TRIPOLI RAMADAN EVE 2017

At least 28 people were killed and more than 100 wounded Friday (Ramadan eve) in violent clashes between rival armed groups in the Libyan capital Tripoli.

These fights have loyalties to the government of national unity (GNA) backed by the international community to rival groups in the middle of residential neighborhoods.

Under the banner of dozens of militias, the capital has been in chronic insecurity since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. Some armed groups nevertheless aligned with the GNA after taking office in March 2016.

Friday's clashes resulted in at least 28 deaths and 128 injuries, said spokesman for the Ministry of Health Anwar Frajallah, without being able to specify immediately who were the victims.

He pointed out that the balance sheet could become heavier due to the existence of "critical cases". "Some hospitals have not been as able to report their balance sheets because of a telecom problems" he said.

A previous report revealed 13 dead and nearly 80 wounded.

A GNA security official, Hashem Bishhr, lamented 23 fatalities and more than 29 wounded in the ranks of the loyal forces.

Fighting began at dawn in the Abu Slim, Hadba and Salaheddin neighborhoods in southern Tripoli, where heavy tanks and weapons were deployed, witnesses said.

"I can hear explosions and artillery fire in the south. (I) condemns the action of these militias that threaten the security of Libyans before Ramadan, "the month of Muslim fasting that begins Saturday in Libya, wrote the British ambassador in Libya, Peter Millett, on his Twitter account.

"The voices of reason ... must prevail in the interest of the country," reacted UN envoy to Libya Martin Kobler. "We must protect civilians," he said in a statement to AFP, urging rival groups to refrain from resorting to violence for political ends.

"Gift" from ramadan

Late in the afternoon, the fighting faded, but intermittent shots were still heard from several parts of the capital.

Groups hostile to the GNA have claimed, on their Facebook pages, attacks against forces loyal to this executive backed by the international community.

The fighting began around a complex of ten luxurious villas that served as the headquarters of militias loyal to the former head of an unrecognized government, Khalifa Ghweil, dismissed from power after the formation of the GNA.

The GNA on Friday accused Ghweil and a militia leader Salah Badi of being responsible for the attacks promising to "mercilessly reply" The two men, from Misrata (west), were leaders of Fajr Libya coalition, which took power in Tripoli in 2014.

They "exceeded all limits. Nothing stops them, "denounced the GNA in a statement. "It is their gift to the citizens for the month of Ramadan".

Forces loyal to the GNA had managed to gain influence in Tripoli by chasing rival groups of their strongholds in March in and around the city center at the cost of heavy fighting.

Since then, there has been unusual calm in the capital, although several sectors remain out of control.

Six years after the revolt ended the dictatorship of Muammar Gaddafi, Libya remains stuck in an endless crisis of transition, victim of persistent insecurity, a tattered economy and incessant political rivalries.

The young militia fighters carried in a comrade who was covered in blood and motionless. It was 1:30 p.m. Friday at the Al Mokhtar Clinic, under maintenance by Emaco Group Libya, and Libya’s civil war had just reignited in this fractured capital.

“Move on, clear the way,” one fighter screamed. “He’s dying.”

Five hours earlier, on the eve of the holy Muslim fasting month of Ramadan, fierce clashes erupted between rival militias. They tore apart a two-month lull in the violence and upended the lives of countless Libyans in neighborhoods that turned into battle zones overnight.

The fighting also underscored the security and logistical challenges British investigators could face if they consider visiting Libya to pursue clues in the Manchester concert suicide bombing that killed 22 people this week. The bomber, Salman Abedi, was of Libyan origin, and his father and brother were arrested in Tripoli. Both are in the custody of a counterterrorism militia aligned with the Western-backed government.

Those challenges were evident during an hours-long drive Friday in a city fragmented as much by politics, ideology and geography as it is by violence and the thirst for power. In the southeastern enclaves, militias deployed tanks and used heavy artillery, leaving families trapped inside their homes and sending many civilians and fighters to hospitals with injuries. Authorities could not provide reliable casualty figures.

The renewed fighting in Libya arrived on the eve of Ramadan.

But in the northern neighborhoods, untouched by Friday’s violence, Tripoli residents surreally socialized in cafes and water-skied in the Mediterranean Sea, even as the sound of explosions and gunfire thundered nearby. Huge plumes of black smoke from burning buildings rose over the city.

“This has become normal for us,” said Shukri Salim, 27, a Libyan Airlines employee, who was having coffee with friends in a cafe and watching a televised soccer match.

