Analyzing the current situation in Libya and strategy followed by UN, it seems unlikely that the negotiations, in form and content managed by Leon, can produce a document which may be able to produce significant effects on the peace process.
In fact, political distance between Tripoli and Tobruk parliaments adds the need to incorporate the militias into the negotiation mechanism. Without supports of clans/khabilas with militias representatives and without the presence of local strongmen, both parties is any national unity government would be unrepresentated and lack any real power in territory.
In this sense, Lon attempt to summon representatives of municipalities for last round of talks was welcome, but not enough considering very poor number of participants compared to country extreme social diversity.
Therefore, development of any peace plan should take into account the demands of individual groups expression of social realities of the country. Without such a practical approach and taking into account the needs of the base, any attempt to help Libya stabilization and pacification are in danger of failure.
Moreover, we should not forget that, so far, UN proposed texts were clearly unbalanced in favor of Tobruk, with parliamentarians from Tripoli relegated to marginal role and excluded from any significant ministerial presence. Under these conditions, it is really difficult for Tripoli to accept any kind of negotiation or agreement. So, if UN really wants to reach a compromise, the text presented by negotiators should be partly rebalanced.
Of course, the re-opening for modifications might further expand its timing while it seems that Leon desire at all costs to close the negotiations before end of his term but it can lead to better results.
The strategy to involve as many stakeholders as possible in the negotiations and make them part of the future Libyan state structure is essential not only to increase government of national unity legitimacy, but also to have a para-military force able to to challenge both threats of Salafi and organized crime that operates trafficking.
Moreover, in view of a possible pacification/stabilization mission, any coalition of forces that will be called to work in Libya will also rely on support of local armed component capable of ensuring both local communities and local knowledge supports. The urgency of such measures and initiatives is also dictated by possible expansion of Bayda Caliphate with its model of Islamic state for Libya.
In fact, political distance between Tripoli and Tobruk parliaments adds the need to incorporate the militias into the negotiation mechanism. Without supports of clans/khabilas with militias representatives and without the presence of local strongmen, both parties is any national unity government would be unrepresentated and lack any real power in territory.
In this sense, Lon attempt to summon representatives of municipalities for last round of talks was welcome, but not enough considering very poor number of participants compared to country extreme social diversity.
Therefore, development of any peace plan should take into account the demands of individual groups expression of social realities of the country. Without such a practical approach and taking into account the needs of the base, any attempt to help Libya stabilization and pacification are in danger of failure.
Moreover, we should not forget that, so far, UN proposed texts were clearly unbalanced in favor of Tobruk, with parliamentarians from Tripoli relegated to marginal role and excluded from any significant ministerial presence. Under these conditions, it is really difficult for Tripoli to accept any kind of negotiation or agreement. So, if UN really wants to reach a compromise, the text presented by negotiators should be partly rebalanced.
Of course, the re-opening for modifications might further expand its timing while it seems that Leon desire at all costs to close the negotiations before end of his term but it can lead to better results.
The strategy to involve as many stakeholders as possible in the negotiations and make them part of the future Libyan state structure is essential not only to increase government of national unity legitimacy, but also to have a para-military force able to to challenge both threats of Salafi and organized crime that operates trafficking.
Moreover, in view of a possible pacification/stabilization mission, any coalition of forces that will be called to work in Libya will also rely on support of local armed component capable of ensuring both local communities and local knowledge supports. The urgency of such measures and initiatives is also dictated by possible expansion of Bayda Caliphate with its model of Islamic state for Libya.
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