The political agreement in 2015 designed to facilitate the transition and lead to the development of a constitution and the election of a new parliament today pose enforcement problems. Worse, it has not solved anything. Since its adoption, Libya has gradually fallen into a state of near anarchy. The power that the Western powers have helped to settle in Tripoli has yet legitimacy.
Premier faiez Sarraj is disputed and has no real authority even in Tripolitania. The Presidential Council he heads, bloated, is crossed by conflicts that hinder it. Public institutions such as the Libyan Central Bank or the National Company Oil (NOC) are paralyzed and suffering from a lack of legitimate national leadership.
Having contributed to the development of this political agreement, UN is discredited and the current UN mission chief in Libya, Martin Kobler, either, has hardly authority. It has little influence and its image is tarnished because of the deteriorating social and economic conditions in Libya he failed to curb. His responsibility is thus engaged and the question of his replacement is regularly asked by the authorities to the east who refuse to receive it.
The three reasons for the failure
analysis shows that democratic transitions in many cases studied, the Political Agreement is a way to manage the transitional period involving the "moderates" and "hard" in a negotiation process their to transcend their objections and overcome their conflicts. This requires identification of the true holders of power and the ability to identify influential players by making them work together.
In the case of Libya, the Skhirat Political Agreement (Morocco) was developed in very different from those set forth criteria. The Libyan parties to dialogue, as members of political parties or representatives of Libyan NGOs supposed to embody civil society, were in fact not representative. It was actually people who, for the most part had no legitimacy or real powers in society. The vast majority of them probably had skills but little social weight, and had no significant social network or structure of influence. The signatories to the Agreement in their majority have committed themselves in any way and influential groups in Libya. This is the first reason for the inefficiency of the Agreement.
The second reason is the confusion and incoherence of the powers that it establishes. Indeed, the executive consists of a Presidential Council of nine members with a president and three vice presidents, and a government of national agreement (GAN). The source of legitimacy of the executive is not very clear. So we do not know from which proceeds the executive.
The 2015 Agreement provides that the "Council of Ministers exercises executive authority and ensure the normal functioning of public institutions of the state. It establishes and runs the government program, proposes projects and draws up the budget. " But at the same time, the chairman of the Presidential Council heads the Council of Ministers and it is Prime Minister, a post he combines with that of the Presidency of the Presidential Council, equivalent to that of a head of state. In the hierarchy of powers, the Presidential Council and its President and GAN are placed above Parliament Tobruk (eastern Libya).
The third reason, the creation of a High Council of State (HCS), a second room next to the Parliament recognized, establish a "near perfect" bicameralism or "balanced" - that is inappropriate in the case of a deeply divided country. It requires consensus, pacified and stable democracies. In the Libyan case, the company is far from pacified, consensus does not exist among the political elites of the East and West and the country is not stabilized.
From this perspective, the creation of HCE, the UN has encouraged further complicates the process of democratic transition, rather than facilitates. The political agreement provides, for example, that Parliament Tobruk must consult with the HCE for all important decisions. This is particularly the case for the appointment of the Governor of the Central Bank, the head of the Office of the audits, the head of the administrative control, the head of anti-corruption authority, the head of the High Court, the Attorney General.
Parliament must also consult with the HCE for the acceptance of the government and the appointment of a Prime Minister or his removal. In a disorganized society, where groups and militias are at war, shuttle mechanisms between the two chambers established by the Political Agreement render it unenforceable, or generating additional conflicts.
How to break the current impasse?
For over a year, the Political Agreement of December 2015 has shown its limits. It has still not been approved by Parliament in Tobruk and therefore has no legitimacy. Instead of facilitating the transition, it has further complicated and aggravated the crisis. To get by, the international community must face the facts and accept to amend this Agreement or rethink on new foundations.
First, we must establish a new interlibyan dialogue involving the presence of representative players with real power and influence extended throughout the country. This must involve the representatives of power in Tobruk, including the Marshal Haftar and major tribes of the East, West and South.
We must, then, adopt simplified and coherent institutional mechanisms. The executive must be embodied by a Prime Minister and a government legitimized by Parliament Tobruk (House of Representatives) which remains, for now, the only elected body and with the legitimacy outcome of the polls. For governance purposes, the Presidential Council must be resized and skills and responsibilities redefined and reduced to not compete and conflict with the powers of the Prime Minister and the government.
While it may be wise to have a presidential institution with the government, it can only be collegial as is the case in the current Agreement. We need a President and a Vice President or two Vice Presidents chosen by consensus and that symbolize the representation of three historical entities of the country, Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan. It is especially clear separation of functions between bodies and the Presidential Council and the government. The Presidential Council, whose presidency should rotate, can be a function mainly of representation of the Libyan State.
Moreover, the skills of the High Council of State (HCE) must be redefined to be consistent with what should be its strict and exclusive advisory. Libya can not endure without serious damage, a "balanced bicameralism" as that resulting from the 2015 Agreement Finally, it is in the House of Representatives of Tobruk to appoint the Commander in Chief of the army in accordance the logic of the parliamentary system that is implicit in the agreement. Unless we want to go to a presidential system, in which case it will have a president elected by universal suffrage and which may then have the Chief Command of the Armed Forces and appoint the chief. This involves amending the existing Agreement.
Tripartite Initiative
The international community and the UN continue to consider the 2015 Agreement as the only way out of the current slump solution. However, divisions and daily violence show that the crisis is worsening and the rejection of the Agreement amplifier - which contrasts with the appearance of unanimity around this pact, which was recently relégitimyzed by the UN.
Nevertheless, different pressures currently operating from inside and outside to amend this Agreement and make it acceptable to Parliament Tobruk, east of the tribes and the Haftar Marshal appointed Commander of the Libyan national army by the House of Representatives of Tobruk. Attempts dialogue inside the country are undertaken to reform the Agreement.
Internationally, efforts are being made by neighboring countries to Libya to help it introduce changes to make the agreement acceptable in the East as in the West and the South, and thus finally applicable. The recent tripartite initiative (Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia), which should lead soon to a summit of heads of state of these countries, is one of the signs that a process is underway to reform of the 2015 Agreement
This is the only peaceful and negotiated solution to the crisis and the only way out of the current impasse which, if it persists, would plunge the country into a true civil war which premises already exist. Given the risk of disintegration of the country and threats of Daesh Islamic state that persists despite defeat on Sirte, it is urgent to go to very substantial changes in the Political Agreement Skhirat
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