EUROPA & ITALIAN POLITICS

E U R O P A

SPESSO mi chiedo dove e come è nato l’Occidente, la sua cultura, la sua potenza ed anche le sue debolezze; ma non so rispondere. Senza dubbio è nato in Europa ma quando e come? La storia e perfino la preistoria non lo dicono; le religioni neppure. Il mito forse. Sì, il mito lo dice.

Queste cose pensavo mentre stavo leggendo un libro sulla mitologia; ce ne sono molti e mi hanno sempre attirato. Colgono il profondo dell’animo nostro e lo mettono in luce, come le sue contraddizioni che cambiano sempre ma sempre ci sono, si scontrano ma non si spengono, fanno parte della nostra specie di uomini che guardano se stessi mentre operano, giudicano se stessi e così nasce l’Io e con esso il desiderio del potere, la sua trascendenza.

Il libro di mitologia che meglio affronta questo tema l’ha scritto pochi mesi fa Paola Mastrocola. Si intitola L’amore prima di noi. Prima di affrontare i problemi reali che dobbiamo risolvere, voglio soffermarmi sul loro aspetto mitico. Poi scenderemo a quelli reali. Dalle stelle alla terra. C’è sempre il filo di Arianna che può farci uscire dal labirinto nel quale oggi il mondo si trova.

«Un giorno Zeus guardava il mondo sotto di sé. Il suo sguardo si era posato per caso su una fanciulla che si chiamava Europa perché aveva gli occhi grandi. Rimase incantato a guardarla. Poco dopo sulla spiaggia della costa fenicia comparve un toro straordinariamente bianco».

«Le ragazze che danzavano sulla spiaggia furono curiose di quel toro straordinariamente bianco. Erano estremamente incuriosite. Il toro si fermò a grande a distanza e continuò a guardare soprattutto Europa dagli occhi grandi. Fu lei ad avvicinarsi. Il toro aspettava e lei arrivò vicina e lo carezzò. Per gioco gli montò sul dorso e lui partì. Entrò in mare al galoppo, superò le onde in un attimo, prese il largo mentre Europa, avvinghiata alle sue corna chiedeva aiuto. Le compagne guardavano mute ma non potevano far nulla. Il toro era ormai in mare aperto, s’involava spariva e riemergeva.

Zeus ebbe da Europa tre figli e le lasciò una lancia che non sbagliava il bersaglio. Uno di loro si chiamò Minosse, che fece costruire nel suo regno il labirinto. L’Europa di allora si chiamò Europa, colei che ha gli occhi grandi. Così da una fanciulla d’Oriente nacque l’Occidente ».

Questo è tutto. Ce n’è abbastanza per riflettere.

A me piacerebbe che sul significato di questa scena mitologica riflettessero le persone d’autorità investite, a cominciare dal presidente della Repubblica, Sergio Mattarella, il presidente della Corte costituzionale Paolo Grossi, il presidente del Consiglio Paolo Gentiloni, il capo del partito di maggioranza Matteo Renzi ed anche, a suo modo, Silvio Berlusconi. Di altri non parlo, pensano ad esistere e seguono soltanto questa necessità.

L’Italia e chi la rappresenta in Europa e nel mondo provengono in qualche modo dal figlio che lo Zeus mitologico lasciò ad Europa e da questo non possiamo prescindere. Come pure dobbiamo capire qual è il filo di Arianna per uscire dal labirinto in cui l’Italia e l’Europa si trovano. Temo per esempio che Renzi abbia sbagliato a respingere la proposta di Mattarella a tenere in vita il suo governo e far nascere in sua vece un governo burattino del quale vuole essere il burattinaio. Così pure credo che sarebbe molto opportuno se Gentiloni tagliasse i fili del burattinaio e avesse il governo che pensa e durasse fino alla fine della legislatura. Temo anche che la diffidenza interna del Pd continui a fare il gioco dei tanti galli che si disputano la sola gallina del pollaio invece di volare alto insieme al segretario. Temo infine che, tranne Mattarella, nessuno abbia capito quali sono i reali interessi del Paese e dell’Europa della quale facciamo parte integrante.

La sinistra, non soltanto quella italiana, dovrebbe porsi due fondamentali obiettivi: modernizzare il proprio modo d’essere aggiornandolo secondo i nuovi bisogni della società e conquistare un ruolo di governo sia in Italia sia in Europa. La guerra nel pollaio è miserevole, dividersi in correnti è altrettanto miserevole, ma purtroppo continuano tutti, dal segretario Renzi fino all’ultimo militante del partito. Questi fin qui esposti sono temi essenziali, ma non sono i soli. Ci sono le riforme e la politica sociale, c’è la legge elettorale e i problemi nati dal bicameralismo ridiventato perfetto con le esigenze che porta con sé. Ne abbiamo più volte parlato da queste pagine ma vale la pena di riparlarne ancora in un mondo che ormai cambia con molta velocità, in una società globale che cambia anch’essa a dir poco ogni mese se non addirittura ogni giorno. Dunque esaminiamoli questi aspetti della situazione e ciò che compete a chi è chiamato a risolverli.

La politica sociale di una sinistra moderna ha due compiti principali: aumentare la produttività ed abolire o almeno diminuire le diseguaglianze. La discussione non è quella attualmente in corso di accrescere le imposte oppure le spese o viceversa; imposte e spese sono certamente strumenti necessari ma l’obiettivo principale è la diseguaglianza che significa sostanzialmente una costante e crescente differenza tra ricchi e poveri.

