Wednesday 28 June 2017

LIBYA PICTURE 28.6.2017

A power outage that propagates over 1500 km in one of the most dangerous areas of the planet can be caused by a police action to catch fuel thieves? Usually not, but in Libya every action can cause unimaginable consequences.
In January, the National Oil Company - the state company that controls the Libyan oil - has accused the mercenary militia which guarantees the safety of the refinery in Zawiya to steal fuel and sell it on the blackmarket.Zawiya, 30 km west of Tripoli, is a hub of strategic importance along with the nearby Mellitah because there converge all pipelines and gas pipelines connected with the oil fields and gas of Tripolitania and Fezzan. From there the oil takes off on oil tankers and the gas plunges along the pipeline Greenstream (operated at 75% Eni, 25% owned by NOC) across the Mediterranean to get to the surface in Gela.
In retaliation, the militia has shut down the power plant adjacent doing almost completely skip the electrical grid and causing the largest blackout Libya who has lived for the past six years.The message was clear: if the mercenary militias they see a threat to their source of illegal income, do not hesitate to unleash retaliation and neither the NOC nor the UN-backed government can help it.
When analysts seek to identify the causes of the endless vicious cycle of instability crisis-war-truce afflicting Libya, often focus on political processes and neglect the main driver of this cycle: an oil-driven economy.This represents the greatest obstacle to exit the loop to achieve a stable peace guaranteed by a recognized government.
The chain of events that led to the blackout record before we were talking about is just an example of complex network of tribes, factions and interests which holds together - but at the same time dries up - the country's resources. An example that demonstrates the weakness of institutions, both political and economic; but also full control that each militia or tribe holds within its territory.
It is clear that the weakness of the country has consequences outside: in this no man's land terrorist organizations thrive and can count on huge territories within which hide and train themselves. But they can easily maintain and accumulate fortunes with the desperate trade towards Italy, with smuggling of oil and weapons.
To effectively help the country, we need to understand the origins of chronic crisis of authority afflicting Libya and - in particular - need to understand the economy of oil-driven war that feeds instability.
To effectively help the country, we need to understand the origins of chronic crisis of authority afflicting Libya and - in particular - need to understand the economy of oil-driven war that feeds instability
The constant competition among the many rival factions has seriously eroded the very credibility of state institutions. Neither of the two main antagonists governments can demonstrate the authority of a popular mandate nor offer real state services.The National Government Agreement (GNA) has the support of the UN and much of the international community, but was not elected or ratified by the House of Representatives, elected in 2014 and based in Tobruk. Therefore, the Libyan judiciary has not recognized the GNA. Meanwhile, the mandate of the House of Representatives - backed by Egypt and the UAE - has expired. The House itself has voted for the mandate to self validate itself obviously arousing the GNA wrath. But who holds the real power are not the two rival governments, but the National Oil Company (which controls wells and refineries, and thus the wealth of the country), the Central Bank of Libya (which controls the treasure) and LIA (Libyan Investment Authority) which owns 50 or 60 billion € in foreign countries.
The first two of these three organizations have resisted assimilation attempts by the two governments and the division into two parts keeping a balance between both sides. The NOC is now at loggerheads with the GNA which seeks to divest by the monopoly of hydrocarbons.
The Central Bank of Libya, meanwhile, is still able to discharge its functions paying public sector wages and providing energy subsidies, but it is at odds with the GNA on how to counter inflation and the growing chasm that has formed between Official exchange rate of the Libyan dinar against the dollar and the existing one on the black market.
Instead, LIA faces a vertical fracture caused by the two antagonistic leaders: Abdulmajid Breish and Ali Mahmoud Hassan.
On February 5, Breish entered in the Tripoli office with a court ruling annulling the mandate conferred by GNA to Hassan.
On May 8, Hassan is back in the building with a GNA confirmation and he was finally chased away again on the 24th of the same month by an appellate ruling of Libyan Supreme Court, which annulled the confirmation. In recent weeks the situation has worsened and is now the militia that controls access to decide which of the two opposing factions can enter the building.
