Thursday 20 October 2016

LIBYA 19.10.2016

It's been a hellish week end for Libya, torn by a civil war in a context of generalized anarchy where to lord are the weapons: Friday, September 14 militiamen loyal to former Prime Minister Islamist al-Khalifa Ghwell took control of the Tripoli area around the Hotel Rixos and occupied the headquarters of the State Council, announcing a "shot" state at a news conference a few hours later. The militias did not have to fire a shot because the local security forces have turned to escape without posing the problem in the least.

Firefights occurred thereafter for the whole weekend in the area of ​​the naval base in Abu Seta, in Tripoli, just between the militias of al-Gwell and loyalists to the government of national unity, which the former prime minister has coup called "illegal executive authority." In the night between Saturday and Sunday, a column of 50 military vehicles left Misurata, where 300 Italian soldiers are also operating, heading for Tripoli to support and defend the government of al-Serraj and Sunday afternoon, October 16, the UN envoy Martin Kobler has clearly stated, on behalf of the UN, his disappointment at the worsening situation in Tripoli: "These actions generate more disorder and insecurity must end for the benefit of the Libyan people."

Meanwhile, the Libyan government is located in Tunisia, barricaded in a hotel trying to unravel the many and complicated skeins Libyan, playing endless meetings: too dangerous to stay in Tripoli. The coup leaders have restored the old administration, the "national salvation government", and al-Ghwell himself decreed the "failure" of the current Presidency of the Council and the UN-backed government. Six months after the advent of al-Serraj government, the result of a deal that seemed endless, and that certainly was characterized by considerable political fragility, Libya falls back again into chaos and a "new" actor made his entrance on the Libyan scene Khalifa al-Gwell.

Across the country, in the west of Tobruk controlled by men of General Khalifa Haftar, Parliament is not recognized by the UN and the government-to Serraj met Monday, October 17 and has basically established a wait-position, to observe the as the events and then decide what to do: "Now we have two governments in Tripoli [...] the situation there is always out of control: it is a city where live 150 different militias," said the MP Salah Suhbi, highlighting what is undoubtedly the main problem of the government-to Serraj: the failure to set its own security force loyal to its institutional political program. Without the presence of the institutions in the streets, like the Police or the Army, the Libyan capital was literally divided between the different lords of the local militia, in a power struggle that the coup of the men of al-Gwell simply exemplified.

In recent days the British ambassador in Tripoli Peter Millett has decided to move to Tunis for personal security reasons: kidnapping her both to extortion purposes that do not, are on the agenda.

In light of all this one wonders military sense of commitment in place by the various souls of the international coalition, only Great Britain and Italy have sent to Libya 5,000 units since the beginning of 2016 to train army men government, the same that if they are taken to his heels in front of the coup plotters without a shot shoot. There is also another aspect, certainly not secondary, that brings out more of a doubt about the meaning of the Italian presence in Misrata: according Frederic Wehrey, a research associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the militias of Misrata - trained, armed and cured by Italians - they are divided internally into two factions in an internecine struggle for supremacy of one: on the one hand there are the Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood on the other. The first go the 604esimo Infantry Battalion, the brother commands former imam of Cordoba, the cleric Khalid bin Rajab al-Firjani brutally killed by Islamic State this summer after he had publicly criticized and rejected the Islamists to use his mosque for their sermons, and are supported by the Salafis commanders of different Tripolitan militias, such as the Battalion Bab Tajura or Special Deterrence Force Tripoli, faithful to Abdelraouf Kara.

The 604th Battalion joined in May with the coalition of various armed groups revamped by al-Serraj government uniting fighters from Sirte, Bani Walid, Tripoli, Zintan, Zliten and Sabha. Almost exclusively Salafis, very active against the Islamic State and the Islamic faction, are considered "Salafists quietist", that is, followers of the doctrine of religious obedience Rabia bin Hadi al-Madkhali: no electoral activism or armed struggle and decades of hatred for the Brotherhood Muslim, the other soul of the militias of Misrata fighting the Daesh Islamists and al-Qaeda.

The Madkhali followers took his foot in Libya about ten years ago, and after the fall of Gaddafi have literally destroyed the Sufi heritage of Libya and persecuted brotherhood: their social control policies were characterized by the anti-vice police and dall ' very strict application of moral rules of Sharia. Today they are fighting alongside the militias Haftar in eastern Libya and alongside the Tripolitan government forces in western Libya, taking care to keep the foot in both camps rather uncomfortable.

The other soul of the militias of Misrata is the Muslim Brotherhood, as the Misratan: followers of the Mufti of Tripoli Sadiq al-Ghariani, there are many who believe that the Salafis freed from Sirte Daesh their intent is to dominate the local, religious institutions , policy and public security. The same fears that nourish the Brothers to the Salafist militias: a dog chasing its tail.

The differences between the two souls of the Tripolitanian coalition militias, however, are not only political and religious roots but also tribal: the local tribal rivalry and Sirtawi Warfalla, for example, are now more alive than ever.

With the choice of al-Serraj government to remain in Tunisia for the risk of security reasons it is that these souls in conflict, until now capable - at least partially - to fight with a common enemy, they can get away, even if you do not clash, and open a new crisis scenario in its already quite complicated Libyan mosaic. Meanwhile the Americans have significantly increased the number of air strikes in Libya from September 21 were carried out 324 raids on the country, more than double those of the previous month, in contrast with the finding of the White House on August 1, when Obama he explained that the bombing campaign would focus only briefly on the coastal area. In late September, the campaign was extended and extended, as well as intensified, and a US military official revealed to Fox News that the intervention is expected to last several months. And this despite the occupant of the White House had defined, in January, as his "worst mistake" just the American interference in Libya for Gaddafi's fall, exactly five years ago.

20 October 2011 Muammar Gaddafi was pulled out of the hole in which he was hiding, beaten and humiliated, loaded on the hood of a pickup and executed among the liberation of the rebels screams. Today Libya has not authoritative centralized authority, has a coup government in the capital itself, a rebel parliament in Tobruk, rampant crime, is a valuable hub for human traffickers, its economy virtually does not exist anymore and the country is fragmented into an almost irreparable, torn by ethnic conflicts, religious and power. A political national tragedy, humanitarian and identity that reflected on Europe, Africa and the Middle East compounded by quarrelsome Libyans and ancient grudges, and the interests of foreign countries: Egypt, Al-Sisi the different souls of the international coalition, with France, which seems to support Haftar while all other supporting al-Serraj. A chaos that is increasingly ungovernable.

Friday 14 October 2016

Tripoli 13.10.2016

The Libyan capital, Tripoli, is living an unprecedented state of violence and insecurity. The level of crime has increased and we cannot count the number of crimes committed by armed men against the state symbols like the civilians. Faced with this violence, the Government of National Unity (GNA) seems more than ever, impotent.

Since its arrival late March in Tripoli GNA has not managed to drive the militia from the capital who continue to do their acts on the streets of Tripoli. This government is itself a victim of these militias Islamist majority. Some armed groups who were put in charge of ensuring the safety of members of the Government no longer do.

The deteriorating situation is unprecedented. It is no longer limited to clashes between militias seeking to have the power. Since early October, the armed robberies are now in the street, kidnappings and assassinations in broad daylight. In addition, abandoned lifeless bodies were thrown to the street corner in the capital. The Tripoli Central Hospital received 34 unidentified bodies in less than a month.

The military, police, employees in administration are the most targeted. But this kind of attack is not limited to the symbols of the state, it always affects civilians. On Wednesday, the civil registry office in Tripoli Municipality was closed. An armed attack was targeted on Tuesday. Its director was killed and several injured employees. They were all present at the workplace during the attack.

