IN THE three years since joyous rebels seized the Libyan capital,
Tripoli, the country has lurched from crisis to crisis, yet somehow
stayed afloat. It is now sinking, weighed down by too many guns and too
many factions, with too few institutions to repair the leaks wrought
under the erratic dictatorship of Muammar Qaddafi. To make things worse
Libya now threatens to have two self-proclaimed governments and two
parliaments: one was elected in June, but the other has refused to
disband. A motley array of militias backs each, and varied regional
powers back them: on August 18th and 23rd, unidentified aircraft, which
later turned out to have been based in Egypt but flown by pilots from
the United Arab Emirates (UAE), bombed targets in Tripoli. In short,
Libya now combines all the ingredients, including meddling foreigners,
for a protracted civil war.
For those Libyans who complain about Western powers fiddling as their
country slides into anarchy, the revelation that an Arab air force
secretly mounted strikes against one side in a Tripoli militia battle
prompted a certain satisfaction. So too did news that American officials
were fuming over the intervention. “Why such a big fuss?” asked one
wealthy backer of the opposing side. “The Americans don’t seem to care
about the state Libya is in.”
The air strikes did not, however, affect the outcome of the battle
that had paralysed the Libyan capital for more than five weeks. It ended
on August 23rd, when the prize fought over, the city’s international
airport (or what remains of it), changed hands. The victors were those
whose positions had been targeted by the mystery warplanes: an alliance
of militias, chief among them units from the prosperous port city of
Misrata, which joined Islamists, Amazigh (or Berber) and other fighters
drawn from several smaller towns on Libya’s western flank. They defeated
militiamen from the conservative western mountain town of Zintan who
had held the airport since Qaddafi fell in 2011.
For Zintan the loss of its most important strategic asset is a huge
blow: a prominent militia leader once boasted that the airport was
“worth a thousand ministries”. It upends what had been a delicate
balance of power in Tripoli and raises the prospect of more violence to
come. “The battle is lost but the war has just begun,” wrote a Zintani
militiaman on Facebook.
That war is linked to a broader Libyan power struggle too often
reduced to a misleading narrative of Islamist versus non-Islamist. In
fact, it is less an ideological battle than a scramble between competing
interest groups rooted in regional, economic and social dynamics. Each
side spins its own yarns: the Misratis, who have the country’s strongest
militias, and their allies claim they are routing an attempted
counter-revolution orchestrated by former regime figures; the Zintanis,
aligned with more liberal-leaning groups, profess to be battling against
an Islamist takeover.
Elements on each side are backed by regional patrons and opponents of
political Islam, notably Qatar and the UAE. The two Gulf rivals were
the most prominent of the Arab countries that helped oust Qaddafi,
sending a handful of fighter jets as part of the NATO-led campaign but
also backing different factions on the ground. Qatar was accused of
favouring Islamist forces and the UAE more tribal-oriented and regional
militias, particularly those from Zintan.
Libya’s new parliament, elected in the June ballot in which Islamists
fared badly, denounced those who had captured Tripoli airport. From the
eastern city of Tobruk, where the parliament has been sitting because
Tripoli and Libya’s second city, Benghazi, are too dangerous, it
declared the triumphant militia alliance, operating under the name
Libyan Dawn, a “terrorist organisation”. Dawn, meanwhile, condemned the
parliament for taking sides and for calling for foreign intervention. It
also spurred the parliament’s predecessor, the discredited national
congress, to reconvene and to name its own “national salvation”
government instead.
The resolution of the airport battle comes as Khalifa Haftar, a
former general loosely allied to the Zintanis, is stalling in his
self-declared war against Islamists in eastern Libya, despite support
from Egypt and the UAE. The hapless government is increasingly shaky.
Most of its members are scattered outside Tripoli; seven of them said
this week they were resigning. Many Libyans fear a scenario where the
elected legislature, recognised internationally and supported by Mr
Haftar’s forces and tribal militias in the east, vies with a
self-declared parliament in the capital buttressed by Misrata’s militias
and their allies.
