Europe & Libya: PM Renzi - if we are at war, better we know

Europe & Libya: PM Renzi - if we are at war, better we know: The lie has this bad side, remove the trust; while the trust and general safety are the most valuable assets of a society. According to Is...

RIGHT OR WRONG EUROPEAN SUPPORT AGAINST GADDAFI ?

UK MPs hit Cameron hard on Libya in a report last week, but in France, no inquiry has been held despite mistakes that should have been learned

The recent UK Parliament committee report on the military intervention in Libya is not only critical of the war, but also reminds us of the recurrent malfunction between French politicians and the military.
In 2011, former French president Nicolas Sarkozy waged war in Libya in order for France to “gain more influence in North Africa” and for Sarkozy to “improve his poll numbers”. This is what the UK foreign affairs committee asserted in its 14 September report.
Saying that British democracy works better than the one in France is nothing new
British MPs on the committee question how the Benghazi intervention to save the population - threatened by Colonel Gaddafi’s crackdown which the MPs argue was “exagerated” - transformed into a regime change operation.
The report also claims that Prime Minister David Cameron bears the “ultimate responsibility” for the air assault that led to Gaddafi’s fall and the civil war that followed, which Islamist groups took advantage of. Cameron’s decisions, according to the report, lacked a “coherent strategy”.

Different conflict, same conclusions

Saying that British democracy works better than the one in France is nothing new.
Under the French constitution, the executive can wage war without consulting parliament. Six months after the beginning of any military intervention abroad, parliament must be summoned for an advisory debate, but one without a vote.
The use of a parliamentary commission of inquiry remains a rare occurrence. The last time it happened was in 1998, following pressure from a media campaign by several NGOs following the Rwandan genocide.

Chaired by Paul Quiles, who had served as defence and interior minister, the French parliamentary commission on Rwanda published a detailed report in December 1998 thoroughly analysing how France had been involved in Rwanda along with recommendations for institutional changes since “errors of assessment” and “serious mismanagement within the institutions” were identified.
The Rwandan case, like “Operation Harmattan” – the codename for France’s participation in the Libyan intervention between March and October 2011 - and like the latest British Parliamentary report, draw the same conclusions.
Both inquiries highlight the paradoxes between the political power of France’s executive and the country’s military forces. Once again, if both of the Fourth and Fifth Republic constitutions stipulate that the executive power gives orders and the army executes them - which is the case for all the parliamentary democracies - the executive power has constitutional supremacy over the armed forces. This means that political and historical errors of the executive always fall on the shoulders of the army.
Since the trauma of May 1940’s Battle of France, when Germany invaded the country, this tendency has always clouded major French policy changes, such as the decolonisation process or the post-Cold War period.

Colony wars 

France owes to General De Gaulle - president of the “France libre” (Free France) - its independence and national and international dignity which relied on three key factors: France’s permanent seat at the UN Security Council, nuclear deterrence and a foreign policy based on an independent and modern armed forces.

The same mistakes were made in Algeria, after massacres in Sétif, Guelma and Kherrata in May 1945, leading to a war that lasted from 1954 until 1962

Political leaders of the Fourth Republic – France’s government between 1946 and 1958 - did not continue that legacy, especially when it came to the decolonisation wars, starting with the Indochina War (1946-1954). In May 1954, the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu sped up the Geneva Agreements signed in July 1954 which partitioned Vietnam and marked the beginning of the Vietnam War which killed at least a million people according to most accounts.
Of the war, many Vietnamese and French historians drew the same irrefutable conclusions. Among other things, they pointed out the intentional negligence on the part of the political leaders, who were entirely incapable of understanding and then dealing with the groundswell of the decolonisation process.
The political leaders of the Fourth Republic not only wanted to defend a system of economic and social exploitation that was completely obsolete at the end of World War II, but above all, they wanted to delegate their responsibilities to military officers who were already trying to deal with tricky operational situations in the field.
The same mistakes were made in Algeria, following massacres in the towns of Sétif, Guelma and Kherrata in May 1945, leading to a war that lasted from 1954 until 1962.
French political leaders gave the military the authority to defend the colonial system and covered up the use of torture which eventually led to the fall of the Fourth Republic and brought General De Gaulle back to power.

Defending interests 

Unlike socialist leaders, from Guy Mollet to Francois Mitterrand, and the ones in favour of French Algeria, De Gaulle was undoubtedly the politician who best understood the inevitable self-determination of the French African colonies to come.

Despite this, parts of the army during his tenure attempted a coup in Algeria with the support of wealthy and powerful settlers, although it was quickly brought to an end. In 1962, the Evian Agreements were signed, leading to the Algeria’s independence on 2 July 1962. Terrorists from the Secret Army Organisation (OAS), a group of right-wing French dissidents who wanted to prevent the country from becoming independent, tried to prevent those agreements from being applied, and the topic is one which still divides French opinion today.
These historical reminders are essential to understand the Libyan disaster, especially since the present conflict shares similarities with many of the “humanitarian wars” that have been waged by Western forces since the end of the Cold War: Somalia, Rwanda, the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya.
All of them were waged in the name of defending “human rights”, but truthfully, they were waged only to defend Western economic interests in those regions, to meddle with the domestic affairs of those countries for regime change, as researcher Alain Joxe showed in his 2002 book Global Empire Wars.
Once again, let’s recall General De Gaulle who decided to withdraw France from NATO in 1966 because he did not believe in “Western war” and wanted France to be independent, the symbol of a third way of thinking, one in favour of a multipolar world, in one dominated by the Western and Eastern blocs.
The disaster of the Libya operation is in line with political and operational shifts in France. In 2008, then president Nicolas Sarkozy made France reintegrate with NATO without asking Parliament for a vote. His successor, Francois Hollande – “heir” of socialist leaders such as Guy Mollet and Francois Mitterrand – has continued on the same path, making sure that French diplomacy follows the guidelines of the US, NATO, Israel and the Gulf countries.