Questa differenza fa sì che il numero dei ricchi diminuisca ma la ricchezza di ciascuno di loro aumenti mentre specularmente il numero dei poveri e dei meno abbienti aumenta insieme alla loro povertà soprattutto per quanto riguarda il cosiddetto ceto medio. Non esiste quasi più il ceto medio e chi ancora ne fa parte ha il timore di diventare proletariato, questa è la situazione, uno dei fattori d’una dilagante rabbia sociale che alligna in tutti i Paesi del mondo a cominciare dagli Stati Uniti d’America, dove il fenomeno ha determinato la vittoria di Donald Trump, e così pure in Inghilterra e minaccia in Germania la cancelliera Angela Merkel e spiega anche la vera causa della nascita del Movimento 5 Stelle in Italia. La diseguaglianza, è questo che dobbiamo combattere. Per quanto riguarda la produttività anche i lavoratori debbono contribuire ma marginalmente. Sono soprattutto gli imprenditori che debbono perfezionare i loro investimenti ma debbono anche inventare nuovi prodotti da offrire ai consumatori. La domanda di consumi dipende da molti fattori ma principalmente da nuovi prodotti offerti. Si veda il fenomeno che la storia dell’industria ci offrì nei primi anni del Novecento: il motore a scoppio e l’automobile. Le prime automobili furono un prodotto di lusso riservato ai ricchi. Comunque un nuovo prodotto che gradualmente sostituì le carrozze trainate da cavalli o da muli. Ma poi accanto alle auto di lusso di grande cilindrata usate anche per le gare sportive, nacque ad un certo punto l’automobile piccola, alla portata dei ceti medi e questa fu l’auto di massa che ebbe una grande diffusione. Nelle città diventò anche la seconda automobile dei ricchi per circolare e posteggiare con maggiore facilità. Adesso sta addirittura nascendo un’auto senza pilota, che marcia da sola e da sola posteggia. L’autista guida accendendo il computer, che poi pensa a tutto il resto.

Questo è il vero aumento della produttività di cui viene anche a godere il salario dei lavoratori dipendenti e di conseguenza anche i consumatori.

Noi qui in Italia facciamo assai poco in questa direzione perché la maggior parte degli imprenditori, se il loro profitto aumenta, invece di riconvertirlo in buona parte, lo tengono per sé e lo investono nella finanza invece che nell’industria. Qui dovrebbero intervenire le imposte o le tasse per punire questo comportamento dei capi delle imprese, ma abbiamo visto ben poco di questa politica fiscale.

Dovremo ora parlare della legge elettorale dopo il No referendario che ripristinando il Senato deve necessariamente esser rifatta dal Parlamento su proposta del governo e/o dai partiti. Ci sono due alternative: una legge sostanzialmente maggioritaria come era l’Italicum, con premio alto, il 40 per cento, oppure una legge proporzionale senza ballottaggio ma eventualmente con un premio di maggioranza per il partito con maggiori voti degli altri. Oppure una via di mezzo tra queste due ipotesi.

Personalmente ritengo che una legge proporzionale con o senza premio sia migliore della maggioritaria. Si obietta (Renzi soprattutto) che la proporzionale frantuma il Parlamento e in tal modo indebolisce la governabilità. Questa obiezione è fondata ma il modo di superarla è la coalizione tra due o più partiti. Molte volte ho richiamato a questo proposito la storia della Democrazia cristiana da Alcide De Gasperi fino alla morte di Aldo Moro. Vigeva la proporzionale e non c’era alcun premio, e le coalizioni si formavano dopo le elezioni. Si rilegga quella legge. Tra l’altro essa può essere entro certi limiti modificata adottando un voto di collegio o uninominale, ma la base di fondo è in ogni caso proporzionale.

È vero che questo tipo di legge alimenterebbe le correnti dentro i partiti, soprattutto in quelli maggiori, ma questo avviene anche adesso, perfino nel movimento grillino. Ormai le correnti ci sono anche lì sebbene sia un movimento di proprietà di Grillo e di Casaleggio.

Questo è comunque il mio parere che ovviamente non conta niente in materie di questo genere.   

K.HAFTER 29.12.2016

http://www.elwatan.com/international/crise-libyenne-la-russie-entre-en-scene-et-affiche-son-soutien-a-haftar-29-12-2016-336078_112.php
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KOBLER CELEBRATES SKHIRAT AGRMNT ANNIVERSARY

The UN special envoy, Martin Kobler, celebrated a few days ago the Skhirrat agreements and the formation of the Al Sarraj government. But what do we actually celebrate? These agreements have not been complied with for a year.

Is the Al Sarraj government likely to win?

It is difficult, Al Sarraj has no legitimacy. This lack of legitimacy is due to several grievances against the first UN special envoy who still have a resonance, and several breaches of the Skirrak agreements. The first special envoy, Bernadino Léon, made several mistakes. That is to say, shipments of mails to the United Arab Emirates, support of Marshal Haftar, revealing his strategy during the dialogue, his search for work with the UAE, the rush of the European Union to take by hand the new Prime Minister in Egypt, another Haftar support. At such a crucial moment, it had to be avoided. Not to mention, the partial choice of certain deputy ministers by himself, and which triggered a great rage in the West. All this has tainted UN credibility. This, in my view, could have been overtaken by the reduction in the number of deputy ministers, a claim from the West, which was later taken over by the East, and which could have served as a basis for the revival Of the dialogue. But the second special envoy, Martin Kobler, did not opt ​​for this choice. His team even slammed the door to protagonists who came to solicit him. Upon his arrival, it was already known that the legitimacy of the future government would be hampered. Especially since, thereafter, the forcing prevailed. It was also very difficult then to follow the dazzling Martin Kobler, because of his multiple actions quite nervous and therefore precipitous. Following the refusal of the two presidents to send delegates to the dialogue, the special envoy imposed deputies belonging to the two delegations of the two parliaments, without their approval by the parliaments, in order to validate the UN draft. First break. If it was voted on 17 December, this method created chain reactions. Including the emergence of a sovereignist movement in Tunis where parliaments on both sides expressed their willingness to unite outside the UN framework. Then to Malta through the two presidents of parliaments. The government of Al Sarraj, despite the efforts of Martin Kobler could not be validated, it is still not by the parliament of Tobrouk hindered, in particular by the refusal of federalist deputies. And by forcing UN. Martin Kobler may have wanted to enter into a dialogue with the two presidents, and the doors that were opening were shattered.