LIBYA 14.10.2016

The Tobruk government headed by Saleh Aquila has again failed to give its confidence to the executive stationed  in Tripoli. In the words of Libyan Parliament's president, stance against GNA would be motivated by distrust of the Prime Minister.
According to Saleh, in fact, Sarraj, was not appointed by the Libyan people, so he would have no legitimacy to lead the country. In parallel, a few days ago the news of the raid in the home of Amer Omran, member of the HoR (House Representatives) in Tobruk, and the arrest of his younger brother, Member of Parliament, by Khalifa Haftar forces. According to Omran, the operation would be due to their support of Skhirat negotiations and its links with Ibrahim Jadhran and oil guards. A strong political opposition with Tripoli that, at first glance, could presage a further step away from Tobruk by the international community which recognizes that in GNA the only legitimate government. The reality, however, seems to be more complex.

The system of alliances of Tobruk, in fact, seems to have acquired greater strength after the conquest of the deposits of the oil crescent by the Libyan National Army (Lna) led by Haftar. In early October, in Paris, at the initiative of the French Government, it was held an international conference on the future of Libya which were not invited nor members Jon, nor the representatives of the Maghreb countries and the Arab League. The Paris meeting, which was attended by UN envoy Martin Kobler and representatives of France, Great Britain, Italy, USA, European Union, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar and Turkey, without HoR, was harshly criticized for this as it was considered a clear opening towards the international front in favor of Tobruk.

Despite Brigitte Curmi, French ambassador to Libya, hastenned to deny any ambiguities, reiterating the exclusive legitimacy of GNA, and French support for the process of national unity started in Skhirat, the distance between the international powers and Tripoli has never been so vast. In this context, significant is the visit of Al Sarraj in Algeria in connection with the meeting in Paris and the statements of the ministers of the two countries after a meeting. In stark contrast to Paris, during the joint press conference, Abdel-Qader Mesahel, Algerian Minister for Affairs of Magheb, the African Union, Arab League, and Mohamed Al-Taher Siyalah, Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs, have, in fact, announced a new conference on the Libyan issue in Niger in late October that would see the involvement of all countries in the area and HoR

Failure final defeat of the Islamic State that despite the huge losses in Sirte, seems to maintain an acceptable level of control of the area and the progressive advancement of Haftar forces, seem to have weakened international support toward GNA. The resumption of oil exports also obliges the international powers to a greater respect towards Tobruk and Haftar. If, as stated in Istanbul by Mustafa Sanalla, NOC chairman, by December, despite the agreement to freeze production of OPEC, Libyan production is expected to reach the highest levels of the last three years. Libyan oil could have in the short term also a significant impact on international diplomacy. In response to the failure to supply crude oil to Egypt from Saudi Arabia because of the favorable vote of Cairo to the Russian resolution of Aleppo, Zyad Daghaim, HoR Parliamentary stated that the Egyptian need could be met by Libyan oil. As reported by the Observer Libya, in fact, the government would have said Tobruk available to give Egypt the crude necessary given the support of Cairo to Cyrenaica and the General Haftar.

Openness to Tobruk and the necessary integration of Haftar in the future Libyan government would also related to the general collapse of the Libyan economy that, according to figures released by the World Bank, could witness a recovery only if they were to come to lasting agreement between Tripoli and Tobruk. In the forecast report of Libyan economy in October, the World Bank, in fact, it would show a scenario in which the rate of inflation continues to rise and the continuous devaluation of the dinar, in connection with damage to infrastructure due to war and rising unemployment, altogether leads to an unstoppable collapse of the gross domestic product of the country. Seeing the recovery of oil exports in the economy with short-term reconstruction and diversification of the asset growth plan solution for the medium to long term, World Bank itself, underlines the absolute necessity of a vote of confidence to GNA. According to the international body, in fact, only this way the economic policies could be implemented in a coordinated and unambiguous throughout the national territory.

Thursday 6 October 2016

Europe & Libya: LIBYA OIL

Europe & Libya: LIBYA OIL: As battle lines were drawn during Libya's long civil war, Libya's National Oil Company (NOC) was split between East and West, wit...