Shirking responsibility 

It is easy for Barack Obama to incriminate Cameron and Sarkozy for the Libyan war. He plays a Pontius Pilate of sorts. This war started with the partial and one-sided interpretation of the Security Council 1973 Resolution, which deals with no-fly zones and humanitarian aid for civilians, and it would not have been possible without the support of the Pentagon, the satellites and radars, and the support of NATO.

Just because the Americans decided to stay behind the scenes does not mean that they are not accountable for this disaster

The British and French militaries - who were in charge of the “dirty work” - knew they could execute the field operations perfectly. But they also knew from the beginning that this war was “tarnished”. Jean Ping, chairman of the African Union Commission, was already negotiating a political solution with Muammar Gaddafi, a process which two French foreign ministers were aware of but did not care about. Equally, the objectives of this war were unclear and unplanned.
When it comes to the US responsibility in the war as well as NATO’s, the British report remains a bit cryptic. Ideologically, the Harmattan Operation implies and echoes the “war on terror” waged under the two Bush administrations, and carried on by Barack Obama.
On 5 and 6 September, during the Defence Summer School, the chief of staff of the French army General Pierre de Villiers bravely gave a lesson to the French, British and US political leaders: “Having a strategy that is exclusively based on military forces will never be able to uproot violence that is rooted in lack of hope, of education, of justice, of development, of governing structure, of consideration. Military action is only one part of the answer to the crisis . . . ''Winning the war doesn’t mean winning the peace'', and we cannot destroy an ideology (terrorism) only with bombs.” Well said.

Field Marshal K. Hafter in Sep 2016

Khalifa Haftar launched September 11, 2016 a military offensive against the militia of Ibrahim Jadhran rallied with Presidential Council of Tripoli. With the capture of five oil terminals on the border of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, the old general is committed outside its traditional settlement area of ​​Cyrenaica, in a direct confrontation with the authorities in Tripoli officially recognized by the Western powers .

The lightning offensive launched on September 11, the first day of Eid al-Adha, by the forces of General Khalifa Haftar is a major milestone in the evolution of the situation in Libya. Less than two years after the launch of its "Operation Al-Karama" ("Dignity") to eradicate political, skilled opponents without distinction of "Islamic terrorists", General Haftar decided this time to attack militia of his former ally Ibrahim Jadhran supported by Tripoli Presidential Council recognized by UN. If this attack is consistent with the refusal of the General Haftar to recognize Sarraj Presidential Council, it nonetheless constitutes a break with the situation before.

General Haftar troops were indeed stationed far to fight the "Islamists" in Benghazi, Derna and Ajdabiya in Cyrenaica. By this foray into the essential oil and taking its five oil terminals on the border of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, the old General is therefore now committed outside its traditional settlement area of ​​Cyrenaica, in a direct confrontation with the authorities in Tripoli officially recognized by the major Western powers.

This pledge-taking comes as the implementation process of Sarraj GNA sponsored by the international community is totally blocked in its current form. In the opinion of UN representative Martin Kobler, trust and the hopes raised by the arrival of Sarraj Presidential Council largely dissipated. Among the causes of this alienation, denial of Tobruk Parliament to ratify the Presidential Council establishment, its inability to meet the legitimate expectations of the Libyans in security and economic matters and the general feeling that it was imposed by 'foreign compromised' Conciliation dynamic

While positive dynamics between East and West were still possible in December 2015 a few weeks before the entry into force of Sarraj Presidential Council, these perspectives are increasingly hypothetical, because of the very different trajectories of the two regions.

Cyrenaica, we see day after day, go to a militarization of both institutions and political practice. In August, General Abderrazak Nadhouri, Chief of Staff of  LNA (Libyan National Army) and military governor of the region, deposed the elected mayors of Benghazi, Ajdabiya and Kufra to replace them with colonels. Many witnesses state of the return of practices of the old regime in police matters: under surveillance, intimidation or direct threats to the families of suspected opponents, preventive detentions and media controls.
This is hardly surprising in view of the presence of many former military officers and security services that resumed service in the ranks of LNA. General Haftar course is the cornerstone of this process that could be called back to military authoritarianism on the model of what is at work in Egypt Marshal Abdel Fattah al-Sissi. But the system could not win without the support and commitment of tribal traditional social structures nor the feeling of regionalist belonging, very powerful in Cyrenaica.

In Tripoli, the population is very diverse, the development of a strong urban culture and external influences - including Ottoman - helped weaken the weight of tribal affiliations. In contrast, Cyrenaica is still characterized by significant weight of these traditional structures. Number of notable major eastern tribes saw in the establishment of the provisional government of al-Bayda in 2014 and the establishment of LNA General Haftar, an opportunity to reaffirm the role of social control.
They had been marginalized during the 2011 insurgency - they had rallied after it started - by the rise of the revolutionary militia leaders close to the brotherhood of Muslims and former Brothers of the Islamic Group Libyan fighter (LIFG). Playing on the strong sense of regional identity, cohesion of the twelve major tribes "nobles" of Cyrenaica, their related tribes and the traditional mistrust of Tripolitania, General Haftar won the support of traditional structures. What is reflected in particular by a strong rallying youth to his army. Thus, a significant proportion of the population of Cyrenaica is acquired or cannot afford to oppose him, except the cities of Darnah, Ajdabiya and Benghazi.

These three cities are in fact characterized by more diverse population, a large proportion of them from towns in the west. They also have the most powerful of Islamist militias, formed in the early days of the insurrection of 2011. The position of the tribes is nevertheless not monolithic, sometimes with internal divisions. Thus a number of militia leaders and the tribe of officers Awaguir based in Benghazi and its neighborhoods, did they allegiance to Sarraj government.