It follows from the sprains to the Skirrat agreements to install at all costs the new government and its during the National Council. This one, installed by a militia, does not already meet the criteria defined by these agreements. This body has, moreover, given a legislative function, an initiative which is disapproved both by Prime Minister Al Sarraj and by Martin Kobler, since normally this body should only be consultative. Then the installation of the government in Tripoli is seen as another sprain, as this government started working without any validation from the parliament of Tobruk. He wants to establish the 2016 budget without any vote from the parliament of Tobruk ... The question of the militias instituted guardians of the Al Sarraj government is also a sprain ... that is trying to solve, currently, painfully, and in a way Curious, the special envoy, via the establishment of a presidential guard. Beyond that, it is the question of the integration of Haftar which created a blockage. And on this point, the UN strategy has even been counterproductive. Under Bernadino Léon, his integration was still feasible. The New York accords went in its direction. With the arrival of the new special envoy, there was no longer any question of it, when it was necessary to integrate it in priority to the army. One even tried to oust him by one of his relatives. This had the effect of tightening the East and confirming to its supporters the bias of the special envoy in favor of the Turko-Qatar-GB axis in favor of the Misurata-Islamist alliance.

The Special Envoy has, moreover, committed a serious error in his strategy. In attempting to revive the oil windfall in favor of the Al Sarraj government, Libya being on the brink of collapse, he tried to put himself in the pocket, and to impose Ibrahim Jadran, guardian of the oil installations in the East, Master singer of the worst kind already imprisoned for his traffics by Gaddafi. The militiaman had become, in no time at all, the new "boss of petroleum", under monstrous blackmail conditions, which would have impacted the Noc itself (!). Martin Kobler pressed on a touch that gave Haftar the unexpected opportunity to storm the oil wells and facilities of the East, which he watched, thus passing the coveted bit of fat to the hands of the Brother enemy. In other words, a flop. Since then, the promoted general Marechal, who could not be integrated into the army, dreams of directing Libya, if he was plebiscite. And this has resulted in a new cycle of East-West violence. Today, we talk about the integration of Haftar. One year lost. And damage to the dialogue.

What about France?

She said nothing about the sprains of the Skhirat agreements. She supported the UN strategy opting for the integration of Islamists into the game, while they are a minority politically. She supported the non-integration of Haftar, a strategy that has been reviewed since ... What can be deplored is also its lack of dynamism to extract Libya from this chaos. When the protagonists of the two governments, when Bernadino Léon broke down in dialogue, wanted to meet in Paris, long before the formation of the Al Sarraj government, the response of the Quai was clear "Libya is not a priority "(!!), while migrants arrived on Europe and the dialogue skated (!). We wanted the UN ..... Either. The protagonists then worked to bring back to the negotiating table the Western members who had left. The radicals of the CGN had suddenly become silent, as were the federalists of the East who were already pointing their nose. Bernadino Léon then came to compose a government ... we know the continuation. I think that meetings made by Libyan actors themselves, but supervised by the UN, could make it easier to reconcile things. The UN could then validate a process of reunification through key actors, which are currently neglected.

We will see, then, what will be the new strategy of Martin Kobler, which is, for the moment, a failure, with the arrival of Trump, who declares himself, in an exaggerated way, anti-Muslim, anti-Islamist. This, in my opinion, would not suffice, the skein having become complex today. And exaggerated rancor. The Libyan actors are at an impasse and neutralize each other. So it will be necessary for Martin Kobler, who has put himself back on many actors, to return, initially, to the agreements of Skhrirrat. Then, also bring back to the reason some actors of the West who have flouted the agreements, and finally integrate Haftar to the army if he now wants it .... Declare a ceasefire . No doubt, to reconsider the copy of the number of presidential advisers, a too heavy structure, where the duties of the deputy ministers, not determined, encroach on that of the Prime Minister. To solve the problem of the function of the Council of State. It should, perhaps, integrate some Libyan actors who have the favor of East and West, a thing already proposed at the very beginning of its mission. But will these actors want it today, in view of the image that the special envoy has forged, called by the Libyans "The King of Libya"? He is accused of grafting Al Sarraj, a landscaping architect by training, to the point of being his liner, placing orders in his place, as well as holding press conferences ... having been too fast and not Fairly clear-sighted. But the special envoy is so discredited that it is unclear whether he will be able to redress the bar ... If he does not succeed in getting this government accepted, he will have to opt for a more flexible solution . It is not with rigidity of action that the UN will succeed in being accepted, especially after 42 years of banishment of the organization by Gaddafi, which did him well ... This leaves traces still in some. ... and especially after a disastrous intervention .... and a difficult dialogue conducted drum beating. The Libyans need to re-familiarize themselves today with the organization, in spite of its faults, and not to face an omnipotent "machine" and, moreover, to pass its orders.

The record of the Skirrat agreements is not glorious. Today we have three governments, that of Al Sarraj, recognized by the community, that of Al Thini and Gweil, which has recently resurfaced and has extended its hand to the East, without results for the moment. And who stretched out his hand to the East, without results for the moment. Tripoli is today the prey to strong tensions, due to the play of the actors and certain UN initiatives, the constitution of a presidential guard. It is not known if there will actually be fighting, as the balance of power is not won, but in any case the militias are preparing for it. In other words, the UN mission has divided more than it has united the actors.