Britain, France, Germany and Italy have joined the United States in
expressing concern about the air strikes. “Foreign intervention won’t
help Libya get out of chaos,” said the UN’s incoming envoy, Bernardino
Leon. On August 27th the UN Security Council endorsed a resolution which
bolsters the existing arms embargo on Libya and may lead to sanctions
against Dawn’s (and other) leaders.
Egyptian officials deny involvement in the raids and the Emiratis
have not commented. But the two, along with such Arab allies as Saudi
Arabia and Algeria, make no secret of their concern that Libya is on the
brink of failed statehood and could become a haven for regional
jihadists. Libyans who have clamoured for foreign intervention say they
are glad someone acted and hope they will again. Judging by the outcome
of the Tripoli raids, however, it will take far more than a few bombs to
tip the balance.
Tripoli
has been far quieter in recent days following the Misratan led alliance
successes, not least in taking control of what is left of Tripoli
international airport. There has been a noticeable reduction in both
small and heavy weapon fire in Tripoli in comparison to the previous two
weeks. There is also a corresponding increasing in the number of people
on the streets, although the pattern of life is still far removed from
normal.
The
Misratan led alliance have given Warshefana
three days (from Wednesday) to hand over fighters and other individuals
perceived to have committed crimes. Given their recent successes it
appears that the Misratan led alliance are now looking to open other
fronts such as against the Honourable Tribes (based in Warshefana and
with close links to the former regime). Some of the individuals could
move across the border to Tunisa but it is unclear how any escalation
would pan out given the geographical and logistical complexity of
fighting the Warshefana over such a large area.
Benghazi
On the back of recent losses in Benghazi it seems likely that Benghazi
airport will be completely lost by forces loyal to Hafter in the coming
days. There are some signs of a drive to push Islamist aligned fighters
towards Tobruk. This would raise interesting questions given Tobruk’s
relatively benign state (which includes continuing international
flights) and could be a tactic formulated in order to increase Egyptian
involvement (given Tobruk is only 150km from the Egyptian border,
compared to 280km for Benghazi).
Political Analysis
Dependent
upon the perspective of those reporting recent events in Tripoli the
forces that this week successfully took over what is left of Tripoli
International Airport cover the full gambit of characterisation
including Misratans, Islamists and revolutionaries. The reality is far
more complex and without an agreed, accurate and simple label to
describe them. The group is certainly comprised in large parts of
Misratan brigades but by no means wholly. Although there are Islamist
elements they fight alongside Misratan forces who in the main could not
be descried as Islamist, and some quite far from it. The term
revolutionaries is also not accurate, for example the elements
from Khoms and Zawiyah (two of the last towns to support the 2011
revolution) cannot easily be described as revolutionaries. Whilst this
could easily be seen as a semantic argument it is symptomatic of the
highly complex tribal, regional, and ideological relationships in Libya.
For our part Emaco group currently refers to them as the Misratan led
alliance (MLA) which aims to strike a balance between being accurate and
not overly complex. Please do let us know your views however.
As
discussed there is no overriding ideological tie between many of the
elements that form the MLA and thus there is a concern that it will
struggle to remain cohesive if the hostilities in Tripoli continue to
reduce and
their grip on power in Tripoli increases. In the short term opening new
fronts (i.e. Warshefana) may both strengthen their gains so far and act
as a short term glue to keep the elements coalesced but the medium term
is less clear. Which leads to the question, are we in the eye of the
storm or has it passed? Whilst impossible to predict with any certainty,
the underlying political stability and lack of cross-country dominance
by any single group will render it difficult for any form of sustainable
and positive solution to develop. The solution must be political and
currently the signs of positive political progress are very limited.