In Tripoli, the diversity of the social fabric and local elites is reflected in the plurality of the political landscape, the fluidity of alliances, the ability to dialogue, reconciliation and - last - engage in combat. Local elites consist of leaders of Islamist and tribal militias, officers of the former regime who joined the insurgency, tribal or from the urban middle class notables, businessmen and former opponents of the Islamists Gaddafi converted into political regime. The fragmentation of large power poles - including the cities of Misrata, Zawiya, Zintan and even to some extent - and sometimes rival militias in Tripoli contributed to the birth of a culture of compromise and negotiation that is reflected in the position of Saraj Presidential Council.
Reconciliation processes were conducted successfully in Jebel Nafusa recent months. Direct contact, even unimaginable a few months ago, even being between certain armed factions of Zintan and Misrata. And if tensions become regular sporadic clashes between armed groups, the various parties have so far managed to avoid a resumption of fighting in the capital. If we cannot deny the antagonism between armed Islamist groups connotation and armed groups belonging rejecting any "ideological", the majority of players have so far ensured to preserve the coexistence based on the dynamic equilibrium of forces. The situation in Tripoli is thus characterized by multiple poles of power, flexibility alliances between them on the basis of their current interests and the internal fragmentation of the power poles.
An international diplomatic failure.
Two separate "political cultures" are therefore taking shape between Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, which do not contribute to the emergence of a consensus in the form that could be in the future governance of Libya. Instead of launching a virtuous circle, the establishment of Sarraj Presidential Council has instead helped create new dividing lines in an already highly fragmented landscape. For particularly neglected negotiation and seeking a compromise prior to the benefit of the accelerated implementation of Presidential Council, the major powers have thus lost their bet at this stage that arrival of Presidential Council would trigger in a virtuous logic. Instead, they can welcome what was for them its primary function: resume enclave of Sirte fighters rallied to Islamic State requesting the direct militaryWestern support. The question is still about to be settled militarily only by the militias of Misrata after three months of fighting.

Militarily, the direct support of Egypt, the UAE and France have not allowed the forces of General Haftar to control Derna and some Benghazi and Ajdabiya neighborhoods, but it was probably a large utility to launch its offensive of September 11 against the oil terminals.
In this regard, the French position seems particularly unreadable. While at the diplomatic level, France officially supports GNA, it provides in same time military assistance in the form of advisors to its rival General Haftar. Reacting to revelations of the involvement shown in newspaper Le Monde in February 2016, the Ministry of Defence had then denied any direct support in Cyrenaica. He finally had to acknowledge in July, after the death of three men of French special force of General Directorate for External Security (DGSE) in the crash of a helicopter shot down in a combat zone near Benghazi.

Contrary to what was asserted politicians, the leaders and French media almost unanimously last few months discussed the inevitability and imminence of a new intervention in Libya, the Libyans had no need of foreign intervention to resume Sirte. The figure written repeatedly from the assessments of Western intelligence services, IS 6 000 fighters in Sirte occupying a territory of 200 km have once again proven false, the actual numbers probably never exceeded 1,500 fighters.

The action of General Haftar causes already a change in the balance of power between East and West and within the Presidential Council itself. If the intention of the authorities is to boost quickly oil exports resumed from Crescent terminals, this will allow them to enhance their prestige in Cyrenaica and increase the weight of their representatives in Presidential Council. This action also indirectly reactivate existing fault lines in Cyrenaica between pro-Haftar factions of some cities of Jebel Nafusa (including Zintan, Roujban and Warchafana) and cities and tribes supporting the Presidential Council.

Militarily, we cannot now exclude offensive against oil terminals launched by defense brigades in Benghazi and Ajdabiya which include Islamist fighters and opponents of General Haftar of both cities. Even if it seems unlikely that major militias from Misrata the OEI fighter in Sirte for three months opened a new front, others could instead launch attacks against the forces of Haftar in the oil increasing but military escalation risks which are not excluded.

After this action the authorities have the political leverage of a Presidential Council undermined by internal divisions and weakened by its inability to improve the situation of the population. Under these conditions, one can legitimately wonder about the future of Presidential Council in its current form and composition.
Meanwhile, voices are heard in the country to criticize UN Support Mission in Libya and ask for the departure of its chief Martin Kobler, which may well be de facto one of the next victims of this collateral military operation on the oil.

Libya: the foreign look at General Haftar is changing

To see him, one imagines evil warlord, still less in general shock shaking the equilibrium of Libya. Khalifa Haftar, 73, would more easily look as a retired school teacher, won by nonchalance. He has white hair carefully smoothed back. And then you notice a vanity: his brown mustache, obviously dyed. And pride: the gold color of stars pricking his epaulettes, which contrasts with the olive green of his uniform wrinkles. There is a general course. But how are those ones who have never taken seriously? Western diplomats have often despised his presumptions of "savior" operetta, as deadly and ineffective.

In Washington, Paris, London, Rome or Berlin, at a time when politicians desperately concocted plans to stabilize a post-Gaddafi Libya in chaos.

General Haftar was always seen as a problem, frankly, never as a solution. The most generous saw him as a "disaster".  And now ? Since the forces of the Libyan National Army (LNA) he directs took on 13 September, Crescent Petroleum, the main export platform of Libyan crude located in Cyrenaica, the look is in changing on general Haftar. He is no longer the one who proclaims false victories, destroying blindly without anything ever conquer. After taking over this summer most of Benghazi "terrorist" (label under which he puts all his opponents), controlling the economic heart of Libya which handles half the oil exported. So, it is the entire UN plan on Libya, from a political agreement (signed late 2015 in Skhirat in Morocco) to the sideline, now mortgaged by recent breakthroughs General Haftar.

"We have the same enemy!", he often says.

