The developments in Libya indicate a sharp rise in tension and the possibility that this should result in a new civil war. Behind this trend there are powerful regional and international influences that support General Haftar, reinforces the current intransigent and weakens the moderates. Therefore, the possibility that they may resolve the crisis politically the wishes of the international community seem markedly fade.
From international diplomacy to the regional
With the Agreement Skhirat international diplomacy launched in December 2015, the Presidential Council (Cp), chaired by Fayez Serraj, with the expectation that it agglomerasse forces in presence and opened the way for a full political and constitutional standards. This attempt failed. Numerous forces in Libya have indicated the need to move from a lowered agreement on the country from the outside by one, more "inclusive", "between Libyans." This indication was quoted by the international diplomacy, which has in fact begun to correct the Skhirat setting. However international diplomacy in Libya is in a phase of withdrawal - for various reasons, many of which do not concern Libya -, the initiative is now in the hands of the region: Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt.
The new route involves a compromise at the summit between the Cp and Serrraj Haftar who later defined in detail by the joint work of the Chamber of Deputies of Tobruk and the State Council of Tripoli. The two institutions, albeit with difficulty, especially in Tobruk, in recent months have designated the two committees held as needed, but can not start work because there is no agreement at the summit. Tried again in Abu Dhabi on May 2 with the Serraj-Haftar meeting, the agreement was not in fact emerged.
The "among Libyans" process is an illusion, in the prevailing conditions, the "among Libyans" process is not only the victim of ill will but it is an illusion. To be made should include Haftar, but the latter will take part will be excluded only if the Islamists, all Islamists (ie only if he will have in the government a political leadership role as well as military). On the other hand, the revolutionaries, including Islamists magna pars, the very idea that Haftar becomes part of the process prefer to continue the armed struggle against him and his allies. This paralyzes the moderates and creates a stall just as the Skhirat agreements.
Therefore, the task of the regional trio looking for a political solution to the Libyan crisis is not really easy. Meanwhile, because the goals of the three governments are not homogeneous: it is true that Egypt pursues a compromise solution, but it does so with the intent to heavily tip the balance on the side of Haftar. In days past, Algeria has moved to the highest levels to Cairo to emphasize that bombing Derna (in response to the massacre of Copts in Minya made by jihadists from Libya) does not solve the issues of the security of Egypt.
The looming welding intransigent
But although the trio was able to secure a compromise, reducing the ambitions of Cairo, the Arab conservatives GCC (and perhaps of Russia), the emergence of a moderate coalition government including Haftar and other personality rightly or wrongly perceived as part of the former regime still result in violent reaction against intransigent, which includes not only Khalifa Ghwell and Nouri Busahmein, but also a part, not easily definable, the Misrata revolutionary militias as well as the diverse range of more markedly Islamist militias now fighting in central and southern areas of Libya against the Libyan National Army (LNA) of Haftar. Among these forces there are disagreements, but the realization of a compromise with Haftar the would weld immediately.
Besides this welding it is looming understand the developments of Sebha, Sirte and jufra that goes on since December last year. From the outset it was clear that the coalition forces then attacked the LNA in the "oil crescent" south of Sirte, under the leadership of the Defense Brigades in Benghazi (Bdb), was a coalition of revolutionaries, that the Islamists and not, radicals and less radical, united by the conviction of duty at any cost prevent a return of the forces of the past, starting from Haftar. In this context, the small army that started its "long march" from the south of the country to get to Sirte and Benghazi resulted leaning nothing less than the defense minister of the Cp, al-Mahdi al-Barghati (in contradiction to the policy compromise pursued by the same Cp).
Among military clashes and difficult diplomacy
Since then complicity with Bdb within the Cp has continued to emerge in various episodes until May 18, and a clash between LNA revolutionary forces in Brak al-Shati (60 km north of Sebha) has not put end to a real massacre men Haftar, taken by surprise, but not only by Bdb but also the Third Force of Misrata that, stationed in the region since 2014, it is now directly under Barghati and then the National Accord Government.
Serraj the day after he suspended from his duties both Barghati is the commander of the Third Force, Jamal al-Traiki, waiting to carry out inspections, but admitted that such investigations are never completed the development confirms what was already evident in December 2016 that is - in the words of International Crisis Group - that "there is a fragmentation in the coalition that supports the Presidency" Tip: If the ICP moves to heal the rift between Tripoli and Tobruk, the result is that it breaks.
The role of the US and Europe
Diplomacy is therefore faced with a tough reality that, after the failure of Skhirat agreements now also calls into question the feasibility of their modification through dialogue "among Libyans." But the road is uphill because the reconsolidation of the alliance between the United States and wiring recommendations conservative GCC in terms of "anti-terrorism" strengthens the regional front that supports Haftar, then dims the chances of compromise, undermines dialogue "among Libyans" confirms the revolutionary front in its reasons and widens.
The European interests are very damaged from this perspective. There will be a European response? Immediately after his election, there have been Emmanuel Macron statements which reveal a sharp intake of French responsibility to Libya, but still it does not define the terms, especially in the European dimension. To know if Europe will respond to the worsening of the crisis in Libya will have to wait at least the German elections. Hopefully it's not too late.
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