Which non platonic solution for Libya

The initiative of Tunisian president Beji Caid Essebsi, implemented with talent by his representative, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Khemaies Jhinaoui, is welcome. Will it succeed, however, to constitute a solution to the Libyan drama? Nothing is less sure.

A step in the right direction

Surely this is a step in the right direction than acting within the framework of the UN by ensuring involve all Libyan parties inclusive, ensuring that the solution can only come from inside.

It's supposed to say and necessary; but this is insufficient in view of the current state of the world, the geostrategic situation of the country and especially the causes of the tragedy.

Now it is a cardinal principle never neglect in political science, what is not to neglect the cause to act effectively on the effect. Especially as we know, for a fact, that the effect can only be to the extent of the case. So it is dramatic in its negative impact or fabulous in its benefits according to the smallness or greatness of the cause, both moral and material.

Act on the cause

yet, we do not talk, or very little, of Libyan drama cause. What is it? To summarize, these are the appetites of the West attracted by the riches of this country suddenly declared disaster status. We know that chaos is an opportunity to make the juiciest business. But ever the neo-colonialists were not many around Libya's bargain. In addition to the wealth of the country, they were and are intended to prevent any change in the unfair, though obsolete.world order

Who today do not know that among the motivations of the cabal orchestrated against the dictator was that Gaddafi had to counter its initiatives, admittedly dumb essentially, but were no less likely to disrupt world disorder dominated by to become lords supposed to save their threatened interests,"tappers"?That this was done in the name of human rights and freedoms of the people does not change the truth.

More than elsewhere, it is known in Tunisia that exploits the true - and also the sacred - the false and despicable.

A Machiavellian strategy

Do not forget! It all began in Tunisia which was, incidentally, the first victim of the Libyan tragedy. We initiated it, as in a game of skittles policies, the fall of a dictatorship considered hardly more or cooperating enough with the aims of neocolonialism. It was the establishment of a subtle strategy, long-term, to force change in the face of a part of the world, without affecting its way to become blatant disorder. This should contribute to hide in some aspects.

The fallacy, though wise - meeting the expectations of enslaved peoples - was obviously democracy. Now it knows that even in the democratic West, that the people supposed not to exist or more; we are a "daimoncratie" that power of demons (daimons) politics. Obviously, these demons are today the gurus of global finance and policy at the service of global capitalism, allied for the occasion at the most venal current in Islam, Salafism in this "wild capital islamism".This is what gave the terrorist organization Islamic State (Daesh).

Fanned in Syria, this nefarious plot is now denounced even in its early initiators in America where the arrival of troublemaker Trump has shown that this strategy of chaos was not the best.

The imperative of solidarity

We can no longer continue to act as if nothing had happened. The head of the Libyan drama is the West that must assume entire responsibility in the ruin of the country and its near and far neighbors.

In the West, it is not just the United States to be involved, but especially the European Union (EU) which left first deadly traits for Gaddafi and his people.

The EU can not and should not be limited to its current practice of scribbling policy inept developing a strategy to lock the borders of Libya, to be considered, and also in Tunisia, retention camps for the flow of refugees, these postmodern concentration camps. She's categorical imperative, both legal and moral, to act on the causes for finally recognizing and serious manner the necessary and essential solidarity between the two shores of the Mediterranean. It is a fatality imposed the inevitable exit of former world paradigm dead an archaic world relations after the Second World War.

Such a healthy reaction begins with the dramatic act in symbolic terms that will repudiation of the current European policy on migration. Let them dare, first, erect new dogma in the freedom of human movements by using the tool now unavoidable biometric circulation visa?

And that repairs the harm done by proposing the accession to the Maghreb Union, including Libya. Is it not thus act on the causes of the Libyan drama and find useful to get out in the framework of the European motto of unity in diversity: In varietate concordia?

LIBYA & TRUMP - 23.2.2017

Among the many crises now facing the new Trump administration, Libya poses a growing challenge. The shattered Mediterranean state is close to open civil war, which could have profoundly negative consequences for U.S. interests and allies.