The
political competition is indeed heating up as the
head of the former General National Congress, Nouri Abu Sahmain,
intensified his refusal to recognise the legitimacy of the House of
Representatives. In addition, a key member of Prime Minister Abdallah
al-Thinni’s cabinet offered his resignation, underscoring the
precariousness of the current government. Subsequently on Wednesday the
UN Security Council passed resolution 2174 (2014) which aimed to tighten
the existing sanctions regime to also include those “individuals and
entities…engaging in or providing support for other acts that threaten
the peace, stability or security of Libya, or obstruct or undermine the
successful completion of its political transition”. The resolution also
appeared to give support to the HoR and Constitutional Drafting
Assembly by calling on them to “carry out their tasks in a spirit of
inclusiveness” and called
“on all parties to engage in an inclusive Libyan-led political dialogue
in order to help restore stability”. It is unclear if UNSCR 2174 will be
applied so broadly by the Sanctions Committee as to cause difficulties
for the likes of Abu Shamain who it could be argued is not supportive of
the HoR political transition.
Abu
Sahmain had already made his opposition to the HoR known when, citing
security concerns, it refused to convene in Benghazi as had initially
been planned and met for the first time in Tobruk. Abu Sahmain claimed
that because no handover ceremony had been held and because the GNC had
not authorized the HoR to meet in Tobruk, the HoR was illegitimate. He
has now
doubled down, allegedly organizing a meeting of former GNC members in
Tripoli to possibly “elect” a new prime minister to replace al-Thinni.
Al-Thinni and HoR President Aqila Salah dismissed Abu Sahmain’s
machinations as irrelevant and without merit. Nonetheless, the point is
clear: Abu Sahmain and his Islamist supporters are making a gamble that
they can revive the government that they controlled and marginalize the
new government under the control of al-Thinni and Salah. The fact that
Abu Sahmain is in Libya’s historic capital, Tripoli, and not isolated in
the far east of the country like al-Thinni lends credibility to his
stratagem. In addition, there are reports that Abu Sahmain’s supporters
may be preventing his detractors in the HoR from returning to Tobruk,
thereby further handicapping the HoR.
In
an additionally worrying sign, Libya’s Minister of Justice has offered
his resignation. Salah Bashir al-Marghani said that current conditions
prevented him from being able to carry out his duties. Originally from
Benghazi, but a long-time Tripoli resident, al-Marghani was a tremendous
force for democratization in Libya. He is widely recognized as Libya’s
leading human rights advocate in addition to being a successful
commercial lawyer. First appointed by ousted Prime Minister Ali Zeidan,
al-Marghani was both a technocratic and a revolutionary. Al-Marghani was
educated in the UK and worked in both Libya’s private sector, as a
founder of the MTL Law Firm in Tripoli, and the public sector, serving
as a consultant to the
Ministry of Justice during the Qadhafi regime. At the same time, he
served as a conduit for NGOs investigating the Qadhafi regime’s human
rights record. In August 2012, he was honoured by Human Rights Watch for
his contribution to protecting human rights during the final years and
months of the Qadhafi regime. In addition, Human Rights Watch recognized
him for his role in securing documents that will potentially contribute
to investigations into the Qadhafi regime’s crimes against humanity.
While his resignation may not be a serious blow to the al-Thinni
government (after all, it faces much more serious problems than the
resignation of one minister, albeit an important one), that al-Marghani
chose to throw in the towel is a very bad sign for the transitional
process’s commitment to democratization.
Further
to last week’s report there was qualified confirmation from various
sources including the US that Egypt was involved in the air strikes that
hit Mistratan led alliance (MLA) targets in Tripoli. However much
uncertainty remains regarding the source of the attacks, which
ultimately appear to have served only to increase the pace of the MLA’s
progress in Tripoli and did little to hamper it. It is unclear if other
countries, such as the UAE or Saudi Arabia were also involved or if
there was additional Western nation backing.
It
is
surprising that the US, who have substantial assets in the region, and
Algeria who it is understood increased its radar coverage post the 2011
revolution to cover far into Libya (including over Tripoli), have not
been able, or perhaps more likely, willing to provide unqualified
confirmation of the source of the attacks. One potential explanation
could be that the US and others were caught off guard and that Egypt
(possibly with UAE and Saudi backing) moved more quickly and overtly
than had been expected. Given the nations alleged by some to have been
involved (Egypt, UAE and Saudi) which all have close ties with the West,
others will point to the desire of Western nations to prevent a
complete state failure in Libya and question if they were used as
proxies.
Oil
As
Prime Minister al-Thinni highlighted in a recent press conference, oil
production and oil exports continue to rise, with El-Feel, Sharara and
Waha coming back on line and replenishing storage facilities at export
terminals. The NOC reported on Monday that production had increased to
650,000 bpd. Thus, while the political and security situations continue
show no sign of progress, with each side refusing to back down and
demonstrating a willingness to go the distance both on the battlefield
and politically, oil production is creeping back up and a reminder to
the warring factions of exactly what is at stake. The UN Security
Council resolution passed on Wednesday also
specifically stated that sanctions could be applied to individuals or
entities “providing support for armed groups or criminal networks
through the illicit exploitation of crude oil or any other natural
resources in Libya”.
What
is remarkable, however, is that production is being brought online
almost entirely by Libyan personnel because most foreign IOC staff quit
Libya a long time ago. This is a testament to the Libyan staff, a
reminder of the surprisingly quick return to production in the aftermath
of the 2011 revolution and bodes well for Libya’s economic future if
the political and security situations can be resolved. The removal of
Omar Shakmak as Acting Oil Minister, to
be replaced by Mustafa Sanalla (current Chairman of the NOC who will
also retain the Chairman’s role) is an indication of political forces at
work to tighten up their grip on the countries’ wealth and potentially
also his success in overseeing a slow but steady increase in production
through difficult times.
Captured
on video by the proud attackers just one month ago, Mr. Badi’s assault
on Libya’s main international airport has now drawn the country’s
fractious militias, tribes and towns into a single national
conflagration that threatens to become a prolonged civil war. Both sides
see the fight as part of a larger regional struggle, fraught with the
risks of a return to repressive authoritarianism or a slide toward
Islamist extremism. Three years after the NATO-backed ouster of Col.
Muammar el-Qaddafi, the violence threatens to turn Libya into a pocket
of chaos destabilizing North Africa for years to come.
Libya
is already a haven for itinerant militants, and the conflict has now
opened new opportunities for Ansar al-Shariah, the hard-line Islamist
group involved in the assault on the American diplomatic Mission in Benghazi in 2012.
Those
backing Mr. Badi say his attack was a pre-emptive blow against an
imminent counterrevolution modeled on the military takeover in Egypt and
backed by its conservative allies: Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates.
Their
opponents, including the militias stocked with former Qaddafi soldiers
that controlled the airport, say Mr. Badi was merely the spearhead of a
hard-line Islamist onslaught resembling the Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria and supported by the Islamist-friendly governments of Turkey and
Qatar.
The
ideological differences are blurry at best: both sides publicly profess
a similar conservative but democratic vision. What is clear is that
Libya is being torn apart by an escalating war among its patchwork of
rival cities and tribes.
Expressions of Despair
In
a broad series of interviews on a five-day trip across the chasm now
dividing the country — from the mountain town of Zintan, through Tripoli
to the coastal city of Misurata — many Libyans despaired of any
resolution.
“We entered this tunnel and we can’t find our way out,” said Ibrahim Omar, a Zintani leader.
Towns
and tribes across the country are choosing sides, in places flying the
flags of rival factions, sometimes including the black banners of
Islamist extremists.
Tripoli,
the capital and the main prize, has become a battleground. The fighting
has destroyed the airport, and on Saturday night Mr. Badi’s allies
finally captured the remaining rubble, at least for the moment. Constant
shelling between rival militias has leveled blocks, emptied
neighborhoods and killed hundreds of people. Storage tanks holding about
25 million gallons of fuel have burned unchecked for a month. Jagged
black clouds shadow the city, with daily blackouts sometimes lasting
more than 12 hours.
Motorists
wait in lines stretching more than three miles at shuttered gas
stations, waiting for them to open. Food prices are soaring, uncollected
garbage is piling up in the streets and bicycles, once unheard-of, are
increasingly common.