LIBYA OIL

As battle lines were drawn during Libya's long civil war, Libya's National Oil Company (NOC) was split between East and West, with opposing governments in Tripoli and Torbruk competing over oil revenues. Libya holds Africa's largest proven reserves of crude, however, ongoing conflict has seriously disrupted oil production and exports - Libya currently produces just 350,000 barrels per day (b/d), significantly below the 1.65 million b/d produced prior to the unrest.

With oil revenues a key source of income, attacks on oil installations have been frequent by rival groups vying for power. A statement on July 2nd - announcing the reunification of the NOC - could indicate that recovery in the Libyan oil sector is on the horizon. An NOC spokesman, Mohamed Elharari, stated that reopening the blockaded export terminals at Es Sider, Ras Lanuf, Zawiya and Zueitina was a top priority for the company. The four ports have a total export capacity of 860,000 b/d, and would significantly boost global crude supplies. Any improvement to the situation could have a substantial impact on global markets - the opening of these terminals would likely lead to downward pressure on oil prices.

However, years of war have ravaged Libya's oil infrastructure, the lack of maintenance represents a significant barrier to increased production in the near term. Both Es Sider and Ras Lanuf have been the focus of attacks, with Ras Lanuf's storage tanks particularly badly damaged. Key to restarting exports will be Ibrahim Jathran, head of the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG) - who have been blockading Libya's export terminals since 2013. Initially set up as a politically neutral force to protect Libya's oil facilities during the civil war, the group have arguably acted as a private militia under Jathran's leadership. A deal between Jathran and the Tripoli-based government on the 25th July was condemned by the chairman of the NOC, Mustafa Sanalla, who stated that the deal set a 'terrible precedent' for further extortion by armed groups controlling oil facilities.

As the disagreements continue, it is clear without the support of the NOC, the prospect of ports reopening remains unlikely.

The reunification of Libya's NOC is certainly a positive step for recovery, however, tremendous barriers remain - in the short to medium term, oil is unlikely to flow at the levels seen in the days of Gaddafi.

Emaco Group Libya, like hundred contractors and suppliers in Libya is ready, willing and able for repair and mantenance oil fields with petrochem industries.
We look for P.R. and salesmen to contact all oil companies both in Eastern and Western Libya.

Monday 3 October 2016

REPORT FRM FRENCH FRIEND BACK YSTRDY FRM TRIPOLI

After the visit to France last week Libyan PM Serraj a diplomatic meeting was hastily arranged on Monday in Paris. Key regional actors involved in the crisis, including neighboring Egypt were invited. The researcher (and friend) Ali Bensaad, professor at the French Institute of Geopolitics is back from a fortnight study trip to Libya. He returns to the battle of Sirte - where he attended the fighting between the brigades which are placed under GNA authority and the jihadists of IS - and the political stalemate between East and west of the country.
In what state did you find Libya?

The economic situation deteriorated further (I was in Tripoli 5 months ago). This is obvious with the question of foreign exchange on the black market currency. In 5 months, the date of my last visit, the value of the Libyan dinar has been halved. The fall of the dinar affects the prices of essential commodities. There is also a shortage of gasoline. For Libya, oil producing country, has very few refineries. There are long queues at petrol stations. But the biggest problem is definitely the lack of liquidity. The withdrawal is limited to 200 dinars per day (about 25 euros). This lack of currency creates tension, everybody complains. In addition, power cuts have worsened. They now last six to eight hours a day. So there is a paradox: we feel a disappointment abt PM Serraj supported by the international community, but also, more than ever, a great need for stabilization ... currently embodied by same Serraj.
What have you observed in Sirte?

The city is emptied of its inhabitants, it is just a battlefield. But the organization and mobilization of Misratis, which account for two thirds of antijihadistes fighters, is impressive. An example: you can drink, eat and refuel anywhere. They are remarkably well organized. The clashes are very deadly and  their losses are considerable. In fact, half of the deaths among the loyalist forces are victims of sniper bullets. And one-third because of bombs or explosives vehicles.