Although the Islamic State (ISIS) was driven from its main areas of control in Libya last year and oil production has rebounded to a three-year high, Libya is more polarized and fragmented than ever. The UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli is failing in its basic functions and confronts an existential challenge from an eastern faction led by General Khalifa Hifter and backed by Egypt, UAE, and, increasingly, Russia. In addition, the economy is veering toward collapse, and jihadist militancy could still find purchase in the country’s chaos.
Now it is the time for careful and robust American diplomatic leadership.
The Trump administration must first school itself in the complexities of Libyan politics, shunning the easy and incorrect categorizations of “Islamist” and “secular” or “nationalist.” It must avoid viewing the country solely through a counterterrorism lens and sub-contracting its Libya policy to regional states, especially Egypt, whose partisan and securitized approach will produce more division and radicalization. Punting the Libya issue to Europe is also a non-starter; without American backing, a European role will lack credibility, inviting Russia to be the key power broker. Backing one side in Libya’s conflicts, as some regional leaders are seeking to persuade the US to do, would trigger a major escalation and a long civil war.
AFTER ISIS
Their operations might have been overshadowed by campaigns in Mosul and eastern Syria, but over the past year, Libyan forces, backed by American airpower and Western special operations, scored a hard-won victory against the ISIS stronghold in the central city of Sirte. Elsewhere across the country, Libyans ejected ISIS cells and fighters from Derna and Benghazi in the east, from Tripoli, and from the town of Sabratha near the Tunisian border. Today, ISIS is no longer a territorial force in Libya in any meaningful sense. That said, its demise presents a number of dangers.
First, remnants of ISIS could still reconstitute themselves and sow trouble. Already, fighters have fled to the desert valleys south of Sirte, where they’ve tried to regroup in small encampments like the one the United States bombed on January 18 of this year. The group is said to have a residual presence around the Western town of Sabratha, a hub for Tunisian jihadists, and its clandestine cells are still capable of attacking in and around the capital. Beyond these specific threats, Libya remains an attractive host to jihadism, whether from ISIS, al Qaeda, or some new variant. The conditions are ripe: a long legacy of jihad, economic despair, a governance vacuum, and worsening polarization that could leave some communities feeling as if they have no recourse but violence. The networks and infrastructure of existing jihadist groups could easily give way to new mutations, much as ISIS co-opted or peeled away Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi, Sabratha, and Sirte. Most importantly, jihadism thrives on conflict; ISIS expanded during Libya’s last round of factional fighting starting in mid-2014, inserting itself in the fissures wrought by the conflict between the so-called Dawn and Dignity camps.
Western diplomats had hoped that fighting ISIS could serve as a springboard for political unity among these warring camps. In fact, the opposite has happened.
Campaigns against ISIS were pell-mell and carried out by disparate and hostile militias without any unifying authority. For example, militias from the powerful city of Misrata that defeated ISIS in Sirte are only loosely tethered to the GNA in Tripoli—and many in their ranks fiercely oppose it. Now that ISIS is gone, Sirte faces enormous challenges of reconstruction and reconciliation. Some tribes in Sirte, such as the Qadhadhafa and Warfalla, see the Misratan-led victory as less of a liberation and more of a conquest—it was their grievances against Misratan domination that gave ISIS an opening in the first place.
Elsewhere in Libya, there are other signs of looming conflict. In Benghazi, Hafter’s self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) has largely defeated ISIS and other jihadist groups, but in the process, it severely ruptured the city’s social fabric, displacing thousands and unleashing exclusionary forces such as tribalism and ultraconservative Salafism. Evicted Islamists are likely to continue the fight, whether through conventional attacks from outside the city or terrorism inside it. Farther to the east, Hifter’s forces are laying siege to Derna, accusing the Islamists there that defeated ISIS of belonging to al Qaeda.
Most ominously, though, the campaign against ISIS has helped embolden Hafter and his supporters to make a renewed push for national domination, with worrisome threats to bring the war to the capital, Tripoli. The risk of renewed conflict makes the need for American diplomatic leadership all the more urgent; having lent its military muscle to help vanquish ISIS, Washington cannot leave Libya to its own devices.
CIVIL WAR
The political safeguards that could have prevented renewed fighting have eroded over the past year. The GNA’s domestic support base has steadily narrowed; its international backers have forfeited much of their credibility because of their inability to dissuade regional states and Russia from supporting the GNA’s adversaries. Most importantly, since the agreement to form the GNA was reached in December 2015, the balance of forces has changed, with Hafter consolidating his power in the East.