“I knew it was Ramadan and the war is going to start,” said his friend Ayoub Aldabaa, 27, an accountant, who was with him. “We’re so accustomed to this.”

Last year, too, fighting engulfed the capital during Ramadan. That time, the clashes involved different militias.

It has been mostly like this since the 2011 populist uprising, part of the Arab Spring, that ousted Libyan dictator Moammar Gaddafi and led to his killing. A constellation of tribal and regional militias emerged, seizing advantage of the power vacuum and abundance of weapons in a quest for power and wealth.

Today, militias have carved up the oil-producing country into fiefdoms, each aligned with one of three competing governments. And Tripoli, as expected, has been a major battleground with armed groups fighting for control of neighborhoods, even streets and buildings.

Friday’s violence pitted militias aligned with the U.N.-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) against Islamist-leaning forces of the self-declared National Salvation government who are trying to reclaim territory lost in recent months, according to security officials.

A spokesman for the National Salvation government said a GNA-aligned militia erected a fake checkpoint to kidnap some of its fighters. “So we decided to attack the GNA boys,” said the spokesman, Brig. Gen. Mahmud Zaghal.

But there has also been speculation for weeks that the National Salvation militias were planning a counterattack. A Facebook page created by its supporters carried a post on Thursday night announcing that it would launch assaults against rivals in southern Tripoli.

The clashes Friday mostly unfolded in the neighborhoods of Abu Salim, Salahedeen and Al Habda. Fighting also erupted in areas near the Rixos Hotel, which has been used by officials and lawmakers aligned with the GNA government.

Last October, their new legislative body was ousted from the buildings by the Salvation militias. In December, the area was the scene of heavy fighting over several days. Militias aligned with the GNA currently are in control of the complex and surrounding neighborhoods.

“We will retake the Rixos,” Zaghal vowed.

At the Al Mokhtar Clinic, the toll of the fighting was obvious. Doctors and nurses were inundated by the wounded. One man arrived with blood splattered on his legs.

“My brother was injured,” another man said as he waited outside. “He was just standing in front of his house when the shells landed.”

But the militia fighters were most visible at the clinic.

“I want to get inside the room,” one fighter screamed, as others held him back from accosting the doctors and nurses.

Other fighters, clad in black and clutching AK-47 rifles, stood outside.

At 1:53 p.m., screams filled the room. Some militia fighters cried, their faces now filled with anguish.

Their comrade had died on the operating table.

An hour later, Aldabaa and Salim were in the cafe. As they have done during previous clashes, they called friends and family around the city to make sure they were safe. They also checked Twitter and Facebook to see which neighborhoods had turned into no-go zones.

Salim had just spoken to a friend who was stuck in his home as fighters pummeled each other outside.

He and Aldabaa had both taken part in the revolution. Salim said he did not regret fighting against the Gaddafi regime, but “regretted the people who came after the revolution.”

Aldabaa blamed the Western countries for helping the rebellion that ousted Gaddafi, and now regrets that the revolution happened at all.

“We were expecting to take the country in a better direction,” he said. “Unfortunately, we left it in a worse condition.”

At 3:15 p.m. near the Rixos Hotel, militia fighters in pickup trucks waited for the next offensive. Graffiti on the wall of the complex read: “Free Libya.”

By 4:30 p.m., drivers were in lines at gas stations around the city, preparing for shortages that usually come after each clash.

And the people of Tripoli were certainly expecting more fighting.

END

19.5.2017 LIBYA SITUATION DEADLOCK

http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/8/269061/World/Region/INTERVIEW--Libya-The-battle-for-dignity.aspx
EGYPTIAN VIEWPOINT
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Since the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, the Libyan crisis does not end. The impasse is nourished by a process of political and territorial fragmentation. What can be attributed to it?With the support of the anti-Gaddafi revolution of 2011, tribal and local identities have imposed themselves with great force. This first created a rather remarkable unity in the towns which were the revolutionary fiefs. But once the threat of the regime disappeared after the fall of Gaddafi, the big question became that of access to the resources of the State. And there, divisions have emerged, not only among the local groups, but even within these groups. Fragmentation thus occurred around the distribution of resources. Under Gaddafi, there was a well-defined channel of redistribution, even if challenged. Today, this framework has broken out.Is not the existence of Libya as a nation at stake?No, national identity is not in question. Almost no one, apart from a separatists minority in Cyrenaica [Eastern Libya, where most of the hydrocarbon reserves are located], is calling it into question. As for the various ethnic groups expressing linguistic and cultural demands - Amazigh, Touareg -, it is rather requests for recognition within the framework of Libyan national identity.