Opposite members Daesh leaks. Besides, they cannot really do that. The sea, in particular, is closely watched. There are no prisoners, the jihadists are fighting to the end. Found charred corpses fighting position. There, I myself witnessed a suicide car bomb. The driver was fully plastered: even they are wounded continue to "fight"!

Half of the Islamic State fighters are Tunisians. There are also sub-Saharans, Algerians, but very few Libyans: Daesh is an external transplant, who eventually unlikely to take. The IS has no future in Libya, in my opinion. However, I am much more worried about extremist groups in the East, or the forces of Al-Qaeda in the south. People of AQIM [al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb], for example, have a family-tribal relay in Libya and experience the desert. Mokhtar Belmokhtar [Algerian jihadist behind numerous attacks in the Sahel] stayed in the East.
How was received confirmation by François Hollande, abt the presence of French troops in the east of Libya?

The crash of three French soldiers in Benghazi, which revealed their activity, had a cataclysmic effect on the rise of anti-Western sentiment in Libya. This discourse on the duplicity of France, which supports El-Serraj one side but that helps the General Haftar [the strong man of the East, which refuses to recognize the authority of the government of national unity] of another, I heard everywhere. At the airport, as a French citizen, it also earned me a bit "shaken". The Tripoli airport held by the militia of Abdel Raouf Kara, a Salafist. The French military engagement alongside Haftar restored grist to the Islamists. The conspiracy theory goes, especially on "The West has pushed the brigades of Misrata [faithful to the unity government] to attack the Islamic State in Sirte to weaken and help his friend Haftar." The encounter in Paris on Monday, which will lead to a French government renewed support faiez el-Serraj certainly aims to improve the image of France.
Khalifa Haftar: Why has he suddenly attacked oil facilities from the center of the country?

I think he wanted to break the cornered a process towards a compromise. You have to put this offensive General Haftar on oil terminals in context: his allies from the town of Zintan came to lift the blockade on gas pipelines; in the south, the Toubou and Tuareg were reconciled; negotiations on the recognition of the unity government by the Parliament of Tobruk took place in Tunis. Above all, according to my information, a delegation was sent Misratis Cyrenaica [in the east] in great secrecy to offer Haftar a compromise, a sort of directory where the general would have occupied the post of minister Defense ... Or his troops to attack this time! This is very worrying. This means it will not just be defense minister, as was thought before. He probably would accept this position in the context of an armed Turkish, not subject to the government. Politically, he was cornered. So he moved things on the military field.
Is he now in a strong position?

The symbolic point of view, oil terminals are important. Being the source of the wealth of Libya, it counts. But the speech Haftar on reopening of terminals is a shell game. He insists: "It is the fault of Ibrahim Jadhran [the leader of the oil installations guards] if oil did not flow, I repaired the situation." This is wrong! It is above all when Jadhran was his ally that the situation was blocked. When Jadhran had rallied PM Serraj, things had begun to unlock themselves.

Haftar however strengthened because he has a popular base much wider than before. It does not control all the East, but he brought security in some cities, like Benghazi, although the price was very heavy. Entire neighborhoods were destroyed. He dismissed all the mayors to appoint military governors. Among the groups fighting Haftar, these are Islamic extremists who eventually take over. Now people are afraid of them, so they fall behind Haftar. Even in the West, some officials now recognize hint that having assisted Islamic brigades in the east was a mistake.
Is he toward federalization of Libya?

The Libyan nation-state exists. It showed his resilience in history. I absolutely do not believe in the possibility of partition of Libya. Khalifa Haftar himself has no secessionist project. As for the viability of a federal project, the Libyans do not. Federalist members are a minority, they just a nuisance capacity.
Can a direct confrontation between East and West around the oil sites take place?