In meeting March 2015 in the disused airbase Marj, located sixty kilometers east of Benghazi, the evil general conceals his bitterness towards the West. Outside, surrounding the pale yellow building where General housed its headquarters, alfalfa fields coat surround Russian tanks out of service, pick-up machine guns sheathed with a cover and freshly supplied ammunition boxes. With Western journalist, General Haftar insists: "We have the same enemy!". He, who is leading the fight against "terrorists" and "extremists", it displays a touchy amazement reserves and inspired critics dubbed his offensive Karama (Dignity) in UN as in Western capitals.

At the time, the mediators were active in forging a peace plan between the Parliament exiled in Tobruk, with Haftar as the military leader and the political-military bloc Fajr Libya (Dawn of Libya ) prevailing in Tripoli in the west, where Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist factions have a significant influence. General Haftar has unshakable certainties. He is not supported by Egypt's marshal Sissi incidentally. In his eyes, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the proponents of political Islam in general, are only "terrorists" with whom it is useless to talk. "You cannot argue with these groups," he says. The only solution: the war to defeat the opponent. "A disaster" grimaces a European diplomat based in Tunis, the rear base of chancelleries working in Libya.

Haftar polarizes where diplomats want to reconcile. The general supporters are loyal and enthusiastic, that's certain. To the east of the country, Cyrenaica, his motherland, his approval rating is at the top. His supporters see him as a brave patriot who had the guts to stand up against the extremist militias - orbiting Ansar Al-Sharia - which were delivered in 2013 in Benghazi in a bloody campaign of assassinations against their opponents, intellectuals, activists of civil society. But he equally met opponents. For them, Haftar is only a "coup" nostalgic methods Gaddafi, a "war criminal", gravedigger of the 2011 Revolution ideals. How to build a Libyan peace around a figure so divisive?

Haftar and Gaddafi: the alliance is strong

To understand the sulphurous image associated with Haftar, one must go back, go up the thread of his military career. Born in 1943 in Ajdabiya on the coast of Cyrenaica, he studied at the Military Academy in Benghazi and refines his officer training in Nasser's Egypt and the Soviet Union. The time is fevered by the rise of Arab nationalism. In 1969, he, along with unknown Moammar Gadhafi, 0ne yearolder, during the coup which overthrew King Idris and established the "Libyan Arab Republic." Haftar between Gaddafi and the alliance is strong. Confidence is such that the "Guide of the Revolution" entrusts Haftar the head of the Libyan contingent supporting Egypt during the War of Yom Kippur in 1973.

And thirteen years later, in 1986, he commanded the troops of Tripoli intervening in Chad against the regime of Hissène Habré. And that's when everything goes wrong. The Libyans were defeated in 1987 during the "war of Toyotas." Humiliation is scathing: a thousand Libyan soldiers killed and from 300 to 400 prisoners, including Haftar himself. Gaddafi, who will not take responsibility for the disaster, disavows Haftar and his men. The affront is irreparable. Haftar passes to the opposition. In retrospect, it is a severe judgment on the Libyan intervention in Chad: "We were going from war to war in Africa, our country had no interest in all this, our men have died for nothing. "Becoming opponent, he joined national salvation front of Libya (FSNL) which had a base in Chad, supported by CIA. From there it foments a coup against Gaddafi.

Due the chronic Chadian instability and political disturbs in1990, the Americans filtered - him and his 350 men - to Zaire. Kinshasa will not hold long and defectors arrived in Kenya. Finally, Washington will agree to host him on American soil.

Coincidentally, Haftar moved to Falls Church, Virginia, a small town of 13.000 inhabitants located 9 kilometers from ... Langley, the CIA headquarter. What was the real nature of the relationship between the CIA and Haftar? And their evolution over the years? From 2003, the opponents score as Haftar necessarily depreciated as Washington warmed his relationship with Gaddafi, who has announced the abandonment of its mass destruction weapons acquisition program.

In 2011, the time for revenge has come. When the anti-Gaddafi revolt broke out in Benghazi, he rushes on site to offer its services to the rebellion. It is a constant in Haftar: he is always "called" by destiny and requested by people. "My fellows asked me to return to help country fights the old regime, I responded to their request". His role was real but modest. Once the task accomplished, he returned to Virginia to "lead a quiet life" In fact, he had not found its place in the direction of the rebellion. This is only a postponement. While the post-Gaddafi Libya disintegrates in 2013 with the reign of militias and its fragmentation into rival fiefdoms, he was again "called". "I could not sit and watch, I answered the call of duty. "

Things were certainly serious with assassination campaign orchestrated by radical Islamists in Benghazi. "I am drawn again to serve my country’’. In May 2014, he launched the "Dignity" campaign, paving the way for the civil war which broke out on a large scale during the summer of same year. It multiplies the rallies: anti-Islamist liberals, formerly Gaddafi tribal networks (Warshefana, Warfalla, etc.), Eastern tribes, former soldiers back, heirs of Arab nationalism into the Muslim Brotherhood to fight a Western conspiracy. Egypt and UAE generously arming them, in violation of the embargo imposed by the UN in 2011.

While the organization Islamic State (IS) threated more clearly Europe, the fight against DAESH is useful. In Benina airport Benghazi, this summer, there were not only French - members of the Action Service of the General Directorate for External Security - to help target jihadist core in the city. Americans and British were there too.

None can ignore now Haftar in Libyan distress.  And even if the Libyan impasse (deadlock) has never been so deep.

Conclusion is that great majority of Libyans wants him.

LIBYA: gen. Hafter yes or no?

Gen. Hafter: yes or no?

I summarize once more, Libya is split between east and west: Between August 2014 and April 2016, Libya was divided between GNA (General National Congress), which operated out of the western city of Tripoli, and HoR (HoR), which operated out of the eastern city of Tobruk. For the past year, UN has been trying to form a unity government,GNA, in an attempt to unite the two centers of power. The GNA was formed earlier this year and arrived in Tripoli in March, but it has not yet been approved by the HoR, leaving the country still divided between rival governments in the east and west.