The GNA failed miserably in a gamble to weaken Hafter by backing rival eastern figures. Since early 2016, Hafter has gradually expelled or silenced former opponents among the eastern forces that are loosely aligned with him. To cement his authority, he empowered armed Salafi groups, reinstated many former elements of former leader Muammar al Qaddafi’s intelligence services, and appointed military governors to replace elected municipal councils. In September, after months of working to coopt tribal leaders and military figures, he took over eastern Libya’s biggest oil export terminals without significant military action. This dealt a heavy blow to the GNA and gained Hifter substantial popularity across the country, as his forces refrained from shutting down the ports to strong-arm the GNA.
Having secured his hold over the east, Hafter is now stepping up efforts to expand his dominion. In the south, LNA-affiliated units are relatively weak but have begun to act more aggressively. Near Sirte, Hafter has deployed officers and militiamen drawn from the city’s tribes. In an eventual confrontation with Misratan forces in the city, he could likely count on support from a powerful Salafi brigade that had fought with the Misratans against ISIS.
Most worryingly, Hafter and his close associates frequently announce that they will soon begin what they call the “liberation” of Tripoli. This notion is far-fetched, as the LNA has few local affiliates around the capital, and its eastern troops are unlikely to fight in the west. But Hifter does not need to actually invade the capital to gain power. All he needs to do is drive a wedge between militias in and around the capital and strike alliances with some of them. This seems to be his precise strategy: by naming several of Tripoli’s militias as forces he could work with, Hifter has stoked tensions and contributed to an uptick in violence in the capital. Hafter probably calculates that he stands to benefit from chaos in Tripoli, which would strengthen his claim that only the LNA can impose stability.In the face of Hifter’s advances, the GNA is crumbling. Since it arrived in Tripoli in March 2016, the GNA has failed to establish its authority even in the capital, let alone elsewhere. A rival government continues to command the loyalty of some militias in Tripoli, and a coalition of Misratan-led militias battle-hardened by combat in Sirte recently arrived in the capital to challenge the GNA’s allies. Meanwhile, those militias nominally supporting the GNA have fueled conflicts by encroaching on the turf of neighborhood rivals. Efforts to establish a UN-backed presidential guard that would protect GNA institutions have been extremely slow in materializing. Even if such a force were formed, it would still face stiff opposition from better-armed militias, causing further violence in the capital.
For ordinary Libyans, the GNA’s ineffectiveness is most clearly seen in the country’s worsening economic crisis and long power cuts. Although several of its own members have boycotted the GNA from the beginning or resigned over the past year, even its staunchest supporters are now willing to renegotiate the agreement on which the GNA is based.
A recent flurry of backchannel talks reflects the widespread recognition that the current political setup is failing. There is now an unprecedented willingness to reach a compromise on almost all sides of the conflict—except that of Hifter. Leading Misratan figures have reached out to the general in recent months to explore his readiness to strike a deal, even offering to integrate him into a unified military structure at his current position, which is superior to that of the Chief of Staff. So far, their efforts have been in vain. In meetings with Western diplomats, Hifter has bluntly stated his intention to rule Libya and rebuffed overtures for negotiations.
Hifter’s uncompromising stance is not only linked to the support he receives from Egypt, the UAE, and Russia but also to expectations that the Trump administration would back Egypt’s position on Libya or support Hifter by lifting the UN arms embargo and directing closer American intelligence and military support to his LNA forces. Egyptian and Russian officials, in turn, are suggesting to Libyan and Western interlocutors that they could induce Hifter to strike a deal. But even more than their willingness, their ability to do so is highly doubtful. In addition to Egypt and Russia, Algeria and Tunisia are also proposing their services as mediators, stepping into the void left by the UN’s faltering efforts.
FRESH APPROACH
Sticking to the mantra of supporting the GNA, as Western governments have done over the past year, is no longer a viable option. But neither is the seemingly easy solution of backing a military strongman such as Hafter. Renewed efforts at brokering a political deal within a new negotiating framework offer the most promising path forward.
Hifter has no realistic prospect of stabilizing Libya through military rule. His Libyan National Army is neither national nor an army. Even in the east, the bulk of the LNA’s forces are drawn from civilian fighters—militias of varying backgrounds that are increasingly disguised as formal army units. In the west and south, the LNA units have a distinctly tribal composition, provoking suspicion among neighboring communities that view them as little more than tribal militias.

