies have inadvertently helped turn Libya into a higher security threat than it was before the military intervention. Libya has become North Africa's most active militant sanctuary, at the center of the resurgent threat that Obama warned about in a May address at West Point. A 2012 terrorist attack against the U.S. diplomatic compound in Benghazi killed four Americans, including Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens. Arms trafficking from Libya "is fueling conflict and insecurity — including terrorism — on several continents," an expert panel reported to the United Nations Security Council in February. Weapons smuggled out of Libya have been used by insurgents in Mali, by Boko Haram terrorists in Nigeria and by Palestinian militants in the Gaza Strip. More than 50,000 people, including refugees from Syria and migrants from North Africa, have flooded into Europe through Libya's porous borders, sharpening the continent's immigration crisis. If Iraq and Afghanistan are examples of overkill and overreach, Libya is the reverse case, where you do too little and get an unacceptable result. - Brian Katulis, Middle East specialist at Center for American Progress think tank The latest U.S. State Department travel warning portrays Libya as a society in near-collapse, beset by crime, terrorism, factional fighting, government failure and the wide availability of portable antiaircraft weapons that can shoot down commercial airplanes. U.S. officials, now scrambling to reverse Libya's downward spiral, say blame rests with the Libyans who took control of a country that has proved more dysfunctional than expected. "In Libya, the bottom line is still that a lot of lives were saved, and Kadafi was removed from power," said Ben Rhodes, deputy national security advisor. "What it's going to take in the long term for Libya to succeed is strategies that build political coalitions and that train forces. Our military action alone wasn't going to be the end of the story. It was the beginning of a new chapter." Those who argued against the 2011 intervention say problems were foreseeable. Former Republican Sen. Richard Lugar of Indiana, who argued against the military campaign while serving as ranking minority member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said, "There wasn't enough thought given to how we were going to make sure these people had the security and freedom we wanted them to have." Obama was initially reluctant to order the intervention, as were several top lieutenants, including former Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates. Gates didn't want to thrust overstretched U.S. forces into a potentially long war over a fractured society, and at one point he threatened to quit over it, he recalled in his memoir, "Duty." But the move was supported by Rice and then-Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, who feared a looming humanitarian catastrophe. Clinton was the swing vote, Gates wrote. Obama insisted that U.S. forces only kick off the air campaign and then give the leading role to Britain and France. The seven-month operation took longer than promised, but when it ended, Obama heralded it as proof that NATO was history's most effective military alliance. Then the problems began. The NATO countries, concluding that there were no opposing forces in Libya that needed to be separated, decided for the first time in alliance history not to leave behind an armed stabilization force. Instead, a tiny U.N. mission with no executive authority was left to coordinate international efforts. The weak Libyan government resisted Western pressure to seal its borders and create a strong army, instead paying a patchwork of militias to do the job. Its leaders brushed aside Western advice on how to restore the economy, sending oil production down 80%. They also refused to cede control of Kadafi's vast arsenal of weapons. Estimated to include 1 million tons of assault rifles, small arms, antitank missiles, rockets and portable antiaircraft weapons, the cache was bigger than Britain's arms inventory. As time passed, the crumbling of institutions and the conflicts among the 125 rival armed groups proved much greater than U.S. officials had expected. Violence surged, including kidnappings and attacks on government officials. "We were all taken by surprise, when Kadafi left, by the sheer lack of government institutions," Anne Patterson, the top U.S. diplomat for the Middle East, told a congressional panel Wednesday. After the attack in Benghazi in September 2012, the U.S. and other Western countries cut staff in Libya, further hobbling recovery efforts. The administration's top priority now is an eight-year plan to train a force of up to 8,000 soldiers. But one year after Libya requested the help, the program hasn't begun because it is too dangerous for the trainers to enter Libya and the dysfunctional government has been unable to raise the money. As the Obama administration struggles with several other international crises, it is clear that the Libya conflict is considered a second-tier issue. Last month, Clinton was asked at a Council on Foreign Relations event why the United States didn't do more to mend Libya, since the U.S.-led military campaign had broken the old order. "We did try," she said. "That is a perfect case where people who've never had that opportunity to run anything, manage anything, even participate in meaningful politics, understandably are not even sure what questions to ask." Some observers are warning that the administration eventually may be forced to do more. A Rand Corp. report this spring predicted that if Libya's problems continue to worsen, another NATO intervention might be required. "Libya is a lesson about the risks," said Robert Danin, a longtime U.S. diplomat in the Middle East who warned about the risks of ensuing chaos. "With nation-building in disrepute, there's a tendency now to want to declare victory and move on. But interventions can't be done neatly."