In this vacuum of power, who can snatch what they find. Armed groups have occupied the oil infrastructure and formally became militias paid to protect themselves. And do not go for the thin: last year the gang led by Ibrahim Jadhran has secured $ 42 million from GNA to cancel the oil boycott between Sirte and Benghazi. On 23 April this year Sadiq el-Kebir, the governor of the Central Bank, estimated that boycotts by militias had caused losses of more than 160 million $.
But in addition to protecting mafia-style there are other techniques to strip the flesh off what remains of the country: at the beginning of this year the National Prosecutor has estimated that theft and smuggling of fuel have caused overall losses of 3.5 billion dollars.
The classical technique consists in the theft of fuel, in its subsequent smuggling in neighboring nations and, from here, in its access to the network of official channels.But now, in the total inability of the NOC to control the flow of crude oil and fuels, are in place more sophisticated techniques to transferring hydrocarbons directly from the refineries to the European market without any administrative interference.
Of course, even the smuggling proceeds of hydrocarbons are subject to extortion, corruptions and concussions.There increasing divergence between the official exchange rate (one $ should be equivalent to 1.4 LD, but today on the black market it takes 8.2 dinars to buy a $) allowed massive gains to those who are able to have currency foreign official rate and then sell it on the blackmarket. And this, of course, increases the inflationary spiral same multiplying the gains of traffickers and bringing down the purchasing power of citizens.
With the use of false letters of guarantee credit, the bands are enriched by exploiting opportunities arbitrage  between the official exchange rate and the realone.The technique adopted plans to credit by the Central Bank of the letters issued to guarantee the payment of goods in $, but are systematically traded fewer goods than those agreed and $ received in excess of the official exchange rate to end up on the black market or out of the country. And not talking about small change: according to a UN report only Haithem al-Tajouri, the head of one of these militias, extorted the Central Bank letters of credit for twenty million dollars.
Liquidity crisis, galloping inflation and inability of the state to provide goods and services to citizens are the ideal elements for the development of smuggling. All goods are imported illegally and sold on the black market
but extortion arecommonplace.The militias kidnap bankers or more bank customers when they do not directly to be open and to clean up the coffers. This causes the flight of investors, but also a liquidity crisis leading to print more money and make flying inflation which is now estimated to be between 30 and 40%. The system can not last long in a nation where most citizens receive salaries or subsidies from the state and that all matter but only oil exports.
Liquidity crisis, galloping inflation and inability of the state to provide goods and services to citizens are the ideal elements for the development ofsmuggling.All goods are imported illegally and sold on the black market. The most profitable commodity it is human flesh, operated by criminal networks offer the desperate chance to escape to Europe to substantial price of all remaining assets held.
Traffickers must in turn pay the militias transit rights on their territory (2 to $ 25 each) and the latter shall directly to strip immigrants of assets that still carry.Calculating that only in 2016 were registered 181,000 sailings to Europe, Global Initiative estimates a business that fluctuates between 275 and 350 million $.
In conclusion, the Libyan war is draining the economy still present resources of the institutions for the benefit of individual gangs and militias that reinvest the money subtracted paying new militiamen and buying newweapons.It 'clear that the same gangs and militias that proliferate in this power vacuum hinder by all means any attempt to unify the state and alternately allied with the two contenders the government of Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj and the army of General Khalifa Haftar in order to keep the two antagonists as possible in balance.
A way out has been proposed by Mahmoud Jibril,who headed the National Council for the Libyan Transition. Jibril is convinced that the only way out steps in a general amnesty for all the gang leaders and militia, tax exemptions and also of land offered to militants to force them to keep their budget within the nation itself. But not necessarily a cure, albeit drastic, may work for one patient moribund as the Libyan state.