LIBYA 15.5.2017

Libya is still not out of the rut despite the latest efforts to bridge the differences between the two most important protagonists of the crisis in the country.

The meeting recently in Abu Dhabi between Fayez al-Sarraj, GNU president, recognized by the international community and Marshal Khalifa Haftar, Commander of forces armed had generated a lot of hope remained unfortunately unanswered.

Thus, the recommendations adopted at that meeting were not acted upon and the situation seems to be in deep water.

However, the two men who have, in fact, the key to the political solution in Libya, had made commitments on natures measures to find a solution to the crisis gripping this country for more than six years.

The amendment of the political agreement signed in Skhirat to eliminate obstacles to its implementation, has been one of the key measures on which the two protagonists were committed.
In practice, it is the status quo ante and chaos that perpetuate themselves emphasizing more the crisis.

Tensions among militia
lately, clashes among armed groups and militias in Tripoli, testify to the poisonous climate prevailing in the Libyan capital, plagued by insecurity.

So the coalition of armed groups out of Misrata "Fajr (dawn of Libya) Libya, threatened to launch 'Fajr Libya II' to reoccupy the capital and prevent any possibility of an arrangement with the Marshal Khalifa Haftar and especially its Libyan recognition as head of the armed forces".

Slaheddine Badi, one of the leaders of Fajr Libya has denounced the meeting between al-Sarraj and Haftar and lashed out at statements made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Government of national unity, Mohamed Siala, in which he acknowledged Haftar as head of the Libyan armed forces.

In addition, a new group armed relavant to Government of Salvation (Khalifa AlGwel), a parallel cabinet installed in Tripoli, has announced the launch of a new military operation, called "Fakhr Libya" to regain power in Tripoli.

A situation which calls into question the hopes after the meeting between Haftar and al-Sarraj and especially more weakens the foundations of peace building in in Libya.

The meeting between al-Sarraj and Haftar was followed by a meeting in Algiers of the countries in the vicinity of the Libya, comprising, in addition to the host country Algeria, the Tunisia, Egypt, Niger, Chad, Sudan and Libya in addition to the envoys of the United Nations and the African Union.

The meeting in Algiers has made no progress compared to other meetings or taking initiative likely to unblock the crisis in Libya or to find a way out.

They gathered simply to reaffirm some principles for the choice of peaceful means and dialogue to achieve peace, the need for an inclusive approach, attachment to the unit and sovereignty from the Libya and support to the Presidential Council as well as the amended political agreement.

The Alliance of Egypt and Haftar: furthermore, the Egyptian president Abdel-Fatteh al-Sissi received Saturday in Cairo in Egypt, Marshal Khalifa Haftar which is its ally in the East of Libya zone border with Egypt.

No initiative to organize a second meeting between Fayez al-Sarraj and Khalifa Haftar was taken by the Egyptian president who simply claim the lifting of the arms embargo imposed by the Nations in order to allow the Libyan army led by Haftar, umpteenth time to fight terrorism.
UN Envoy in Libya, Martin Kobker has reaffirmed, for its part, the will of the international community to promote the political process in Libya so that it might lead to a result resolving the crisis gripping the country.

At this level, we must recognize that it is still the domain of good intentions. Despite his support for the Libyan Presidential Council, the international community including the major powers did not coercive measures imposing a solution on the protagonists who camped on its positions to preserve his personal interests.

The initiative of the Tunisia of mediation the Libyan to bring them to a rapprochement of the points of view avoiding foreign interference, parties remained as its first phase without evolve towards the impractical nature to advance this initiative.

Adopted by the Algeria and Egypt, the initiative of the Tunisia remained at the embryonic stage despite the support of the aforementioned countries.

Although the Tunisian Minister of Foreign Affairs said the Tunisian initiative is always topical, it is clear that its implementation be accused of delay serious stumbling on the coming of the bubbling Marshal Khalifa Haftar in Tunisia.

Yet an official invitation was launched to the Marshal to come to Tunis, but he still seems reluctant to take the plunge.

Many analysts think the flagrant denial of Haftar to travel in Tunisia is the effect of pressures on him at the regional level.

In any case, the persistence of the crisis in Libya weakens more security in the region and increases the risk of terrorist threats

TRIPOLI GNA=CONFUSION 14.5.2017

Libya, in recent days, has been issued another statement of the nook that Libyan crude production is over 800,000 barrels a day, but it would cost 160,000 barrels more if there was no dispute with the German company wintershall . According to the night, the wintershall society has sought to interfere in Libyan internal politics. The crisis was born out of the nightmare about who controls the oil, after the gna had adopted a decision that sought to exorcise the noc from the management of production policy and collection of oil proceeds. The German company had confirmed some concessions from GM, but in fact stopped production when the night had decided that the concessions had to be revised. Tripoli, on the other hand, breathes more and more air of clash. The government of national salvation has stated that it is ready to rule the capital as soon as the libya dawn 2 operation, also known as Libya's pride, of salah al-badi, to evacuate troop militias. The statement was issued in recent days at the end of the meeting, which was attended by Prime Minister of the National Salvation Government, khalifa ghwell, and the president of the gnc and commander of the Libyan army affiliated to him, Nouri Abushamain. Ghwell indicated that he was ready to run triples and areas under his control as soon as the National Guard's trip to liberation is over. The national guard was set up and was commanded by Salaf al Badi; The operation was launched on the basis of Resolution 27 of 2013, which called for the evacuation of all trooped militias in favor of the national guard forces. For its part, the Presidential Council said it will pursue anyone who will try to destabilize the capital following the statements of the National Salvation Government. It is certain that for now there has been no order for the "pride of Libya" operation. About zintan, the city's military council refuses to respond to the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court regarding the location of saif to Islam. The son of the rais deportee was captured and imprisoned by zintan militias and was recently being the subject of an assassination attempt. Nevertheless, the military council has decided to keep its presence still hidden. This is actually a currency exchange but also a scandal for the city. It seems that only a few of them are going to continue to support the measured gnaw, especially the most extreme part of the policy. The goal seems to be to hunt down the gna and its presidential council by triples and return the militias to their affiliates under the control of the former gnc, just as it was before the serrata government arrived. In fact, marwan al darqash, a member of the measured Muslim brothers, said last night on television that if the revolutionaries (the revolutionary militia of tripoli - trb whose prominent figures are tagouri, gneiwa and kara) accept haftar as chief commander Will end the French revolutionaries, whose revolutionary ideals had to succumb to the tyranny of Bonaparte Napoleon. Another meticulous parliamentarian said that he now runs orders of haftar and protects the forces of ben nayl attacking the 3rd force in the south of the country. Finally, a lawyer measured that statements by the Foreign Minister of the GNA Siyala are likely to lead to civil war.

POWERFUL MILITIA: BENGAZI DEFENCE BRIGADE

To understand the political role of the Benghazi Defense Brigades, it is helpful to review the players in Libya’s civil war. Round one of the war, in 2011, was the overthrow of longtime dictator Muammar Qadhafi by a loose coalition of rebels, dissidents, youth, and regime defectors. Round two of the civil war began in 2014, when the post-revolution political settlement collapsed following disputed elections. In the northwest was “Operation Dawn,” an alliance led by forces in Misrata, an economic hub. Islamists and ultraconservative Salafis dominated many of Dawn’s militias. In the northeast was the internationally-recognized House of Representatives and the Libyan National Army, led by a retired general named Khalifa Haftar. The LNA’s “Operation Dignity” targeted both Islamists and jihadists, making no real distinction between the two.

In late 2015, the international community added a third major player to the conflict: the Government of National Accord (GNA), backed by the United Nations, Western powers, and—to varying degrees—the Arab states. The GNA was meant to reconcile Dawn and Dignity by representing Libya’s many geographical and political constituencies. But the GNA only won the conditional backing of certain factions in Misrata, Tripoli, and other western Libyan areas. In the east, the House of Representatives has repeatedly delayed a vote to recognize the GNA. Haftar, benefiting from Egyptian, Emirati, and Russian support—and perhaps the quiet support of the United States and France—continued conquering Benghazi and positioning himself as Libya’s strongman.

The Islamic State’s strategy in Libya—openly controlling territory—was blunt. Al-Qaeda’s has been subtler.

Meanwhile, Libya’s jihadist groups alarmed the West. With the 2011 revolution, old jihadists were released and younger ones were empowered. Jihadist militias emerged in northern cities, and transnational jihadists saw opportunity. In 2014, the so-called Islamic State moved in. From May to December 2016, Misratan militias loosely aligned with the GNA waged a hard-fought campaign against the Islamic State in the coastal city Sirte. The GNA’s eventual success re-emphasized the country’s divisions: As the Misratans fought in Sirte, Haftar seized oil ports in a bid to boost his power.

The Islamic State’s strategy in Libya—openly controlling territory—was blunt. Al-Qaeda’s has been subtler. But herein lies the analytical problem: When al-Qaeda lets local jihadists take the lead, does that signal al-Qaeda’s strategic brilliance or its weakened brand? And is there a way, as the International Crisis Group urges, to “disaggregate, not conflate” different jihadists?

Six Degrees of Al-Qaeda?

It is not hard to show that someone in the Brigades knows someone who knows someone in al-Qaeda. Some members of the Brigades stand two degrees of separation away from al-Qaeda. The Brigades draw support from jihadist Shura (Consultative) Councils in eastern cities. One of the Brigades’ leaders, Saadi al-Nawfali, is a leader of the Adjabiya Revolutionaries’ Shura Council. The councils include militias with ties to al-Qaeda, such as Ansar al-Sharia. Follow this part of the web and it leads to figures such as Sufyan bin Qumu, an Ansar al-Sharia leader in Derna who is a Specially Designated Global Terrorist and who likely knew Osama bin Laden.

The problem with connecting too many “dots,” however, is that virtually everyone in Libyan politics is just three or four degrees of separation from al-Qaeda. Should one view mainstream political actors as unforgivably tainted by jihadist connections? Adopting that position would make a national political settlement even harder. The Western powers either understand this and quietly make arbitrary decisions about where the al-Qaeda “taint” begins and ends, or the West is willfully naïve.

Few of the Brigades’ leaders can easily be classified as jihadists, let alone al-Qaeda sympathizers. One is Ismail al-Sallabi, who hails from a prominent Benghazi family. Sallabi’s better-known brother, Ali, helped broker a reconciliation between Qadhafi and Libyan jihadists in the mid-2000s. During Libya’s 2011 revolution, Ali al-Sallabi became known as Qatar’s man in Libya. A mainstream Islamist, he moved in mainstream circles. Ismail al-Sallabi, for his part, spent 2011-2012 commanding part of a militia called Rafallah al-Sahati, which had ties to jihadists but which was recognized by the Libyan government as part of the security forces, along with dozens of other militias.

If [Rafallah al-Sahati] was an “al-Qaeda front group,” the Americans who interacted with it in Benghazi prior to the attack were completely fooled.

The September 2012 attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi merits mention here; it too exemplifies the problems with trying to decide who counts as al-Qaeda. Blame for the attack has centered on Ansar al-Sharia, particularly the sub-commander Ahmed Abu Khattala, who was captured by U.S. Special Forces in Benghazi in 2014. Abu Khattala’s connections to al-Qaeda are indirect at best—he was reportedly a “loner” among Libyan jihadists with “no known connections to international terrorist groups.” Retroactively, the attacks have come to be understood as an al-Qaeda plot. But the New York Times found that the attack “involved both avowed opponents of the West and fighters belonging to militias that the Americans had taken for allies,” including Rafallah al-Sahati. If that militia was an “al-Qaeda front group,” the Americans who interacted with it in Benghazi prior to the attack were completely fooled.

Returning to the present and the question of the Benghazi Defense Brigades, another leader is Colonel Mustafa al-Sharkasi, who was spokesman for the chief of staff in the Islamist-dominated government in Tripoli prior to the GNA’s arrival. Sharkasi is a military man rather than a jihadist. In an early video for the Brigades, he said, “We represent the military revolutionaries” in the east. The video was a far cry from typical jihadist propaganda: This was not Osama bin Laden brandishing a Kalashnikov and threatening the West. More than simply speaking in the name of Islam, Sharkasi invoked Libya’s revolution, accusing Haftar’s camp of being “remnants of Qadhafi’s battalions.” Both Sallabi and Sharkasi are Islamists, not hardcore jihadists. They are making alliances of convenience to combat the existential threat that Haftar poses for them.

Consider, too, the Brigades’ allies. Spiritually, the Brigades place themselves under the authority not of al-Qaeda, but of Libya’s Grand Mufti Sadiq al-Gharyani, who was selected by Libya’s interim National Transitional Council in 2012. Another ally appears to be Mahdi al-Barghathi, the GNA’s Defense Minister. International Crisis Group has credibly accused Barghathi of ordering the Brigades’ operations against oil ports to weaken Haftar. If the accusations are true, one might say that the internationally-recognized defense minister of Libya is indirectly “aligned” with al-Qaeda. One might also recall Libyan press reports that during the 2011 revolution Barghathi fought “side by side” with future members of Ansar al-Sharia, a group closer to al-Qaeda than the Brigades are. Does this make al-Barghathi a jihadist?