In Benghazi, Libya’s second-largest city, the fighting has closed both its airport and seaport, strangling the city.
In
an alarming turn for the West, the rush toward war is also lifting the
fortunes of the Islamist extremists of Ansar al-Shariah, the Benghazi
militant group. It has gained ground because other militias and factions
are building new alliances with its fighters against common enemies.
The
United Nations, the United States and the other Western powers have
withdrawn their diplomats and closed their missions. “We cannot care
more than you do,” the British ambassador, Michael Aron, wrote in a
Twitter message to a Libyan pleading for international help. (The United
Nations is sending a special envoy, Bernardino León, to try to arrange a
truce.)
Even
the first years after Colonel Qaddafi’s ouster were better, said Hisham
Krekshi, a former Tripoli councilman, savoring a few hours of
uninterrupted electricity in the upscale cafe that he owns, its tables
and the street deserted. “This is a war, and a lot of innocent people
are dying.”
Until
now, a rough balance of power among local brigades had preserved a kind
of equilibrium, if not stability. Although the transitional government
scarcely existed outside of the luxury hotels where its officials
gathered, no other force was strong enough to dominate. No single
interest divided the competing cities and factions.
But
that semblance of unity is now in tatters, and with it the hope that
nonviolent negotiations might settle the competition for power and,
implicitly, Libya’s oil.
In May, a renegade former general, Khalifa Hifter, declared that he would seize power by force
to purge Libya of Islamists, beginning in Benghazi. He vowed to
eradicate the hard-line Islamists of Ansar al-Shariah, blamed for a long
series of bombings and assassinations.
Borrowing
lines from President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi of Egypt, General Hifter also
pledged to close the Parliament and arrest moderate Islamist members.
And he has mustered a small fleet of helicopters and warplanes that have
bombed rival bases around Benghazi, a steep escalation of the violence.
To
fight back, moderate Islamists and other brigades who had distanced
themselves from Ansar al-Shariah began closing ranks, welcoming the
group into a newly formed council of “revolutionary” militias.
“A
lot of them have fought well,” Ali Bozakouk, a moderate Islamist
lawmaker from Benghazi, said of militants with Ansar al-Shariah,
speaking last week after meetings in Misurata. “When you are fighting
against an intruder, sometimes you have hard choices. You are brothers
in arms now and work out your differences later.”
Militias Choose Sides
But the war has driven the other militias closer to the militants and further from moderates like Mr. Bozakouk.
Last
week, a broad alliance of Benghazi militias that now includes Ansar
al-Shariah issued a defiant statement denouncing relative moderates like
the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood. “We will not accept the project of
democracy, secular parties, nor the parties that falsely claim the
Islamic cause,” the statement read. “They do not represent us.”
Although
the general’s blitz has now stalled, it polarized the country, drawing
alarms from some cities and tribes but applause from others. Perhaps the
loudest applause came from the western mountain town of Zintan, where
local militia leaders had recruited hundreds of former Qaddafi soldiers
into special brigades, while also keeping control of the Tripoli
airport.
The
alarms went off in the rival coastal city of Misurata, where militias
have allied with the Islamists in political battles and jostled with the
Zintanis for influence in the capital. Since Colonel Qaddafi’s ouster,
the Misurata and Islamist militias developed a reputation for besieging
government buildings and kidnapping high officials to try to pressure
the Parliament. But in recent months the Zintanis and their
anti-Islamist allies have stormed the Parliament and kidnapped senior
lawmakers as well.
Adding
to the tensions, the newly elected Parliament, led at first, on a
seniority basis, by a member supportive of Mr. Hifter, announced plans
to convene in Tobruk, an eastern city under the general’s control.
About
30 members, most of them Islamists or Misuratans, refused to attend,
dispelling hopes that the new legislature might unify the country. “That
is foreign territory to me,” said Mr. Bozakouk, the Benghazi
representative, who joined the boycott. (Tripoli’s backup airport, under
the control of an Islamist militia, has cut off flights to Tobruk, even
blocking a trip by the prime minister.)