The idea that Hifter’s forces could take over Tripoli and rebuild the Libyan state is thus highly implausible. Indeed, encouraging Hafter to expand his reach toward Tripoli risks triggering a war over the capital that could drag on for years. With a third of the country’s population living in the greater Tripoli area, such a conflict could cause displacement and humanitarian suffering on a scale not seen to date in Libya. It would also offer opportunities for jihadist mobilization. Non-Islamist armed groups in Tripoli would join forces with Islamist-leaning fighters to confront Hafter. As in the case of Benghazi, the most extreme and irreconcilable elements would invariably rise to the fore.

Even if Hafter were able to establish control over Tripoli, his rule would cause more, not less, radicalization. Like Egypt’s al-Sisi, Hafter makes no distinction between ISIS, al Qaeda, and the Muslim Brotherhood (whose Libyan branch has supported the GNA’s formation). His stated goal of killing, jailing, or exiling Islamists of all types risks provoking moderate, pro-state Islamists into going underground and allying themselves with radical jihadists. Meanwhile, doctrinaire Salafis of the tendency promoted by Hafter—who preach absolute loyalty to a sitting ruler—would further extend their influence, and enforce their harsh interpretation of Sharia law more widely.  

In sum, unification through military action is not realistic in Libya. Instead, USA, in conjunction with regional states, should support a renewed push for a political settlement. This requires, first, deterring any moves toward military escalation by exerting credible pressure on the warring parties, to include the threat of sanctions and exclusion from any future security assistance. Second, it requires rebuilding the negotiating architecture, with regional states taking the lead. The challenge will be brokering a common platform for dialogue among states with vested interests in Libya. How to deal with an increasingly assertive Russia will pose a particular difficulty. Recent initiatives by regional states should be encouraged, but they need to be transferred into a more coherent framework. A small group of states, closely coordinating with each other, could act as mediators and, eventually, witnesses and guarantors to an agreement. 

The U.S. role in such a process could be to provide strong and explicit support for the mediating consortium. Most importantly, it would require putting pressure on the regional states still backing Hifter. Every effort should be made to broker a deal that includes the general within the framework of a civilian-controlled military. But if Hifter proves recalcitrant, US must be willing to push his regional backers to end their support. 

Libya’s highly fragmented political landscape means that negotiations are a complex undertaking. Although the existing December 2015 agreement can serve as a starting point, the negotiating parties should be reconsidered. The current, failing agreement relied on the country’s two rival parliaments in Tripoli and Tobruk, which are both equally incapable of making decisions and inadequate proxies for the actual parties to the conflict. At the same time, Libya has few real power brokers, and their authority is often limited geographically. A new negotiating framework will have to deal with the thorny issue of representation for key political constituencies and military forces across the country. Shortcuts are unlikely to lead to a sustainable outcome. 

The worsening tensions in Libya could present the Trump administration with a significant test of its capacity for containing escalating crises, reconciling conflicting interests among its allies, and checking Russia’s ambitions. Expectations that the new administration will back one side in the conflict have raised the risk of an escalation that could lead to an open-ended war. To prevent such an outcome, US must send strong signals to forces on all sides of the conflict, as well as their foreign patrons, and make clear that a political settlement presents the only viable path out of the chaos.

END 

PLS READ THE TRUE HAFTER AGENDA http://www.arabnews.com/node/1058301

NATO & LIBYA 19.2.2017

The focus of Nato's conference in Brussels, the first since Donald Trump got to the White House, was on the message he sent to an organisation of Western allies he had called "obsolete" while speaking of his admiration for Vladimir Putin.

The message, a veiled threat, conveyed by US Defence Secretary James Mattis, was that the continuing failure of the alliance to pay its share on security would lead to the US reevaluating its commitment to the defence of Europe. That and the continuing fallout over Trump national security adviser Michael Flynn's departure after clandestine contacts with the Russians, were the sources of fascination and foreboding here. Almost unnoticed a development took place at the end of the summit, on Libya, which is likely to have great resonance in relations among Nato, the US and Russia, Trump and Putin. Nato's secretary-general, Jens Stoltenberg, announced that the alliance is likely to provide security support to the Libyan government of Fayez al-Sarraj.

"We have said for some time that we are ready to help Libya but that any assistance has to be based on a request from the Libyan government," said Stoltenberg. "This is the request we received yesterday - training local forces is one of the best weapons in the fight against terrorism and building stability."

Libya has, of course, become a source of huge trouble for Europe since David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy instigated Nato's military intervention and the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi six years ago. It is the main conduit for hundreds of thousands of refugees crossing the Mediterranean and also the lawless place where Isis has established its main base for carrying out attacks in the Maghreb.

Special forces of Western countries are already in action in Libya - the US has carried out airstrikes on Isis and other Islamist terrorists. But any formal deployment of forces by Nato faces problems. There is the danger of mission creep: being sucked into a violent and semi-anarchic quagmire, as well as the fact that the Government of National Accord, headed by Fayez al-Sarraj, which Nato is supposed to prop up, has very little territory and very little power.

The man who claims to wield real power - an aspiring new Gaddafi according to his enemies - is former general Khalifa Haftar with his force the Libyan National Army (LNA). He has the backing of Egypt and the UAE whose warplanes have carried out airstrikes in his support. Now, crucially, he has the support of a Russia expanding its influence across the Middle-East and North Africa.

General Haftar went to Moscow twice last year to seek help and then turned up on board the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov as it was returning from waters off the coast of Syria where it had been part of the blitzkrieg enabling Bashar al-Assad to recapture Aleppo. He met the Russian defence minister Sergei Shoigu, on board, to discuss, according to the Kremlin, "fighting international terrorist groups in the Middle East."

The US under Barack Obama had refused to deal with General Haftar but the Libyan commander and his backers, the parliament in Benghazi, one of the country's three governments, say they are also now optimistic that they will get the support of the Trump administration.

Abdel Fattah al-Sisi was the first foreign leader to congratulate Trump after his victory and the Egyptian president has been pressing Washington to switch its support to General Haftar. And, according to reports, members of the Trump team have started discussing the Haftar option. An American official in Brussels commented: "The Trump people may well think Libya would be a less sensitive theatre to cooperate with the Russians on counter-terrorism than Syria: the common conception is that Libya is a mess - we have Daesh [Isis] running around there and if this guy Haftar is being effective, then maybe he is the man."

Even before the coming of Trump there has been a feeling among some American officials that the problems being faced by Europe from Libya were, to an extent, self-induced. Paris and London were very much the cheerleaders in getting rid of Colonel Gaddafi, with Washington somewhat dubious about the outcome. The military mission was initially French and British led, but the Americans had to step in as shortfalls in equipment and bombs and missiles became apparent. In his speech to Nato at the end of the conflict, US defence secretary Leon Panetta warned that "legitimate questions about whether, if present trends continue, Nato will again be able to sustain the kind of operations we have seen in Libya without the US taking on even more of the burden."

The "trends" that Panetta was talking about was most of Nato not paying their way for the defence of the alliance. American officials pointed out that Mattis was having to make the same point again, much more forcefully, this week, six years later.

The issue of money is not something bothering General Haftar at the moment. Russia has printed 4bn Libyan Dinars (around $2.8bn) on contract to the Libyan Central Bank which it has transferred it to his backers in Benghazi. Haftar now claims that Moscow will enable him to spend the money legitimately by helping to lift the UN arms embargo in place since 2011. This allows only the UN-backed GNC administration in Tripoli to bring in weapons with the approval of the UN Security Council Committee.

General Haftar does not lack weapons: a steady, illicit flow comes from the Arab states backing him and his LNA is undoubtedly the most effective non-Islamist force in the country at present. Nato and the EU had been trying to get the general to come to an agreement with al-Sarraj's General National Council, namely that he retains military command while accepting the civilian administration. Boris Johnson wished earlier this month that "Gen Haftar can be persuaded that he can be a big part of the future of Libya but without necessarily having to be a new Boss''.

No, Mr.Trump, training the local Muslims is not good  idea. Training Muslims means training part of them to gun against the Christians.This is the mistake the Republican Bushes did and America is still paying its price.

But efforts to this end have been fruitless with General Haftar increasingly empowered by the backing of his international friends. Italian foreign minister Angelino Alfano was due to ask for help on the issue from Sergey Lavrov at a meeting of foreign ministers in Bonn yesterday. But news from there was dominated by the first meeting between Russia's foreign minister and Rex Tillerson, Trump's new secretary of state.

It looks increasingly likely that what happens in Libya, as in so much else in the tide of current geopolitics, is likely to be decided by how relations evolve between Trump and Putin; the forming of the new order, with other international players increasingly on the sideline.

END

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LIBYAN ROOTS ?

Libya’s historical province of Cyrenaica (or Barqa in Arabic) in the east, including its southern desert and oases such as Al-Jaghbub and Kufra, is a natural extension of Egypt’s Western Desert. There is barely any significant environmental or demographic difference between Libya’s Al-Jaghbub oasis and its close neighbor to the east Egypt’s Siwa oasis.

Furthermore, the major tribes of Egypt’s Matrouh Province — including the Awlad Ali — also inhabit eastern Cyrenaica across the current borders as well as Fezzan.

On the other hand, the province of Tripolitania, which includes the present capital Tripoli, is considered by many Arabs as an environmental and demographic extension of Tunisia and Algeria.