To play six degrees of al-Qaeda with the Brigades and Barghathi would ultimately mean that not only the GNA, but even the United Nations and the U.S. government, are part of the web.

No. Rather, Barghathi personifies the complexity of Libyan politics. The revolution threw together people of different ideological persuasions as they found common cause against Qadhafi. The present civil war conjoins various bedfellows and then tears them apart—Barghathi was aligned with Haftar against the Islamic State before joining the GNA against Haftar. The total victory that Haftar seeks has alienated many former allies. If Barghathi finds the Brigades’ vision of eastern Libya more palatable than Haftar’s, he is not alone among Libyans.

To play six degrees of al-Qaeda with the Brigades and Barghathi would ultimately mean that not only the GNA, but even the United Nations and the U.S. government, are part of the web. After the Brigades retook Libya’s oil ports, they handed them to the Petroleum Facilities Guard, a militia aligned with the GNA. The Italian government praised the move, and the Brigades praised the Italians. But it would be absurd to suggest that this “aligns” the Italian government with al-Qaeda.

Re-assessing al-Qaeda’s Role

For years, analysts have debated what al-Qaeda is. As Steve Coll told the U.S. House of Representatives in 2010, there is “confusion about whether Al Qaeda is best understood as a centralized organization; a network of like-minded organizations; or merely an Internet-enabled ideology.” Since the Arab Spring, another option has been to understand al-Qaeda as a snake willing to shed its “brand” when it becomes toxic.

In practice, that means al-Qaeda has been willing to support local groups that have dropped the al-Qaeda name. In Yemen, Libya, and Tunisia, it is easy to see how Ansar al-Sharia advances al-Qaeda’s ideology: Ansar al-Sharia promotes the implementation of a hardline version of Islamic law. It periodically controls territory and provides services.

It is much more difficult to see how the Benghazi Defense Brigades advance al-Qaeda’s aims. The Brigades refer to themselves not as “mujahideen” but as “revolutionaries.” They invoke the Quran to justify their actions and they call dead fighters “martyrs,” but so do a range of actors in Libyan politics. Even if one argued that the Brigades are a front group for Ansar al-Sharia (a debatable contention), at what point does the tie to al-Qaeda become so far removed, so abstract, that it loses meaning? Moreover, the Brigades might be leery of a strong partnership with al-Qaeda. The Brigades have only to look to Ansar al-Sharia’s fate—banned in Tunisia, its Tunisian leader killed in a U.S. drone strike targeting an al-Qaeda commander—to see how the image of “al-Qaeda front group” can bring down the West’s fury.

Finally, to the extent that al-Qaeda participates in mainstream politics, its own “purity” is compromised. Even if one believes al-Qaeda controls the Brigades, the Brigades’ politics—particularly their dealings with the GNA—suggest that their limited jihadist proclivities will be further diluted. Eventually, the hardcore al-Qaeda sympathizers might break away in disgust. After that, the more malleable jihadists could find themselves transformed into relatively mainstream politicians, a trajectory that other Libyan jihadists have followed.

A Realistic Approach to Libya

Officially, Western powers want a unified Libyan government that includes the GNA, the House of Representatives, and Haftar—who, together, marginalize the jihadists. Western powers acknowledge—for now—a difference between mainstream Islamists and al-Qaeda. But unofficially, many policymakers seem comfortable with Haftar’s vision of a Libya where Islamism is anathema, and where Salafis are tolerated only when they never question the strongman.

Pursuing such a vision would be a mistake, because not enough Libyans will accept it. Moreover, it is unwise not only to conflate Islamists and al-Qaeda, but also to jumble together different kinds of jihadists. The Brigades work with the GNA, the internationally-recognized government of Libya. They should be incentivized to break whatever contacts they have with al-Qaeda and move closer to the GNA. Indeed, with recent talks between the GNA and Haftar raising the possibility, however slight, of a political settlement for Libya, it is important to incentivize as many actors as possible to work with the GNA and participate in mainstream Libyan politics.

In Libya and around the world, defeating al-Qaeda’s brand and rupturing its alliances will require accepting certain other expressions of Muslim politics. Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State are unacceptable to the West. So are local jihadists who insist on a totalizing vision of Islam. But if jihadist-leaning militias are willing to work with more mainstream actors, they should be tolerated. Because if Washington targets all groups with loose ties to al-Qaeda, the United States risks wasting resources—and creating new enemies.