WHY WAS ITALY NOT ATTACKED BY JIHAD SO FAR? TRUMP & LIBYA

Italy is the only major European country not to have suffered attacks in the last 15 years: nothing to do with a disorganized jihadism and the effectiveness of our counter-terrorismTerrorism as a child 10 years threats in video Ahmed Taskour, the alleged foreign fighter Moroccan investigated in Milan for international terrorism
On the morning of 19 December 2016, the Court of Assise in Milan has sentenced to 9 years in jail Maria Giulia Sergio, an Italian woman also known as Fatima, for going to fight jihad in Syria along with the Islamic State (ISIS or ): it was the first conviction of an Italian court against a so-called "foreign fighter", a person went to fight abroad with terrorist groups. Several hours later in Berlin he was made the first major attack of the Islamic State in Germany: a truck hit the crowd at a Christmas market in the city center, killing 12 people and wounding more than 40. 
The two episodes did talk again of the danger of terrorism in Italy, a theme that is often treated by politicians and the press only in an instrumental respect to other issues, such as immigration.After the recent bombings in Paris, Brussels, Nice and now Berlin - and earlier ones in Madrid and London, among others - many wonder how it is that in the past 15 years, Italy has remained outside the objectives of terrorist groups Islamists.
This does not mean that there will not be, of course: experts say that for years has questioned the "when" and "where", not "if", but when it will happen remains true that Italy will be by long the last major Western European country to be hit. Yet in the late nineties and early twenty-first century Italy was one of the most important European countries for international terrorism: in Milan there was the Islamic Institute of Viale Jenner, one of the most important logistical support for volunteers from all over the world who wanted to go and fight the jihad in Bosnia (the Institute was established by the US Treasury department, "the main base of al Qaeda in Europe").
 Also in Milan, there was a group that was recruiting mujahideen to fight in Iraqi Kurdistan, where he was also an active group linked to al-Qaida; and other northern Italian cities had been put up qaidisti centers that were part of a network that also included other European cities and producing false documents. Then, in the first half of the twenty-first century, the international difficulties of al Qaeda and effective Italian anti-terrorism operations led to the dismantling of the main recruitment networks and financing jihad, leaving room for something different. This "something" has so far not been able to plan attacks or to put in a solid standing and extensive terrorist networks throughout the country, despite the threats against Italy made among others by the Islamic State. How did it happen?Muslim Islamic Institute in front of Viale Jenner in Milan Let's start from the beginning: the Islamic State but was not losing?After the attacks of the last year and a half, the terrorist threat in Europe was primarily associated with the Islamic State (even if, for example, the attack on the drafting of Charlie Hebdo in Paris was made by two men linked to al Qaeda). Several were so amazed of the Islamic state's ability to do even attacks in Europe given the continuing military defeats suffered by the group in Iraq, Syria and Libya.
This premise is useful to understand what type of terrorism we are talking about and what should worry even Italy. The attacks claimed by the Islamic State have not all been planned and directed by the group's top: Some yes, as the Paris attacks of November 2015; others do not, such as those made by the so-called "lone wolves", ie people who are radicalized with propaganda material circulated on the Internet and that they have acted autonomously, simply inspired by jihadist ideology of the Islamic State, particularly aggressive in respect of ' West. So far, the Italian intelligence was considered most likely in Italy the attacks of "lone wolves", those in the second category, although it can not be excluded altogether more organized attacks.It is an important distinction but not so sharp, as often thought (and some people think that basically does not count even that great). Since the Islamic State began to lose territories in the Middle East and North Africa, its leaders have issued several appeals to supporters urging them to make direct attacks in their countries, without necessarily going to fight in the Caliphate. The "lone wolves" improvised, so to speak, there were also the "foreign fighters": the lost

there were also the "foreign fighters": people go home after receiving military training in Syria, Iraq or Libya. For this, as written by Thomas Hegghammer, an expert on jihadism and scholar at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment in Kjeller (Norway), we should not think that the jihadist activity in Europe is declining: in the coming years could further increase for several reasons, including where the persistence of wars in the Muslim world and the ease in spreading propaganda over the Internet. If in Italy jihadism organized, structured and what top-down structure, struggling to regain momentum after the great anti-terrorist operations of the twenty-first century, and if the return of the "foreign fighters" has not yet become a large problem, you can not say the same for jihadism so-called "homegrown", to disconnect from the big international terrorist networks and mosques, and based primarily on communications on the Internet.

sulle comunicazioni su internet.

 
Who today are the jihadists in Italy. Last annual report presented to Parliament Italian intelligence (PDF), which refers to 2015, it is said that the greatest danger to Italy come from the so-called "homegrown" jihadism, pursued mainly by the second generation of immigrant Muslims. It is a jihadist linked to communication on the Internet, which usually develops away from the mosques. The first case of terrorist "homegrown" in Italy is considered to Mohammed Game, Libyan citizen born in Benghazi and arrived in Italy in 2003. The October 12, 2009 Game tried to blow himself up at the gate of the barracks of Santa Barbara, on the outskirts of Milan : he was only wounded, along with two soldiers. On his computer, police found 185 files on the writings of Abu Musab al-Suri, one of the leading ideologues of global jihad, best known for having developed the leaderless resistance concept (at Suri is very well taken up in the ideology of the Islamic State) .The case of Game is interesting to also understand the jihadists arrived after him: for example Barbara Aisha Farina, Italian woman born in Milan who converted to Islam and began to handle various blogs that spread jihadist propaganda; Jarmoune Mohamed, a Moroccan resident in Valcamonica arrested on suspicion of organizing an attack on the synagogue in Milan; and Anas el Abboubi, a young man of Moroccan origin residing in a small town in the valleys north of Brescia, who before radicalized on the Internet was a rapper rather well known by the name of McKhalif (or Dr. Domino).

Lorenzo Vidino, of jihadism expert in Italy and among other things ISPI researcher, wrote that in Italy there are dynamics that replicate those seen in other countries, even if in small:

 "An informal stage, estimated at several hundred units, which, with varying levels of intensity, adopt the jihadist ideology. It is, in essence, a small group of subjects from the sociological characteristics (age, sex, ethnicity, education, social status) extremely heterogeneous but which shares the jihadist faith. [...] Most of these subjects was not involved in any violent action, but rather limits its militancy in often frantic activity on the Internet, aimed to disseminate material that ranges from the purely theological all'operativo. "In Italy it works well against terrorism?Typically the Italian anti-terrorism work is considered very good, probably for the particular history of Italy and the many years of experience in combating domestic terrorism, the right and left, and mafia organizations, such as the Camorra.
 In addition, the former Interior Minister Angelino Alfano, now foreign minister, he used a lot of the expulsions instrument that is considered effective in the short term but in the long does not solve the problem. The journalist Giulia Paravicini wrote on Politico that from 2004 to 2014 the Italian government had expelled for reasons of national security an average of 14 people a year; in the last two years the number of expulsions has risen to 123, most of them aimed at Moroccans and Tunisians. Alfano told Paravicini, "We have extended the personal preventive measures that we apply to the Mafia suspects to our anti-terrorism laws. The key words here are "suspect" and "preventive measures", because what happens is not the result of a process and a condemnation, but something that precedes them. "In Italy the crime of terrorism is regulated by Article 270 of the Penal Code, which has been changed a lot over the past 15 years. The most recent changes were two. In February 2015 a law wanted by Alfano which among other things introduced the crime of "organization of transfers for the purposes of terrorism", which provides for 3 to 6 years in prison for "foreign fighters" were approved (one of crimes for which she was sentenced Maria Giulia Sergio) and those who organize, finance or makes propaganda for the jihad. The decree Alfano also predicted up to 10 years in prison for "lone wolves" and established an intelligence strengthening, encouraging such undercover operations.The second amendment to Article 270 of the Criminal Code was approved a few months ago, in July 2016, to give an opportunity to the authorities to punish even those who support and finance potential "lone wolves." Parliament is considering the introduction of other measures, but the times are often very long. For example, in early August, the Senate Judiciary Committee has approved the use of so-called "Trojan horse" in anti-terrorism investigations. The "Trojan horse" is software that can steal sensitive information or access to private computer systems without the user noticing it: the measure, that could make life easier for the investigation of online radicalization cases, however, must still complete in the parliamentary process.Things I do not even workThe fact that Italy has not yet suffered major terrorist attacks of Islamist-inspired does not mean that things work perfectly, or that there is nothing you can do better. Today improvable things seem to be mainly three (PDF). The first, wrote Bruno Megale, former head of counter-terrorism section of the Digos and now superintendent of Caltanissetta, is the lack of North African origin investigators, Balkan and Middle Eastern, lack that instead is not found in many other European countries. According Megale would be important to have investigators who know the places from which the majority of jihadists operating in Italy, in order to better understand their motives and their behaviors.The second problem, wrote Leonardo Lesti, deputy prosecutor at the court in Milan, is the difficulty of interpreting certain rules on terrorism: for example, when you can talk about self-training of a potential jihadist, a crime punishable by law today? How many times you have to watch a video of propaganda of the Islamic State so that we can actually talk about self-training? It is a problem that has been facing the law, but often without the knowledge and the tools to decide competently.The third problem, wrote Lorenzo Vidino, as the almost total lack of policies to prevent radicalization and those for de-radicalization of people who have already been indoctrinated (centers that promote inter-religious dialogue, for example, or structures with specialized staff that helps indoctrinated people to return to a "normal" life). As for prevention, one of the most discussed topics in Europe in recent years has been the management of prisoners considered to be at risk of radicalization: many of the radical Islamists who have been involved in attacks in Europe have been radicalized in prison, for example after entering in contacts with individuals convicted of terrorism (for the time being the main suspect of the attack in Berlin had spent four years in prison in Italy: the connection between the two is a question to be taken lightly, but it could also prove to be relevant) . In other European countries, these policies have existed for fifteen years, and the European Union itself has encouraged the spread, financing of state agencies programs and organizations. In Italy it is still on the high seas, even if something is moving.
In September 2014, former Interior Minister Angelino Alfano had spoken in Parliament the opportunity to initiate specific de-radicalization programs, and parliamentarians Andrea Manciulli (PD) and Stefano Dambruoso (Civic Choice) had submitted a bill on the subject ( PDF), which, however, is blocked by red tape notes of Italian Parliament.
This type of programs and structures could become even more necessary in a few years when it will spread a wider second-generation immigrant Muslims and Italy may face the same problems that are going through today, countries like France, Belgium and Germany. 

TRUMP AND LIBYA
Among many of Obama's legacy, the new US administration will have to deal with the Libyan issue. The unorthodox appointment of Donald Trump in the key posts of foreign and defense administration is not clear if there will be, and what will be the guideline.If we would have expected a talk and substantial continuity over Libya as part of a possible Clinton administration (Hillary was just one of the major supporters of the intervention of 2011 in an Obama administration reluctant), any assumptions about policy Trump now seems a speculation. If we were to entrust us with the words spoken during the election campaign would clarify things do not. When the then Republican candidate publicly asked the Russians to hack emails on Libya Clinton, Libya was only an instrumental background of his livid election campaign. Trump repeatedly insisted that it was contrary to the interventions in Iraq and Libya, Hillary denied this but promptly recalling that actually supported the action against the Gaddafi regime. No possibility of new policy towards the crisis was outlined. For more than three months since last August the US was engaged in Operation Odyssey Lightening with the aim of striking the militiamen of the Islamic State in Sirte, a military campaign passed under track and that favored the pro-government forces of national unity Fayez Serraj.Although the defeat of ISIS appear as positive news in the Libyan scenario, the country does not seem to get out again by the ongoing crisis. The occupation of the port facilities in central Libya by military forces of General Khalifa Haftar occurred last month suggests the emergence of possible new scenarios of uncertainty. Libya continues today to be divided between a parliament (and executive) in Tobruk and a presidential council (headed by Fayez Serraj) in Tripoli, supported by the United Nations, the first nucleus of what should be the National Unity Government (GNA) . In fact, both do not possess real ability to govern, but rather are "hostage" of the militias who support them and who control the territory, respectively, those of General Haftar in Cyrenaica and those associated Misrata and Tripoli in the west of the country.The Obama administration has not been able to make a decisive contribution to resolving the crisis, but gave a clear position. Continued to push for a solution mediated by the United Nations, he has tried to shrink at least the western front and then tried to revive the action of GNA strengthening it politically, economically and militarily. In what he found, first of all, an ally in Italy in. In several times during the year it was envisaged the possibility of negotiating with Haftar, provided that the general would accept a role-part in the UN governance while limiting its ambitions for hegemony over the entire Libya. However, the developments of the last months of 2016 make this more and more remote option, while international conditions seem to drastically weaken the chances of success of mediation.To limit any Rome-Washington axis ambition in this field there are the poor relations that both have with Cairo (the largest sponsors of Haftar) at this time. Mend the east with the west of the country without a bond of trust with the government of al-Sisi, it became increasingly difficult for diplomats of the two countries. What you can predict is that in the months to Rome might appear more isolated in these attempts since the new US administration could not follow the previous administration's line.Difficult to hope that some of the key figures in the new administration cares about the Libyan crisis. Rex Tillerson at the State Department is a businessman, a man of relationships, perhaps ready to make concessions to the Egyptians and Russians if this can help close the crisis. Perhaps the US could back to evaluate positively the Haftar paper, the apparent "strong man" emerging from the east of the country. Michael Flynn, director of the Trump safety has not distinguished in the recent past for the analysis capacity on the country, so much so that as a result of the attack in Benghazi where he died the American ambassador Christopher Stevens sought a pretext to find Iranian responsibility (!) in that attack. What we do not seem to need the Libyan crisis are preconceived thesis, tract or hasty disengagement. The Libyan crisis requires patience and leadership skills in dictating compromise lines. At present it is difficult to say with certainty whether the administration Trump is interested to have a leading role in this scenario.
END
 