Meanwhile, armed groups with shifting allegiances are fighting for territorial control. One of the most powerful, the LNA (Libyan National Army), led by Gen. (today Field Marshal) Khalifa Hafter, reportedly just defeated a rival in eastern Libya and took control of four key oil export terminals. The move will significantly improve Hafter's bargaining power with the GNA, which he opposes. Hafter, who is loosely aligned with the HoR operating out of Tobruk, will now use his power over the oil export terminals to gain political concessions from the GNA, specifically ensuring his role in the military command structure of the unity government. Meanwhile, he and the HoR will have to work with the national oil company — which is also split — to increase exports from the seized terminals, though damage, technical deficiencies and cash shortages will limit the extent of realistic export growth.

Analysis

Hafter's LNA moved Sept. 11 to take control of four key oil export terminals in the Gulf of Sirte — Ras Lanuf, As Sidra, Zueitina and Marsa el Brega — which had been controlled by a rival armed group, the central branch of the Petroleum Facilities Guards, loyal to Ibrahim Jadhran. By Monday, all four of the terminals were reportedly under the LNA's control, and many of the Petroleum Facilities Guards forces had fled or had surrendered their command to Hafter's forces.

The enmity between Hafter and Jadhran is personal, though until 2014 both supported HoR and its govt in Beyda. The rancor worsened with the creation of the GNA, which Jadhran backs and Hafter opposes. At the beginning of the year, the Islamic State attacked oil terminals controlled by the Petroleum Facilities Guards at Ras Lanuf and As Sidra, and the LNA refused to come to the group's aid, prompting Jadhran to accuse Hafter of complicity with the jihadists. Local forces from Misrata stepped in to help the Petroleum Facilities Guards, providing air support and medical attention.

Since then, Jadhran's forces have reciprocated by aiding the Misratan militias in their bid to retake control of Sirte from the Islamic State. The Petroleum Facilities Guards approached the city from the east, seizing strategic towns including Bin Jawad and Harawa, while Misratan forces closed in from the south and west. In fact, Jadhran has taken the practical approach of brokering deals with multiple groups when it suits his goals. On July 27, Jadhran brokered a deal with the GNA to reopen the Ras Lanuf and As Sidra export terminals, reportedly in exchange for back pay for his forces. GNA Defense Minister Mahdi al-Barghathi — another of Hafter's many rivals — played a significant role in signing that deal, which was emblematic of the growing cooperation between Jadhran and the GNA that directly contradicts Hafter's interests.

The Cost of Collaboration

Jadhran's deal making has not come without a price. His collaboration, however practical, with members of the GNA and the Misratan forces aligned with it has decreased his popularity in eastern Libya, where his support had historically been strongest, forged by tribal and familial ties and by his armed opposition to Tripoli's control of oil revenue. Moreover, the deal he made with the GNA to reopen ports in exchange for payment has added to the sentiment in Libya's east that he is just out for personal gain rather than for the broader benefit of eastern Libya and its tribes.

Hafter has stepped in to exploit this discontent and to systematically undermine Jadhran's support in the east. The general has short-circuited Jadhran's familial links to the east by replacing his brother, Salem Jadhran, as mayor of Ajdabiya with a military council and by declaring a replacement for Jadhran at the helm of the Petroleum Facilities Guards. (Ironically, the Petroleum Facilities Guards are technically a subset of the LNA.) Hafter was even able to undermine Jadhran's tribal support by creating a rift between Jadhran and his al-Magharba tribe, which has provided many of the fighters under his control.

In mid-August, elders from al-Magharba called for the Petroleum Facilities Guards to submit to the LNA's control and to support Hafter; during the assault on the oil ports, the al-Magharba tribal elder in Ajdabiya repeated the instruction. In recent weeks, Hafter also reinforced his own forces by recruiting Sudanese rebels from the Justice and Equality Movement, at the encouragement of Egypt. By some accounts, the recent fighting in Ras Lanuf was mostly waged by Justice and Equality Movement militants.

So far, Hafter's strategy appears to be working. Jadhran's forces reportedly laid down their arms at the recently seized oil ports and fled without much of a fight. In the days since, the LNA has mobilized a battalion, Bilal bin Rabah, to secure and protect the oil installations. There have been rumors that forces still loyal to Jadhran and perhaps to Islamist extremists such as the Benghazi Defense Brigades — both of which oppose Hafter as much as each other — are preparing a counterassault.

Never-Ending Negotiations

Hafter's moves come during a tenuous negotiation period between Libya's rival governments. Under the U.N.-led unity agreement signed in December, the HoR would function as the GNA's legislative branch, but only after it approved the creation of the GNA itself. The HoR, however, failed to meet the quorum needed to hold a vote. And Hafter is a big factor in that failure. Hafter has urged his allies, including House speaker Aguila Saleh, to prevent the ratification of the GNA — for which Saleh has been sanctioned by US.

After it was clear that a sufficient number of HoR members supported the agreement, even though they could not reach quorum to vote because of security concerns, the international community decided to implement the government anyway. In March, the GNA came into force, with Fayez al-Sarraj as its prime minister. In August, the House finally did meet its quorum — barely — but rejected the formation of the GNA. Several lawmakers later complained that Saleh changed the itinerary at the last minute to include the vote on the GNA precisely because he knew he had the votes to reject it.

The vote forces the GNA to submit a new Cabinet for approval but has also reopened negotiations among the various stakeholders in Libya over the exact structure and role of the GNA. Tellingly, under the rejected structure, al-Barghathi was named defense minister, the position that Hafter wants for either himself or for a close ally. Al-Barghathi had been an important colonel in Benghazi, commanding one of the top two battalions in the fight there, and counts among Hafter's rivals. (Much like his campaign against Jadhran, Hafter has sought to sever the links between al-Barghathi and his former subordinates and allies in Benghazi.)

