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Following the elections last June, the resulting parliament and the government it appointed were displaced from Tripoli, the capital, to Tubruq far in the east by an alliance of forces (including the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists) called Libya Dawn, which had suffered electoral defeat.
International leaders repeat their willingness to help — once this
UN-sponsored unity government is in place. Depending on how you count,
however, there have been up to five governments of Libya since the
revolution. And each has embraced the political spectrum, only for unity
to disappear each time one party pursued its own interests.
Given the distrust, it is key to get right the principles for determining who should be in a government. Does insistence on “inclusive policies” translate into including in government those in Libya Dawn who have long maintained an ambivalent relationship with Islamic extremists, whom the UN itself has outlawed? In answering that, we should not conflate participation in the political process with participation in government. Western leaders appear wedded to the proposition that governments in the Middle East must include every political faction to be held “legitimate”. The danger is that even a group that usurped power by force wields a veto.
Negotiation needs to shape the context of a final agreement. The litmus test of what is a legitimate participant in talks should be its stance on Isis. Some elements of Libya Dawn (including Muslim Brotherhood members) have failed that test for too long. Hence the distrust of their motives — even among those from their own ranks, some of whom have now taken the battle to Isis.
Mr León’s determination is impressive. There is, however, a flaw in his negotiating framework. The elected government suspects western partners and the UN are bent on securing the inclusion in talks and in government of those who have maintained an alliance with the principal enemy — the one fiercely opposed elsewhere in the region.
Who appoints the unity government is therefore crucial. Is it to be assorted negotiators assembled by the UN most recently in Morocco, or leaders of political parties gathered by the UN in Algeria — some of whom have no representatives in an elected body? Why is that more legitimate than the House of Representatives elected nearly a year ago?
It is essential that the international community builds consensus around a few principles. Libya’s resources and territory must not fall into the hands of a coalition that can be manipulated by those associated with Isis and al-Qaeda. Explicit, unequivocal opposition to such extremists is a prerequisite for inclusion in any negotiating process.
“Legitimacy” cannot permit the transfer of legislative authority from an elected to an unelected body appointed by those who took up arms to assert power. The constituent assembly elected last year to draft a new constitution may regrettably need to enter the fray and authorise the establishment of a unity government until polls can be held under a new constitution.
The Libyan army should be supported in its efforts to defeat extremist forces. All other militias should be disarmed or integrated into government forces, with UN-agreed sanctions imposed on those refusing to do so.
The writer, a former UK ambassador in Iraq, Egypt and Libya, is chairman of the Libyan British Business Council
Following the elections last June, the resulting parliament and the government it appointed were displaced from Tripoli, the capital, to Tubruq far in the east by an alliance of forces (including the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists) called Libya Dawn, which had suffered electoral defeat.
Libya now also risks becoming the platform for the most vicious
terrorist group to emerge from the region. As in Syria and Iraq, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant,
known as Isis, has mutated in Libya, exploiting the political and
military stalemate afflicting UN-sponsored negotiations to establish a
national unity government under the guidance of Bernardino León, the UN
envoy.
Given the distrust, it is key to get right the principles for determining who should be in a government. Does insistence on “inclusive policies” translate into including in government those in Libya Dawn who have long maintained an ambivalent relationship with Islamic extremists, whom the UN itself has outlawed? In answering that, we should not conflate participation in the political process with participation in government. Western leaders appear wedded to the proposition that governments in the Middle East must include every political faction to be held “legitimate”. The danger is that even a group that usurped power by force wields a veto.
Negotiation needs to shape the context of a final agreement. The litmus test of what is a legitimate participant in talks should be its stance on Isis. Some elements of Libya Dawn (including Muslim Brotherhood members) have failed that test for too long. Hence the distrust of their motives — even among those from their own ranks, some of whom have now taken the battle to Isis.
Mr León’s determination is impressive. There is, however, a flaw in his negotiating framework. The elected government suspects western partners and the UN are bent on securing the inclusion in talks and in government of those who have maintained an alliance with the principal enemy — the one fiercely opposed elsewhere in the region.
Who appoints the unity government is therefore crucial. Is it to be assorted negotiators assembled by the UN most recently in Morocco, or leaders of political parties gathered by the UN in Algeria — some of whom have no representatives in an elected body? Why is that more legitimate than the House of Representatives elected nearly a year ago?
It is essential that the international community builds consensus around a few principles. Libya’s resources and territory must not fall into the hands of a coalition that can be manipulated by those associated with Isis and al-Qaeda. Explicit, unequivocal opposition to such extremists is a prerequisite for inclusion in any negotiating process.
“Legitimacy” cannot permit the transfer of legislative authority from an elected to an unelected body appointed by those who took up arms to assert power. The constituent assembly elected last year to draft a new constitution may regrettably need to enter the fray and authorise the establishment of a unity government until polls can be held under a new constitution.
The Libyan army should be supported in its efforts to defeat extremist forces. All other militias should be disarmed or integrated into government forces, with UN-agreed sanctions imposed on those refusing to do so.
The writer, a former UK ambassador in Iraq, Egypt and Libya, is chairman of the Libyan British Business Council
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