Europe & Libya: HAFTER and TRUMP

Europe & Libya: HAFTER and TRUMP: we focus on the Libyan Political Agreement agreed upon by the Libya Dialogue Group. Under this agreement, we indicated that the Government ...

HAFTER and TRUMP

we focus on the Libyan Political Agreement agreed upon by the Libya Dialogue Group. Under this agreement, we indicated that the Government of National Unity had begun its work in April 2016 in Tripoli. We had said that the militia forces that recognized the Government of National Unity had begun an operation to expel DAESH from Sirthe and all of Libya but that the Government of National Unity still had serious problems in assuming its authority. There are many problems, the Assembly of Representatives in Tobrouk which continues its existence even though its term of office has expired. The government attached to this Assembly of Representatives and General Khalifa Haftar who conducts his military forces are the greatest obstacles to national reconciliation. Haftar, which is increasing its strength in the east of the country, is in the process of creating a military administration in this region.
Another factor is the disagreement in the Libyan policies of the extra-Libyan actors that political groups in Libya wish to include in the quest for solutions. The United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and even Turkey who today wish to have the floor on the developments in Libya, Have no policies that are in harmony. Thus, even if they all recognize the same government as the official authority, they support a different Libyan actor. That obviously hurts the quests for national unity.
Although it is increasing its power day by day in eastern Libya, Haftar is not happy with the current situation. The support granted to Haftar by Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, France and Saudi Arabia does not allow him to resolve the Libyan crisis as he would like. He feels that he can play a key role if Russia intervenes actively in the Libyan crisis. In this context, during the year 2016 he made two visits to Russia in the hope of obtaining the support of this country. It was the electoral victory of Donald Trump that prompted Haftar to make his second visit to Russia. Trump's statements about his new Middle Eastern policies, his view of all Islamists as terrorists and his speeches during which he supported Al-Sisi and Putin are also among the essential elements that constitute the cause of his visit Russia. Haftar believes that at the time of Trump, the United States, Egypt and Russia will be able to establish a new cooperation in the Middle East. To this end, the Libyan general went to Moscow to request military aid and training from the Russian administration. If Moscow decides to support one of the parts of the Libyan question, it will surely have an important effect on the Libyan actors. Would Russia make such a choice?
Unlike its position in Syria, Russia has so far avoided interfering with the Libyan problem and has never before vetoed the UN Security Council's decisions on Libya. On the other hand, Russia has supported the political dialogue and agreements that have been established in Libya over the past two years. It even recognized the Government of National Unity. Moreover, we know that Russia has a sympathy for the governments of Hafter and Tobruk. Russia is close to the position of France, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates regarding the Libyan issue.
Hafter's government used the map of terrorism as a common enemy to gain military support during its meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. However, the official spokesman of the Kremlin has so far made no declarations as to whether Russia will give this support or not. On the contrary, the Russian spokesman said that they had made contacts with different political branches and that talks with Hafter were part of this process. On the other hand, information about the Lavrov-Hafter interview published by the Russian official news agency does not show that the support requested was provided. Lavrov told Hafter that Russia supports the quest for a national consensus in Libya according to the decisions of the UN Security Council.
During his election campaign, Donald Trump often criticized the Obama administration and Hillary Clinton for their Libyan policy. Donald Trump, who has always spoken favorably of Putin, said he would seek to cooperate with Russia in the Middle East. It is for all these reasons that the Haftar supporters considered Trump's victory as a good one.

SITUATION IN LIBYA 9.11.2016 in En & Ita

The liberation of our compatriots in Libya, beyond the necessary considerations about the level of safety of workers operating in the country, it also reminds us that many Italian companies, especially in the construction industry and energy, have never stops, managing struggled to keep open a road that many foreign companies have long since ceased to go.

It will be the economy to lead the recovery of relations between Italy and Libya? Despite attempts to boycott the special economic relationship between the two countries - one among all the intervention wanted by France in 2011 to enlarge the oil slice across the Alps and put an end to the "annoying" treaty of friendship and cooperation between Italy and Libya - the 'Italy has managed to maintain a close link with Libya. Last October Mahamoud Ali Hassan, chairman of the Libyan Investment Autorithy (Lia), the Libyan treasure from 67 billion dollars still frozen in London, wanted to meet the leaders of Eni, Finmeccanica-Leonardo, Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, Snam and Unicredit. The aim was to explain the opportunities the Libyan reconstruction and the possibility of a presence of Lia in the various boards of directors, through the investment of about 8 billion of internal funds. It is very small compared to a possible release of Lia and this uncertainty is difficult to predict the Hassan held, but the signal appears clear, however: Italy remains a privileged interlocutor for the Libyan economy.

If the outlook may appear attractive, but the reality is quite another thing. The Libyan economy is in pieces. According to recent World Bank data, the inflation rate grew by 25% in the first half of 2016. The prices of flour and bread increased fivefold. Per capita income has fallen to less than $ 5 thousand, compared to almost $ 13 thousand in 2012. The country is facing a persistent liquidity crisis. The salaries of many civil servants (the vast majority of the country's workforce) are blocked, as well as those of some militias, a few weeks ago, in protest, had occupied the headquarters of the Presidential Council of Tripoli was out coup.