As time passed by, the two coastal provinces became linked with the desert province of Fezzan, and later the three provinces witnessed various kinds of interaction, especially, after the Islamic-Arab conquests.

Subsequently, during the 20th century the three provinces were united under the Senussi religious leadership and the present day Libya was born; and despite the fact that the new state continued to have two capitals, Tripoli and Benghazi, for sometime, one national identity was eventually established.

It was further cemented thanks to oil riches, urbanization and internal migrations, as single-tribe dominated towns decreased while larger, more mixed cities emerged. Today branches of the same tribe may inhabit various cities and towns across the vast Libyan territories.

Major cities like Tripoli and Benghazi are truly diverse, as are smaller towns like Derna and Misrata; but other towns are less diverse such as Tobruk and Al-Bayda in the east, Bani Walid, Zintan and the Jabal Nafousa in the west.

The Qaddafi regime always lied when preaching “Arabism” “Secularism,” and “Socialism,” while meddling in the nation’s social fabric. Like other dictatorships it played on and exploited tribal, sectarian, ethnic and regional differences and sensitivities; thus fomenting widespread suspicion, fear and even hatred, which surfaced in a long subdued and maltreated population the moment the yoke of suppression was lifted.

As a result, it was not really surprising to see extremist organizations with dubious origins and intentions, such as the Islamic State (IS), finding their way into the countries where the winds of change shook or brought down dictators. What we see today in Libya isn’t much different to what we see in Yemen and Syria.

What we see is an “arena” created, first, by the huge void left by the collapse of autocratic cliques that have controlled and abused their countries and countrymen for more than four decades, destroying in the process most of the pillars of a civil society; and second, by inept handling by an international community whose short term interests have taken precedence over a strategic vision for a region that has several common denominators in spite of its vast geographic area.

The common ailments of Libya, Syria, Yemen, Egypt and Iraq may amount to more than the international community is willing to admit.

However, if the West is now worried about the danger approaching southern Europe from a Libyan coast infested by extremist self-proclaimed “Islamist” groups, it must take a more ethical and strategic stance than it is currently doing.

Of course, Libya poses an imminent danger to Europe. Iran’s as yet hidden “collaboration” has not yet reached this far, (and may not do so), but Washington’s undeclared “partnerships” will most likely increase the geographic, sectarian and social “incubator” of terrorism and extremism in Libya.

Once again, the world would be better off if it stopped pouring kerosene on a raging fire.