I do not believe either. Serraj and Misratis [in the West] have realized that it was not in their interest to directly confront the Haftar army. This would even against-productive: such a battle would be perceived as an attack of the West against the East, it federates the inhabitants of Cyrenaica around Haftar by giving a regional dimension to the battle.

As for Haftar, his troops would not make the weight. In reality, he is a poor general: he lost against Chadians in 1987, he failed to crush the Islamists in East Libya for over two years, and he draws strength mainly Toubou fighters ... There no military solution to the Libyan crisis because no one can really take over. They must find a political formula, it is the only solution. In this country, it is always possible: Libya is a country of nomads. The political nomadism is seen as a virtue, as strange as it may seem to Western eyes.  ... In Sahara, two qualities are important: endurance and adaptability.

Sunday 2 October 2016

LIBYA GOOD & BAD NEWS

Good, as well as bad news, has recently dominated news from Libya, the North African country that, despite its proximity to the  EU (around 250 km), rarely makes the headlines. On a positive note, unlike for other conflicts in the region, there is a political agreement mediated by the UN which has led to the establishment of a Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli. There are also positive military developments since the Islamic State (IS), which established one of its “provinces” around the Libyan town Sirte, has been almost completely defeated by a ground operation led by Libyan forces with the aid of US air strikes and special forces of several EU members.

Less optimistic is the fact that the country is as divided as ever, with the Tripoli-based GNA having only loose control of parts of the West and South of the country and the east being a de facto separate country under the dictatorship of renegade general Khalifa Heftar. Heftar receives support from Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – and increasingly from Russia. Heftar is a former colonel who fought under Gaddafi until he was captured by Chadian forces in 1987. Gaddafi disowned him and he went into exil in the USA. Heftar returned to Libya in 2011 to fight against Gaddafi in the civil war.
A divided country with two governments
After the fall of Gaddafi in October 2011, the country plunged gradually into new levels of anarchy. The opposition armed groups that fought under the umbrella of the National Transitional Council (NTC) did not disarm after the war. On the contrary, they receive state salaries and this has expanded their ranks. With several assaults on the fragile Libyan institutions in 2012 and 2013, and by hoarding weapons and government money, these militias asserted their control over the state. In the spring of 2014, renegade general Khalifa Heftar led an insurgency called “Operation Dignity” with the goal of wiping Libya clean of everything that smelled of political Islam. Heftar did not hide his admiration for Egypt’s general Sisi, who rewarded him with military and political support, soon followed by his patrons in the Emirates.
In the summer of the same year, Islamists, members of the Amazigh minority and other hard-line anti-Gaddafi militias created Libya Dawn, an umbrella organisation which gained control of the capital and destroyed its international airport. The internationally-recognised government of the time left Tripoli and established itself between Tobruk and Beyda, in the eastern fiefdom of general Heftar, while Libya Dawn established its own “government of national salvation” in Tripoli without gaining the recognition of a single country.
The Libyan Political Agreement
The UN and its then-Special Envoy Bernardino Leon started a negotiation to reunify the two governments. Under the leadership of his successor, the current envoy Martin Kobler, the Libyan Political Agreement was signed in the Moroccan city of Skhirat in December last year. It established a nine-members strong Presidency Council which would oversee a Government of National Accord while one of the final stipulations called for the firing of general Heftar as head of the armed forces.
The agreement and the government had to be approved by the parliament, the House of Representatives (HoR) based in Tobruk and under the control of Heftar’s loyalists. While seven out of the nine members of the Presidency Council arrived in Tripoli at the end of March and took control of most state institutions, the parliament in Tobruk has rejected two different lists of ministers submitted by the Presidency Council while expressing its continued support for the old Beyda-based government of Abdullah al Thinni, close to Heftar.
The implementation of the agreement is therefore blocked. Negotiations are under way with the mediation of Egypt and the support of the UK, France and Italy which, in different ways, have expressed the need for Tripoli to include Heftar somehow in the new security structure and for him to serve under the civilian authority, pushing on his loyalists to approve the government in parliament.
Despite all these difficulties, the UN-brokered agreement has brought together many forces in different parts of the country, some of which have successfully defeated Isis. Moreover, the national peace process has encouraged many cities to strike local ceasefires, sparing vast parts of Western and Southern Libya from further violence. War crimes, human rights violations and terrorist attacks, while present also in these parts of the country, are more widespread in the east with the cities of Benghazi and Derna suffering the most.
Heftar benefits from the blocked implementation of the agreement
This constant state of war in Cyrenaica (the old name of eastern Libya), the external support and the shortcomings of the peace process have all conjured to support Heftar’s project of becoming the “de facto dictator of a de facto country” that, with some exceptions, extends from the city of Harawa to the Egyptian border and south to the city of Kufra. Prime Minister Thinni has been completely under Heftar’s control since the beginning of 2015 when he was repeatedly denied the right to leave the country. The HoR allows votes to take place only when they are favourable to the general, intimidating non-compliant MPs. More recently, he has established military governors in the largest cities, forbidden the remaining mayors from engaging with the government in Tripoli and, with the help of Russia, printed its own Libyan dinars – which the government in the capital has decided to accept to avoid sanctioning the split of the country.
Heftar is slowly clearing the east of Libya of his opponents and in the last months he received the decisive support of French special forces – while the same EU country was decisive diplomatically in establishing the government in Tripoli. His current strategy seems to be consolidate his firm hold on the east while sabotaging the “unity government” in Tripoli. On its part, the GNA has been so far completely unable to either provide basic services or start a nation-wide reconciliation process. While important results have been achieved in the past year, Libya could be heading soon for more divisions and more violence.
Supporting intra-Libyan reconciliation is the key to stabilisation
The division of the country can appear as a solution only if one conducts a superficial analysis. For starters, there is no consensus on where the line between east and west Libya should run and the contested area would likely be the “oil crescent” east of Sirte where most of the country’s oil resources are. Entrenching the existing split is undesirable and so is keeping the political process hostage to the east-west split.
So how can one at the same avoid entrenching the split between the two parts of Libya while allowing the part which is more or less under the GNA control to move on and function? It is a tall order, but promoting intra-Libyan reconciliation is key to the stabilisation. While elsewhere reconciliation is seen as a way to heal the wounds of the past, in Libya it is a measure to avoid further escalation.
A national dialogue initiative could be facilitated by the UN (Special Envoy Martin Kobler is already moving in this sense) and receive the logistical and financial support of the GNA while remaining independent from government control. It should support a country-wide conversation on crucial issues such as, to make a few examples, the fate of political prisoners, the distribution of oil wealth (with the goal of restarting oil production and avoiding the economic collapse of the country) or the social and political inclusion of members of the former regime without blood on their hands. This reconciliation initiative should go hand in hand with concrete moves by the GNA in Tripoli to reach out to the east, promoting decentralisation and addressing the issue of the building of a national army.
While reaching out to the people of eastern Libya and showing sincere understanding for the grievances and concerns that led many of them to support Heftar, the GNA should move on and rule the country, addressing the main concerns of ordinary Libyans such as the liquidity crisis or continued and extensive power cuts.
The US and Europe, on their side, while continuing to offer all the possible help to the GNA on these concrete issues, should also act to unlock the political process. Negotiations to include Heftar (and its external backers) into the political agreement have been ongoing for months without any significant progress. That agreement contains itself the tools that allow to unlock the process: for instance, article 16 and 17 say that the House of Representatives must become a truly neutral body and not Heftar’s political branch. It should sit in a neutral location and all members should be free to express their vote, unlike what’s happened in the past. Finally, the agreement is the only available instrument (if properly voted in a constitutional amendment by the HoR) to extend the mandate of the Tobruk parliament which expired on 20 October. Failing these conditions, it is about time that the US and Europe stop recognising simultaneously the government in Tripoli and the political branch of its rival in Tobruk.