On the whole, then, it weighs the collapse of oil production alone was worth all the Libyan economy during Gaddafi's reign. What remains of the revenue of the past, now reduced to less than a fifth, it is poorly managed by the Libyan Central Bank which hinders the delivery of the funds obtained from the sale of crude oil, getting by with difficulty between the "factions" in Tripoli and Tobruk. To ward off the inevitability of the Libyan default on 31 October, the Foreign Office in London has called a meeting of the countries that support the National Accord Government, but the result was little more than nothing done.

This should not be surprising given that in reality no one seems to have yet figured out who the other party to talk to Libya. The UN's premier Serraj even weaker and weaker in the capital, or "not recognized" General Haftar who, however, has won the wells of the oil crescent and de facto controls them?

From this point of view if you really want to grasp the opportunities of the Libyan reconstruction, you will have to bear with much more conviction the country's recovery. Beyond the support for the recovery of oil production will be necessary in the short term, increase the circulation of money, under the control of the central bank, maybe thawing, after close supervision, some of Libyan assets abroad. But nothing can be done without a preliminary political reconstruction of the country which must necessarily pass through an inclusive dialogue and effective cooperation between the actors of the local context. How to do it will not be just a problem of the Libyans but also for all external actors who, more or less knowingly, have helped to exacerbate or cause chaos in the country.

La liberazione dei nostri connazionali in Libia, al di là delle necessarie considerazioni sul livello di sicurezza dei lavoratori che operano nel paese, ci ricorda anche che molte aziende italiane, specie del comparto delle costruzioni e dell'energia, non si sono mai fermate, riuscendo a tenere faticosamente aperta una strada che molte imprese straniere hanno smesso da tempo di percorrere.

Potrà essere l'economia a guidare la ripresa dei rapporti tra Italia e Libia? Nonostante i tentativi di boicottare la special relationship economica tra i due paesi — uno tra tutti l'intervento voluto dalla Francia nel 2011 per allargare la fetta petrolifera d'oltralpe e porre fine al "fastidioso" trattato di amicizia e cooperazione italo-libico — l'Italia è riuscita a mantenere un legame preferenziale con la Libia. Lo scorso ottobre Ali Mahamoud Hassan, chairman del Libyan Investment Autorithy (Lia), il tesoretto libico da 67 miliardi di dollari ancora congelato a Londra, ha voluto incontrare i vertici di Eni, Leonardo-Finmeccanica, Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, Snam e Unicredit. L'obiettivo era quello di illustrare le opportunità della ricostruzione libica e valutare la possibilità di una presenza della Lia nei vari consigli di amministrazione, grazie all'investimento di circa 8 miliardi di fondi interni. Si tratta di ben poca cosa rispetto a un possibile sblocco della Lia e in questa situazione di incertezza è difficile prevedere la tenuta di Hassan, ma il segnale appare comunque chiaro: l'Italia resta un interlocutore privilegiato per il mondo economico libico. 

Se le prospettive possono apparire interessanti, la realtà è però ben altra cosa. L'economia libica è in pezzi. Secondo dati recenti della Banca mondiale il tasso di inflazione è cresciuto del 25% nel primo semestre del 2016. I prezzi di farina e pane sono quintuplicati. Il reddito pro capite è sceso a meno di 5mila dollari, rispetto ai quasi 13mila dollari del 2012. Il paese versa in una persistente crisi di liquidità. Gli stipendi dei tanti dipendenti pubblici (la stragrande maggioranza della forza lavoro del paese) sono bloccati, così come quelli di alcune milizie che, qualche settimana fa, in segno di protesta, avevano occupato la sede del Consiglio presidenziale di Tripoli facendo gridare al golpe. 

Su tutto, poi, pesa il crollo della produzione di petrolio che da solo valeva tutta l'economia libica durante il regno di Gheddafi. Quello che resta degli introiti di un tempo, oggi ridotti a meno di un quinto, è mal gestito dalla Banca centrale libica che ostacola la consegna dei fondi ottenuti dalla vendita del greggio, barcamenandosi a fatica tra le "fazioni" di Tripoli e Tobruk. Per scongiurare l'ineluttabilità del default libico lo scorso 31 ottobre il Foreign Office di Londra ha convocato un incontro tra i paesi che sostengono il Governo di Accordo Nazionale, ma il risultato è stato poco più di un niente di fatto.  

Ciò non dovrebbe stupire visto che in realtà nessuno sembra aver ancora capito chi sia l'interlocutore con cui parlare in Libia. Il premier dell'Onu Serraj, sempre più debole anche nella capitale, o il "non riconosciuto" generale Haftar che, però, ha conquistato i pozzi della mezzaluna petrolifera e de facto li controlla? 

Da questo punto di vista se davvero si vorranno cogliere le opportunità della ricostruzione libica, si dovrà sostenere con molta più convinzione la ripresa del paese. Al di là del supporto alla ripresa della produzione petrolifera sarà necessario, nel breve periodo, aumentare la circolazione di denaro, sotto il controllo della Banca centrale, magari scongelando, previa una stretta supervisione, alcuni dei beni libici all'estero. Nulla però potrà essere fatto senza una preliminare ricostruzione politica del paese che dovrà necessariamente passare attraverso un dialogo inclusivo ed una cooperazione efficace tra gli attori del contesto locale. Come farlo non sarà solo un problema dei libici ma anche di tutti gli attori esterni che, più o meno scientemente, hanno contribuito a causare o ad acuire il caos nel paese.

LIBYA 19.10.2016

It's been a hellish week end for Libya, torn by a civil war in a context of generalized anarchy where to lord are the weapons: Friday, September 14 militiamen loyal to former Prime Minister Islamist al-Khalifa Ghwell took control of the Tripoli area around the Hotel Rixos and occupied the headquarters of the State Council, announcing a "shot" state at a news conference a few hours later. The militias did not have to fire a shot because the local security forces have turned to escape without posing the problem in the least.