TRUMP & PLATO

Few political science books surpass The Republic by Greek philosopher Plato in erudition and analytical depth. Most students first read it in graduate school and may occasionally refer to it to remind themselves how societies move along from aristocracy to timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and, inevitably, to tyranny. It is a valuable tome to all those who cherish liberty and who, mistakenly, assume that freedom lasts.
A recent BBC News report rekindled Plato’s relevance, in light of developments in Washington and several western countries, with critical elections scheduled next in France, Germany and, perhaps, the United Kingdom. How relevant is Plato and what can be done to stop the onslaughts that threaten our liberties?
The relevance of the question is due to the fact that a good portion of western populations strenuously object to what is perceived as a loss of identity and, equally important, of feared socio-religious “invasions”, which presumably intend to change their Christian norms. Yet, there is much more at stake, as anticipated by the Greek.
Plato divided his political vision into distinct phases, starting with aristocracy, which he defined as a form of government that entrusted power to a philosopher king. Such a figure is assumed to be wise and, in the framework of surviving Arab monarchies, best suited to rule over the masses. Although aristocracy is privileged, all subjects are allowed, even encouraged, to own property and produce goods for themselves. Above all else, the aristocratic philosopher-ruler is an individual with character, imbued with an impeccable sense of justice, and who has faith in the Creator, whose truths he upholds.
Plato believed that, over time, aristocracy degenerates into a timocracy because the philosopher-monarch is not always well served by his advisers. When the production of wealth reaches a certain level in any society, the Greek foresaw that cultivating virtues for its own sake and upholding the highest selfless standards, are no longer satisfactory to those anxious to aggrandise their interests. It must be emphasised that the chief danger of a timocracy is to strip the philosopher-ruler of intrinsic abilities to reason and, instead, engage in unwise activities like war, because raw and simple-minded features replace calculated and high-spirited goals. Power replaces intellect that, for Plato, highlighted the mechanism through which a society drifts from aristocracy to oligarchy.
To be sure, Plato found some merit in timocracies, including a desire to rule according to clearly enunciated laws, though what he lamented was the loss of virtue. What troubled the philosopher is the ease with which a timocratic ruler displays his cravings for power, relying on military might and absolute authority, instead of focusing on the virtues of his soul.
Plato defines oligarchy as a system of government that distinguishes between the rich and the poor, empowering the former disproportionately. Under oligarchy, what truly matters is the accumulation of wealth for its own sake and, over time, money takes over virtue as those entrusted with governance alter laws to further encourage the lust for materialism. Plato foresaw how oligarchs amend whatever constitutions exist to restrict political power as much as possible or to give the advantages to the super-wealthy.
Of course, such moves create a plethora of consequences, including how power is distributed that, ironically, removes the wise and the virtuous from all governance responsibilities. Incompetent officials are substituted, according to Plato, who in turn encourage class warfare to better divide and rule. As income disparities widen, an oligarchy aims to pit the rich against the poor, to implement laws that encourage some to enrich themselves through exploitative contracts and to further strip the poor of whatever savings they may have assembled under shady pyramid schemes.
As the oligarchic state increases the lust for material goods, poverty increases, popular anger builds, and revolution threatens the state from within. The chief weakness of oligarchic rule is the inevitable loss of the military, given that those who control wealth fear for their very own safety and seldom trust those who allegedly protect them.
According to Plato, a democracy is thus established, as the French, British, Russian, American and Chinese revolutions, among others, amply illustrated. What distinguishes a democracy is freedom for all. Clearly, the masses are the winners as “citizens” opt to exercise free will. High tolerance levels are introduced, which may even lead to anarchy, though Plato laments that democracy fails to tame unnecessary desires, which will often lead to disorder. One is tempted to splurge in excesses, including vices, all in the name of liberty.
This, according to Plato — and which we ought to reflect upon with utmost care — is the real danger that confronts democracy: The ease with which it can fall into tyranny where chaos dominates. As freedoms are taken for granted, tyrants introduce fear and cajole increasingly domesticated citizens into full docility that, inevitably, will allow for the rise of those who “seize” power, even in those instances when such tyrants are “elected”.
Fortunately for us, past tyrants are eventually removed from power, though the threat in 2017 is for the rise of neo-tyrants, individuals who pretend to be just when they are not, and who allege to uphold the law when that is the last thing on their minds. Tragically, neo-tyrants lack both wisdom and honour, still the two essential ingredients to preserve liberty. When a society produces a leader who lacks both, citizens truly suffer, as all concerned lose their humanity and sense of justice.

LIBYA PICTURE 12.2.2017

Armed carousels, militia influx, impatience with the United Nations and popular discontent. In Tripoli there is a brazier burning under the ashes of the revolution ready to inflame souls and soldiers, a handful of days dall'anniversario of 17 February 2011, the beginning of the Libyan spring. Perceptions and facts, such as "dropped" bloc in the capital of Libya's fledgling National Guard, the muscle of the police evidence Rada, clashes between brigades, and uncertainty about the future. Fears that the US State Department endorses a statement in which they expressed "serious concern" for the meet in the Libyan capital of means of "so-called LNG."  "A deployment that could further destabilize the already fragile security in Tripoli, "warns Foggy Bottom renewing the invitation" to support the process of political reconciliation under the GNA" and "pledging to oversee the transition to a new government through peaceful elections" in 'area of ​​Skhirat agreements.
The climate of tension, however, is the son of the Agreements of December 2015, sponsored by the UN that led to the appointment of Fayez al-Sarraj head of the national accord government. Gna he is struggling with a difficult process of internal stabilization and in an unlikely dialogue with Cyrenaica, increasingly autonomous fiefdom of Khalifa Haftar. "Sarraj is likely to have its day," says Othman Bensasi, former political adviser to former Prime Minister Ali Zeidan. "When he arrived he promised stability in 90 days, it's been over a year and nothing has happened, he cannot spend the money in the budget because it has no key ministers, people are tired."
The weakness of the president comes from the fact that controls a small political group and a small force field. "In Libya, if you want to do something you have to control the military."
At present there are 38 armed groups in Tripoli, one of the strongest three is with Sarraj while three support Ghwell Khalifa, a former prime minister and rival of the prime minister. These in turn control other groups scattered throughout the territory patchy.  