The problem is that even though Hafter is aligned with foreign powers in his opposition to jihadist forces, he believes that Western powers and many of Libya's armed groups, including Misratan forces, are too sympathetic to Islamist groups —not just jihadists and Salafists, but also groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. Even before the GNA was formed, Hafter and many of those militias clashed in Sirte and around oil terminals. Despite his differing views, there is a growing recognition that given Hafter's abilities, he should be given a role in whatever government Libya forms. Over the past month, the U.N. envoy leading the negotiating process has noted that Hafter's role in the GNA must be strengthened, and just last week the group discussed a proposal to form a military council that would govern all armed forces and militias. That proposed council would be led by five men: al-Sarraj, Hafter, Saleh and two members of the Presidential Council, possibly including Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed Matiq, who is from Misrata and who would represent that region's interests. On Sept. 14, Saleh promoted Hafter to the position of field marshal of the LNA. The promotion could be seen as an attempt to position Hafter as the highest-ranking official within any potential military council.

Many of these actors are in Cairo again this week, possibly trying to strike a grand bargain. Such a council may gain traction, though finding a solution that will appeal to Libya's eastern and western stakeholders will be difficult.

The Question of Oil

Now that Hafter controls several important oil terminals in central Libya and has relatively unchallenged control over eastern Libya, he and his allies have significant bargaining power in the political process. Neither the LNA nor the Tobruk government have any interest in actually operating the terminals. They have said they plan to relinquish control of them to the national oil company — in contrast to Jadhran, who repeatedly tried to export oil for his own financial gain. The question, however, is to which branch the terminals should go. Like most Libyan institutions, the oil authority has been split in two.

Prior to its split, the national oil company was based in Tripoli, and this half of the company retained international recognition. It has mostly managed to stay out of political disputes, despite its location in the west. The rival national oil company is based in Baida and was established by the HoR, after which it has acted as an instrument of the government. But it has failed to gain international legitimacy and has yet to make a sale. The U.S. Navy has even intervened to prevent the Baida branch from completing a sale. In July, the two companies reached a deal to reunify, though the process is far from complete.

Hafter and his government backers are hoping to hand over the ports to what will be a fully unified national oil company, but in the meantime, they are working with the Tripoli-based national oil company in exchange for concessions regarding the GNA. In fact, the Tripoli-based chairman of the national oil company said Sept. 13 that it would work to resume exports within four weeks. Saleh, too, has expressed willingness to work with the Tripoli company, saying the terminals would be surrendered to the newly unified national oil company. Heads from both rival oil companies are due to meet next week to finalize the process.

Turning operational control of the terminals over to the national oil company peacefully would actually work in Hafter's favor, enabling him to present himself as a rational negotiator rather than someone trying to exploit Libya's wealth personally. But if negotiations fall apart, Hafter holds the military advantage in the region and can deny the national oil company access to the terminals in the future. For Hafter, oil is not the issue; the challenge is convincing the country that the LNA is fighting for the benefit of all Libyans and is not just Hafter's personal band of tribal-based militias. Branching out and offering concessions to the national oil company would help project that image, because oil revenue feeds the Central Bank of Libya in Tripoli. That institution, which has remained somewhat functional despite Libya's split into rival governments, supports massive public wage and social spending programs throughout the country.

Is Peace Possible?

Compromise between the Tripoli and Tobruk governments on a plan that includes Hafter or a close ally will certainly be difficult. With the LNA now in control of As Sidra and Bin Jawad, Hafter's forces are closer to Misratan forces than they have been since 2015, when they were actively battling each other. Hafter now has two choices: He can continue pushing west toward Sirte, though his forces are stretched thin, even with the Justice and Equality Movement's support. Or he can cement his position around the oil terminals and continue negotiating. For now, the latter option seems most likely, since venturing farther west would mean potentially clashing with Misratan forces, who are fighting the Islamic State. Such a move could cause negotiations to fall apart altogether and reignite the armed conflict between east and west that raged for most of 2014.

Of course, the decision is not just Hafter's to make. Misratan forces are some of the primary supporters of the GNA. Along with fighting the Islamic State, they have been providing security in and around Tripoli for the GNA. Misrata is home to many militias that have historically worked to counter Hafter. For now, they are preoccupied with their battle for Sirte, but once that fight is over, they could turn their attention toward Hafter once again. Just as Hafter has effectively solidified his position as a viable negotiator, Misratan forces have done the same through their fight against the Islamic State.

However the struggle plays out, the next phase of the Libyan conflict has clearly begun, and stakeholders are moving to solidify their positions. Even though the HoR has rejected the U.N.-backed GNA and Hafter has taken control of four of Libya's most important oil export terminals, hope for a successful unity government is still alive. But if we have learned anything in the five years since former Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi was ousted, it is that negotiations in Libya are inherently fragile. Though Hafter's position is stronger now than it ever has been, he still a divisive figure. Because of this, he may still be compelled to act through force. Still, it is significant that Hafter now holds considerably more negotiating power than many of his rivals. Libya's most important oil export terminals, hope for a successful unity government is still alive. But if we have learned anything in the five years since former Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi was ousted, it is that negotiations in Libya are inherently fragile. Though Hafter's position is stronger now than it ever has been, he still a divisive figure. Because of this, he may still be compelled to act through force. Still, it is significant that Hafter now holds considerably more negotiating power than many of his rivals.

END

12.9.2016 Libya sinks into the unknown

The troops of General Haftar, based in eastern Libya, took control of three oil ports, Monday, September 12. The days of the government of national unity (GNA), based in Tripoli are counted.

What is the offensive troops Haftar?

It did not take three days General Haftar to take possession of three major oil terminals of the country, Zoueitina, Al-Sedra and Ras Lanuf. The chief proclaimed Libyan National Army (ANL) linked to the rival authorities in eastern Libya and defies increasingly severely the fragile unity government (GNA), based in Tripoli since the spring and brought to the end arm by the UN.

What were the reactions?

In a joint statement, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK and USA "condemn" the attacks against oil sites and demanding "an immediate cease-fire."