Firefights occurred thereafter for the whole weekend in the area of ​​the naval base in Abu Seta, in Tripoli, just between the militias of al-Gwell and loyalists to the government of national unity, which the former prime minister has coup called "illegal executive authority." In the night between Saturday and Sunday, a column of 50 military vehicles left Misurata, where 300 Italian soldiers are also operating, heading for Tripoli to support and defend the government of al-Serraj and Sunday afternoon, October 16, the UN envoy Martin Kobler has clearly stated, on behalf of the UN, his disappointment at the worsening situation in Tripoli: "These actions generate more disorder and insecurity must end for the benefit of the Libyan people."

Meanwhile, the Libyan government is located in Tunisia, barricaded in a hotel trying to unravel the many and complicated skeins Libyan, playing endless meetings: too dangerous to stay in Tripoli. The coup leaders have restored the old administration, the "national salvation government", and al-Ghwell himself decreed the "failure" of the current Presidency of the Council and the UN-backed government. Six months after the advent of al-Serraj government, the result of a deal that seemed endless, and that certainly was characterized by considerable political fragility, Libya falls back again into chaos and a "new" actor made his entrance on the Libyan scene Khalifa al-Gwell.

Across the country, in the west of Tobruk controlled by men of General Khalifa Haftar, Parliament is not recognized by the UN and the government-to Serraj met Monday, October 17 and has basically established a wait-position, to observe the as the events and then decide what to do: "Now we have two governments in Tripoli [...] the situation there is always out of control: it is a city where live 150 different militias," said the MP Salah Suhbi, highlighting what is undoubtedly the main problem of the government-to Serraj: the failure to set its own security force loyal to its institutional political program. Without the presence of the institutions in the streets, like the Police or the Army, the Libyan capital was literally divided between the different lords of the local militia, in a power struggle that the coup of the men of al-Gwell simply exemplified.

In recent days the British ambassador in Tripoli Peter Millett has decided to move to Tunis for personal security reasons: kidnapping her both to extortion purposes that do not, are on the agenda.

In light of all this one wonders military sense of commitment in place by the various souls of the international coalition, only Great Britain and Italy have sent to Libya 5,000 units since the beginning of 2016 to train army men government, the same that if they are taken to his heels in front of the coup plotters without a shot shoot. There is also another aspect, certainly not secondary, that brings out more of a doubt about the meaning of the Italian presence in Misrata: according Frederic Wehrey, a research associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the militias of Misrata - trained, armed and cured by Italians - they are divided internally into two factions in an internecine struggle for supremacy of one: on the one hand there are the Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood on the other. The first go the 604esimo Infantry Battalion, the brother commands former imam of Cordoba, the cleric Khalid bin Rajab al-Firjani brutally killed by Islamic State this summer after he had publicly criticized and rejected the Islamists to use his mosque for their sermons, and are supported by the Salafis commanders of different Tripolitan militias, such as the Battalion Bab Tajura or Special Deterrence Force Tripoli, faithful to Abdelraouf Kara.

The 604th Battalion joined in May with the coalition of various armed groups revamped by al-Serraj government uniting fighters from Sirte, Bani Walid, Tripoli, Zintan, Zliten and Sabha. Almost exclusively Salafis, very active against the Islamic State and the Islamic faction, are considered "Salafists quietist", that is, followers of the doctrine of religious obedience Rabia bin Hadi al-Madkhali: no electoral activism or armed struggle and decades of hatred for the Brotherhood Muslim, the other soul of the militias of Misrata fighting the Daesh Islamists and al-Qaeda.

The Madkhali followers took his foot in Libya about ten years ago, and after the fall of Gaddafi have literally destroyed the Sufi heritage of Libya and persecuted brotherhood: their social control policies were characterized by the anti-vice police and dall ' very strict application of moral rules of Sharia. Today they are fighting alongside the militias Haftar in eastern Libya and alongside the Tripolitan government forces in western Libya, taking care to keep the foot in both camps rather uncomfortable.

The other soul of the militias of Misrata is the Muslim Brotherhood, as the Misratan: followers of the Mufti of Tripoli Sadiq al-Ghariani, there are many who believe that the Salafis freed from Sirte Daesh their intent is to dominate the local, religious institutions , policy and public security. The same fears that nourish the Brothers to the Salafist militias: a dog chasing its tail.

The differences between the two souls of the Tripolitanian coalition militias, however, are not only political and religious roots but also tribal: the local tribal rivalry and Sirtawi Warfalla, for example, are now more alive than ever.

With the choice of al-Serraj government to remain in Tunisia for the risk of security reasons it is that these souls in conflict, until now capable - at least partially - to fight with a common enemy, they can get away, even if you do not clash, and open a new crisis scenario in its already quite complicated Libyan mosaic. Meanwhile the Americans have significantly increased the number of air strikes in Libya from September 21 were carried out 324 raids on the country, more than double those of the previous month, in contrast with the finding of the White House on August 1, when Obama he explained that the bombing campaign would focus only briefly on the coastal area. In late September, the campaign was extended and extended, as well as intensified, and a US military official revealed to Fox News that the intervention is expected to last several months. And this despite the occupant of the White House had defined, in January, as his "worst mistake" just the American interference in Libya for Gaddafi's fall, exactly five years ago.

20 October 2011 Muammar Gaddafi was pulled out of the hole in which he was hiding, beaten and humiliated, loaded on the hood of a pickup and executed among the liberation of the rebels screams. Today Libya has not authoritative centralized authority, has a coup government in the capital itself, a rebel parliament in Tobruk, rampant crime, is a valuable hub for human traffickers, its economy virtually does not exist anymore and the country is fragmented into an almost irreparable, torn by ethnic conflicts, religious and power. A political national tragedy, humanitarian and identity that reflected on Europe, Africa and the Middle East compounded by quarrelsome Libyans and ancient grudges, and the interests of foreign countries: Egypt, Al-Sisi the different souls of the international coalition, with France, which seems to support Haftar while all other supporting al-Serraj. A chaos that is increasingly ungovernable.