Then there are the Islamists by either party, such as the Mufti Sheikh Sadeq al-Gharyani with Ghwell, and the brigades Kara close to Sarraj. The common matrix is ​​therefore porous sides of the border, facilitating a riverside exchange for belief or convenience. The groups then have links with groups in other cities, which poses a risk of confrontation amplification. This fluidity paradoxically made it possible to avoid another conflict, but it is a balance guaranteed by the presence of so many and such weapons in circulation, thus labile. Even the hypothesis of Sarraj-Haftar dialogue advocated by Martin Kobler, is considered unfair because they are different creatures: the first political, military second.The UN has failed in setting, believe in many, primarily in having parachuted Sarraj in Tripoli without putting him in a position to acquire concrete contents and win domestic legitimacy. "It is not the first time that Libya will focuses on orphans characters consent and emptied of power - says Bensasi former member of the National Transitional Council and now director of the Department of Labour -. It was a mistake to rely on people like Kobler and Leon. " Sarraj is now engaged in a race against time to gather outside the force required to penetrate the domestic level, as evidenced by the signed agreements for migrants in Italy and Europe, and diplomatic and trade mission to Turkey (whose long hand often behind certain movements of internal troops to Libya and beyond). A race to avoid having to take the sea route by which he had arrived a year ago arriving at the base of Abu Sitta.A hypothesis favored by a growing number of people in Tripoli, some of which call for a dialogue between the military Ghwell, who is recovering control of forces in the field, and Haftar. And which shows cut off the UN in respect of whom a growing impatience after the appointment of Salam Fayyad.

The hostility towards the Palestinians is known in Libya, because of the easy kindergartens that Gaddafi gave them - to annoy Arab powers rivals and facilitate the anti-Israeli propaganda - creating colonies poorly tolerated. Libya also feels far from the Middle East, emphasizes Bensasi: "What help can give those who for 70 years failed to solve his problems?".

Libya Feb 2017 interesting analyis

Libya Feb 2017 interesting analyis in http://gulfnews.com/opinion/thinkers/us-russia-cooperation-can-start-with-libya-1.1973014

Rebus Libya: UNICREDIT 4% shares disputed between Tobruk and Tripoli govts

Rebus Libya: UNICREDIT 4,2% shares disputed between Tobruk and Tripoli govts. These shares  are divided between Central Bank and LIA (Libya Investments Authority or sovereign wealth fund). Serraj PM has recently changed LIA summits

"We have an excellent relationship with Libya," and "I do not think that will increase its share "because now they have other priorities." Thus he spoke the president of Unicredit, Giuseppe Vita on May 14, 2015 on the sidelines of the bank. Vita was just back from a meeting with the leaders of CBL and LIA, which are both shareholders with respectively 2.95% and 1.27% (total 4,22%) of UNICREDIT capital.

The problem is priorities - Vita said about two years ago - which have changed for both Libya, which has returned on the brink of civil war and has to deal with Isis 'at home', while Unicredit launches a capital big increase for 13 billion €. Libya should pay pro-rata almost 540 million €.

What will Libyans do? Will they stay in the capital of Italian banks joining the increase pro rata? Some observers interviewed by the newspaper bet on the participation of CBL whilst still see LIA as a great unknown move. "Already making a decision will not be easy because the instability of the country is reflected in that of the fund command chairs," says a source, noting that the other party is not unique.

On a side there are the representatives of Tobruk Government, on other side Fayez Al Serraj, PM of Libyan national unity government which took office last March in Tripoli.

In August 2016 Serraj appointed an "interim steering committee" for LIA, with President Ali Mahmoud Hassan instead Bouhadi, arrested a week before. Bouhadi, who operated from Malta, was regarded as LIA legitimate representative as appointed by the Government of Tobruk - the only one recognized by the UN before the executive Serraj - although the fund guide was challenged in London court by 'former number one’ Abdulmagid Breish, commissioned by the Libyan government in Tripoli.

In December Serraj daughter married a LIA executive in London with a wedding in style. However, both sides want to control the fund, because it is the only source of cash and will finance projects for the reconstruction of Libya when embargo will be lifted.

"Thanks to Italy for his courageous forerunner role in the stabilization of Libya," the Libyan PM repeated several times, in an interview with newspaper Republic on 24 January from his residence in Tripoli where Italy has recently reopened its embassy. In mid-October the president of LIA, Hassan, had a meeting in Rome with Italian Minister of the Treasury, PierCarlo Padoan and the next day he ended his Italian mission in Milan where he met Unicredit CEO, Jean Pierre Mustier. Until a few years ago LIA could rely on a vice president in Unicredit board. Tomorrow, who knows.