The leader of the unrecognized government in the East, Abdullah al-Theni said it would "work for the return of the activity of oil terminals in the shortest possible time to ensure all Libyans a dignified life." The UN Special Representative for Libya, Martin Kobler, has engaged recalled Monday, September 12 that under the resolution 2259 of the UN oil installations must be under the supervision of GNA and any export beyond its control was illegal by nature and therefore prohibited.

What is at stake in this battle?

This battle for oil increasing control reflects the disintegration of the situation in Libya. For the first time, forces loyal to the Eastern authorities' opposition to those hitherto loyal to GNA. So far, the troops of General Haftar fought - and still fight - the revolutionary brigades and Islamists based in the Benghazi area. While militias from Misrata who had joined the GNA led - and still lead during four months - the struggle to reclaim the city of Sirte, which fell into the hands of jihadists Daesh.

This confrontation between the forces of the East and West comes less than a month after the divorce policy was officially consumated. A majority of members of parliament fled to Tobruk has indeed refused August 22 to give confidence to the GNA. This vote was expected since last winter has completed a fatal blow to the agreement Skhirat (Morocco), signed in December under the auspices of the UN, in order to forge a reconciliation between political forces East and West and their associated militias.

Part of the Libyan people had seen a good eye the arrival of Fayez el-Sarraj head to the GNA in Tripoli in the spring. The GNA was and is unable to install its authority over the country, hopes have since dulled.

LIBYA: MEETING UN & RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER 9.9.2016

All Libyan political parties and tribal groups should take part in forming unified government bodies in the country, the Russian Foreign Ministry said in a statement. The statement comes after the meeting of UN Special Representative for Libya Martin Kobler with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov earlier in the day in Moscow. "[The sides] stressed the necessity to engage all political sides, tribal groups and the country's regional authorities to form unified government bodies in Libya," the statement reads. The consensus on the remaining issues should be reached shortly as it will allow the Libyan government to address significant domestic challenges, including growing terrorism threat, the statement added. As agreed in December 2015, the two Libyan rival parliaments - the House of Representatives in Tobruk and the Tripoli-based General National Congress - established the Libyan Political Dialogue as a mechanism of reconciliation and formed the Government of National Accord (GNA), which is yet not supported by the House of Representatives, the parliament. Libya has been in a state of turmoil since 2011, when a civil war began in the country and long-standing leader Muammar Gaddafi was overthrown.
INSHALLA TAMAM

Ghazala roundabout a Tripoli

                GHAZALA ROUNDABOUT - La fontana in cui si trovava la statua della donna e della gazzella a Tripoli fino al 5 novembre 2014.   

                                           

Stavo cercando di spiegare alla mia amica Jody un’abitudine particolare che i Libici hanno ereditato dai loro antenati. I loro bisnonni avevano questo geniale sistema di denominazione: davano ad alcune cose nomi che contraddicevano il loro significato e la loro natura (sì, come se la nostra cultura non fosse già abbastanza complicata).

Ecco un esempio di come funziona: la parola fuoco in arabo è nar. In dialetto libico usano la stessa parola, ma la parola nar (fuoco) significa anche inferno. I nostri nonni però non lo hanno chiamato nar, detestavano quella parola, lo hanno chiamato al afeya, che si può tradurre con “stare bene, in salute e al sicuro”. Evidentemente è il contrario di quanto sottinteso dalla parola inferno.

Ecco un altro esempio: nella vita di tutti i giorni non chiamiamo un cieco “cieco”: usiamo invece la parola bassier che significa “colui che vede”, “vedere”, “la persona con la vista”, e anche “chi ha una visione” (in senso letterale e metaforico).

Forse è proprio una “cosa da libici” chiamare le cose con nomi che ne contraddicono la natura. Ma credo che il gioco del capovolgimento delle parole che abbiamo creato al mondo piaccia parecchio. Come faccio a saperlo? Perché di tanto in tanto decide di farci fare quattro risate.

Un crudele umorismo

Guardate i nomi di chi fa parte delle loro “élite” e troverete molte battute nascoste, come quella contenuta nel nome del primo ministro Faiz Seraj: faiz in arabo significa “vincitore”. Il nome del gran mufti, Al Sadiq, famoso bugiardo, significa “onesto”, “colui che dice la verità”, “colui che non mente mai”.

A Tripoli hanno sviluppato il gioco in modo ancora più creativo includendo altri elementi: hanno distrutto molti luoghi ed edifici storici che davano il nome alle aree in cui si trovavano e abbiamo mantenuto quegli stessi nomi, che adesso indicano l’assenza di quei luoghi storici. È un senso dell’umorismo crudele: oggi a Tripoli abbiamo una Airport road senza aeroporto, e sono fieri di avere una Gazelle square, la rotonda della gazzella, senza gazzella.

   

Cosa c’è nel corpo delle donne che induce tutte le società a stabilire come possono vestirsi?

   

La statua della gazzella, risalente al periodo dell’occupazione italiana in Libia, era una splendida statua iconica in bronzo raffigurante una donna nuda e una gazzella in una fontana davanti al porto.

Con il braccio proteso verso il collo della gazzella, “la donna rappresenta l’Italia e il ruolo vitale dell’acqua in un deserto reso fertile dagli acquedotti, mentre la gazzella simboleggia la Tripolitania e la Cirenaica”, due regioni unificate dall’Italia nel 1934 e che costituiscono gran parte della Libia di oggi.

La donna e la sua gazzella hanno assistito alla seconda guerra mondiale, alla monarchia libica, alla dittatura di Gheddafi e alla rivoluzione. La statua è sopravvissuta perfino a un missile che l’ha colpita alla fine dell’agosto 2014 e che le ha fatto un buco nella pancia. Pochi mesi dopo è scomparsa: l’hanno portata via, nessuno sa dove né chi possa essere stato. Le milizie di estremisti islamici avevano minacciato di distruggerla anni fa e dobbiamo presumere che alla fine abbiano mantenuto la loro promessa.

Loro vedevano solo una donna nuda, un corpo di donna che non dovrebbe essere rivelato, che deve essere coperto, cosa che a un certo punto hanno anche cercato di fare ricoprendola in modo maldestro con teli di stoffa.

Alla fine l’hanno distrutta.

Ho ritrovato lo stesso simbolismo, lo stesso atteggiamento ostile ad un corpo di donna in una foto del 1957 in cui si vede una donna che indossa un bikini su una spiaggia di Rimini, sulla costa adriatica italiana: un poliziotto nella foto sta multando la donna per aver indossato un costume che la lasciava scoperta. All’epoca in cui la foto è stata scattata, quel bikini era troppo sfrontato per essere indossato in pubblico.

La domanda nasce spontanea: cosa c’è nel corpo delle donne che induce tutte le società a stabilire come possono vestirsi?

La rimozione della statua della gazzella è stato un evento simbolico nell’ascesa al potere degli estremisti a Tripoli. Guardando la statua, non riuscivano a vedere altro che una donna nuda, un corpo di donna.

Lo sguardo maschile

E una donna nuda non è anche ciò che ha visto il primo ministro Manuel Valls guardando la Marianna. Ha invocato il simbolo della repubblica francese, la Marianna appunto, nella querelle sul divieto di indossare il burkini in spiaggia, affermando: “Il suo seno è scoperto perché nutre il popolo. Non indossa un velo perché è libera”.

Credo che sia ipocrita scagliarsi contro il divieto di indossare il burkini e non condannare l’imposizione dell’hijab in altri paesi. Quando molti libici si sono detti offesi dal bikini della nuotatrice libica, perché secondo loro le donne libiche non dovrebbero vestirsi così, io mi sono schierato a favore di quel bikini; e quando i poliziotti costringono una donna a togliersi il burkini su una spiaggia, io mi schiero a favore di quel burkini.

Il punto è che se guardo le due foto, quella del 1957 e quella scattata in Francia quest’anno, vedo la stessa cosa: una donna vittima di ingiustizia, umiliazione e discriminazione.

Tra la gazzella e la Marianna si dipana la storia dello sguardo maschile sui corpi delle donne. Dalla Francia alla Libia, tra l’estrema sinistra e l’estrema destra, i corpi delle donne continuano a essere il campo di battaglia di una guerra combattuta da uomini, uomini che stabiliscono in continuazione le regole sui corpi delle donne, dicendogli di vestirsi o di spogliarsi. Secondo loro lo fanno per il loro bene, perché sono più giudiziosi.

WILL WE EVER LEARN 'NATION BUILDING'?

Will we ever learn NATION BUILDING? How many people will have to die, and how many more hundreds of billions of dollars will be squandered, before we get that long-distance social engineering does not work? One would think that the experience in Afghanistan and Iraq would be clear enough. It is fifteen years later, and we are still told that unless we send more advisers, more troops and more shiploads of cash, these nations will fall into the hands of the Taliban, ISIS, Iran—or their regimes will just collapse. Now comes a slew of mavens who argue that the fact that civil war is raging in Libya and that ISIS is finding a foothold there, is because we left after deposing Gaddafi. They say we should have stayed—or move now—to “stabilize” Libya.

“If you are going to carry out a military intervention to decapitate the government, you are making a commitment and you should be making a commitment to the stability of that country over the long haul.” From overseas, Jean-David Levitte, senior diplomatic adviser to former French president Nicolas Sarkozy, believes that “it was a big mistake not to stay. We should have helped them create a proper police force. As Colin Powell used to say to President Bush, you break it, you own it.” And former UK prime minister David Cameron holds that “we have to do as much as we can now – with I hope a willing Libyan population and politicians – to try and bring that national unity government together.” General David Petraeus acknowledges the difficulties involved but concluded simply that “what we did was certainly not enough.” The Washington Post finds that “pacification of Libya would probably require another Western intervention and a peacekeeping force, coupled with a far more robust international mediation mission.”

The notion that the US can engage in nation building in the Middle East is a sociological illusion. The US sank half a trillion dollars into nation building in Afghanistan and Iraq over fifteen years. In Afghanistan, it “succeeded” in transforming the country from one of the most corrupt nations in the world to the most corrupt. It has become the leading producer of opiates, which are flooding Europe. And it has a regime that cannot protect itself or pay for itself. In Iraq, since it was liberated by the US, at least three hundred thousand civilians have been killed, many more maimed, and still more forced out of their homes. The military and the police trained and advised by the US for over fifteen years are often used by the Shia government to kill and harass Sunnis.

The best way to show that these societies are not ready for nation building is to examine the conditions that existed in the two countries that the US did succeed in stabilizing and turning into democratic societies—namely, Germany and Japan. Here are the sociological conditions that existed in these nations: full cessation of all hostility before any nation building, a high level of domestic security and local acceptance of the foreign occupation and the democratization drive. In addition, these nations had strong national unity, competent government personnel and a low level of corruption. Furthermore, they had strong economic fundamentals, including strong industrial bases, established infrastructure, educated populations, and vigorous support for science and technology, corporations, business and commerce. Their cultural values included hard work, high levels of saving, and other forms of self-restraint and capacity to defer gratification, essential for democratic development. Finally, the U.S. commitment to nation building, including provision of adequate funding and troops, was strong.

Not even one of these conditions exists in the contested nations in Northern Africa & Middle East.

One cannot but wonder why anyone would hold that a much smaller U.S. force, with a much smaller budget, could achieve what the US could not when the numbers were twenty times higher.

The US should provide humanitarian assistance, offer peacekeeping forces to enforce settlements once the warring parties reach one, and leave the rest to the Europeans to mend. They got us into this mess, and they will suffer most from it. Time for them to learn the lessons of nation building.