Over
the weekend, a spokesman for the old disbanded Parliament, favored by
the Islamists and Misuratans, declared that it would reconvene in
Tripoli. In Tobruk, a spokesman for the new Parliament declared that the
Islamist- and Misuratan-allied militias were terrorists, suggesting
that Libya might soon have two legislatures with competing armies.
Each
side has the support of competing satellite television networks
financed and, often, broadcast from abroad, typically from Qatar for the
Islamists and from the United Arab Emirates for their foes.
“It
is a struggle across the region,” said Hassan Tatanaki, a Libyan-born
business mogul who owns one of the anti-Islamist satellite networks,
speaking in an interview from an office in the Emirates. “We are in a
state of war and this is no time for compromise.”
He
said he had also suggested moving the newly elected Parliament to
Tobruk, and then he helped pay to transport it there, in General
Hifter’s turf. “If I try to think of all the money I spent, I will get a
heart attack,” Mr. Tatanaki said.
Fighters
and tribes who fought one another during the uprising against Colonel
Qaddafi are now coming together on the same side of the new fight,
especially with the Zintanis against the Islamists. Some former Qaddafi
officers who had fled Libya are even coming back to take up arms again.
“It
is not pro- or anti-Qaddafi any more — it is about Libya,” said a
former Qaddafi officer in a military uniform, who had returned from
Tunisia. He lounged against the wall of a mountainside guardhouse full
of Zintani fighters who were his foes three years ago.
Beneath
the battle against “extremists,” he said, was an even deeper, ethnic
struggle: the tribes of Arab descent, like the Zintanis, against those
of Berber, Circassian or Turkish ancestry, like the Misuratis. “The
victory will be for the Arab tribes,” he said. He declined to provide
his real name, insisting all journalists were spies.
Those
sympathetic to Mr. Badi’s assault on the airport argue that his fight
is an extension of the fight against General Hifter’s anti-Islamist
coup, arguing without evidence that their opponents were using the
Tripoli airport to bring in weapons and equipment from abroad.
Mr.
Badi “wanted to have them for lunch before they had him for dinner,”
Mr. Krekshi, the former Tripoli councilman and a member of the Muslim
Brotherhood, said. (The Brotherhood has said it takes no side in the
armed struggle and seeks only dialogue, but in an interview, the chief
of its political office also refused to condemn the airport assault.)
No Room for Compromise
Misurata
city leaders said they had no warning of Mr. Badi’s attack. But the
city’s powerful militias swung in full force behind him, and city
leaders said the presence of former Qaddafi soldiers among the Zintani
militia at the airport convinced them that there was no room to
compromise.
“We
are sorry for the bloodshed, but this is a necessary surgical
operation,” said Abdel Rahman al-Kisa, a lawyer tapped to speak for
Misurata’s city leaders, coolly defending the destruction of Tripoli.
(Fuel, food, and electricity are still plentiful in Misurata, which has
its own airport and seaport, and checkpoints where departing drivers are
forced to empty any gas cans.)
In
Zintan, on the other side of the fight, city leaders said Mr. Badi
personified the extremist threat: As an ultraconservative former
lawmaker, he once scolded a hostess at the inauguration for her
uncovered hair.
“It is creeping up on us,” said Mr. Omar, the Zintan leader. “It is going to be like a new Afghanistan.”
In
Misurata, several local leaders suggested that opposing cities were
under the domination of armed Qaddafi loyalists and still in need of
liberation.
Elsewhere,
several fighters even said they no longer believed that the rival
cities, Zintan and Misurata in particular, could coexist as a nation.
“When the dust settles, Misurata will be alone, because their arrogance
has created so many enemies,” Ali Mohamed Abdullah, a Zintani fighter,
declared.
Taking
stock of the damage Tripoli has already suffered, another fighter, Amr
el-Taher el-Sayed, shook his head. “Libyans have become monsters,” he
said.