Saturday, June 25 a new piece was added to the design of General Khalifa Haftar to gain complete control of eastern Libya with almost total occupation of the city of Benghazi. The troops of the Libyan National Army under his command, after three years of hard struggle have conquered the neighborhood of Souq Al Hout, one of the last positions held by the Benghazi Defense Brigade,an Islamist militia that, with the financial support of Qatar, was successful in 2014 to take control of the city from which he had started the revolt against Muammar Gaddafi's dictatorship in 2011.
The defeat of the Islamists of Benghazi is probably no stranger to the total blockade imposed by Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states and Egypt to the Emirate of Qatar, accused not only of supporting Islamist terrorism and extremists of the Muslim Brotherhood in North Africa and the Middle East, but also to entertain ambiguous cooperative relations with the Shiite regime of the Iranian ayatollahs.
For two weeks, ever since the blockade was imposed in Doha, all the clandestine funding streams and logistical support to militias in Libya, Syria and Iraq are fighting for the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate broke down. The loss of Benghazi is one of the first and most obvious consequences of this, given that the general is Egypt's privileged ally of President Al Sisi, one of the main regional players in the war on Islam Salafi and one of the instigators diplomatic-offensive trade Partnership against Qatar.
While Haftar consolidates its control over the region, in the name and on behalf of the House of Representatives of Tobruk, the parliament of Cyrenaica is determined not to be regarded as legitimate government in the Tripoli from Fayez Serraj. In this impasse, the United Nations has decided to appoint a new special envoy in the country, in an attempt to give new impetus to the reunification process of the factions that continue a civil war of "low intensity" to take complete control of Libya.
Another new UN envoy, Salame replaces Kobler
On June 20, the UN Security Council appointed former Lebanese minister of culture, Ghassan Salame, new special envoy for Libya, replacing the German Martin Kobler. Kobler had been in office for two years, since he had been called to take over the spagnolo Bernardino Leon who had distinguished himself in the negative, for its total failure to address in a coherent and rational the chaotic situation in which Libya was precipitated after the bloody ouster of Gaddafi.
In an effort to make a positive change to the situation in Libya, in December of 2015 Kobler had staked everything on the formation of a "National Accord Government" directed by Fayez Serraj under UN supervision. The experiment failed: the solution imposed from above by the UN was not accepted by the vast majority of the field and Serraj forces landed in Tripoli in March 2016, it is not even able to take full control of the capital, where his authority is routinely questioned by militias of Libyan Alba,the Islamist faction under the command of "premier" of Tripolitania, Khalifa Gwell.
Serraj, in an attempt to reassert his authority, on June 22 appointed military commanders of two of the three areas in which the country was divided. The General Osama al Jawili command the western, while his colleague Mohammed Al Hadad will go the the central command. No general was appointed commander instead dell'aera East, where that law only the Libyan National Army Haftar.
It is, however, purely theoretical commands, because Al Serraj does not have sufficient forces to eliminate Islamist militias, tribal forces and LNA or political authority to bring these aggressive military formations under its control.
The role of the son of Gaddafi
The situation of the "National Accord Government" Tripoli has become even more precarious after his release from prison where he was held since 2011 by one of the sons of the dictator Gaddafi, Saif Al Islam. The son of the colonel was under the control of a Zintan militia, area theoretically under the jurisdiction of Al Serraj government, and was released on June 11 following an amnesty decreed by the House of Representatives of Tobruk, the parliament of Cyrenaica which so far has refused to recognize the government imposed by the UN.
Saif al-Islam Gaddafi still enjoys the support of the Tuareg tribes have always been faithful to his father's family, and may therefore induce them to line up alongside Al Khalifa Haftar making further tipping the balance of power in favor of the general Tobruk.
Now that Martin Kobler, German and pragmatic, has been replaced by Ghassan Salame - a former Lebanese minister coming from a country multi-denominational and torn by decades of internal tensions on ethnic and religious basis, should have experience and know how sufficient to adequately address the Libyan quagmire - it opens perhaps the last chance for the international community to resolve the Libyan crisis, before having to surrender before the disappearance of a unified Libya and its final breakdown in its three components historical, Fezzan, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, ie the ancient Wilayat of the Ottoman Empire.

No comments: