K. HAFTER Nov2017

Ex-general accused of war crimes is being groomed by EU leaders to become Libya's next strong man. What could go wrong?

From a security standpoint, the presence of certain heavily armed militant factions in post-2011 Libya deeply unsettles European governments. Although Daesh (ISIS) lost its stronghold in Sirte at the hands of Misratan militias in late 2016, Daesh remains a relevant force in Libya, underscored by its killing of two Libyan National Army (LNA) soldiers at a checkpoint near Ajdabiya on October 25. Other extremist militias such as Libya Shield, Ansar al Sharia in Benghazi, Ansar al Sharia in Darnah, and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb have also contributed to fears of Libya becoming a hub for global terrorists to plot attacks against Europe.
Since Libya’s bifurcation in mid-2014, Haftar and the LNA, loyal to the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR), have received foreign support from Russia and several Arab states to the east of Libya. Yet Haftar—despite refusing to recognize the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli as Libya’s legitimate government—has worked to convince Western powers that he represents Libya’s most realistic hope for a stable and secular future. It appears that such efforts have been paying off politically as more European statesmen have made moves which serve to legitimize Haftar.
More than any other Western government, France, which mainly sees the Libyan crisis through a counterterrorism prism, has directly and indirectly supported Haftar. Despite the International Criminal Court’s warrant for Mahmoud Mustafa Busayf al Werfalli (a Libyan general who serves in the LNA) on war crimes charges, Paris has worked closely with Haftar’s most important Arab state sponsors—Egypt and the UAE—to provide the LNA with support. Last year, officials in Paris admitted that three French soldiers died conducting an "intelligence-gathering mission" near Benghazi, which experts saw as further evidence of French help for the LNA.
On July 27, President Emmanuel Macron hosted talks between Haftar and the GNA’s head, Fayes al Serraj, to break Libya’s political impasse. Leaders of the rival Tripoli and Tobruk-based governments signed a 10-point statement, committing both to holding a ceasefire and national elections “as soon as possible.” Yet in the eyes of many Libyans, including Guma el Gamaty, the meeting in Paris provided Haftar with more potential to achieve a “takeover” of Libya by way of an election at a time when the ex-CIA asset is enjoying more popularity. There is growing suspicion that France’s underlying goal is to work with Egypt and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to establish Haftar as Libya’s new dictator.
By virtue of geography, Italy has had to engage Libya on migration and terrorism issues. Rome—more than any other Western capital—has backed the GNA and opposed moves to legitimize Haftar politically. Yet within Italy’s leadership there has not been a consensus on the question of what role Haftar should play in Libya’s future and how Rome should engage the “renegade general.”
Signalling a possible shift in Italy’s policy, In September Haftar met with Italy’s Defence Minister, Roberta Pinotti, and Italian security chiefs in Rome. Mattia Toaldo expertly posited that Haftar’s visit to Rome illustrated the growing influence of Interior Minister Marco Minniti, who joins other voices in Italy’s government in advocating that Italy and Haftar establish more cooperative relations to tackle the numerous issues facing Italian-Libyan relations.
Under the banner of fighting “terror,” the United Kingdom has supported Haftar too. In August, British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson visited Haftar in Benghazi and credited the LNA with combatting “umpteen militias… in lawless areas of Libya.” London’s chief diplomat urged Libya’s strongman to adhere to the Paris ceasefire and to work with the UN to achieve peace in Libya. Yet Johnson’s Benghazi visit was illustrative of the West’s shift toward recognizing Haftar.
The West’s growing recognition of Haftar as a political force to contend with in Libya stems from the GNA’s failure to govern Libyan territory beyond certain parts of Tripoli in contrast to the HoR/LNA’s control of roughly half of the North African country. At the same time, given how little appetite there is among the US and European public for the deployment of Western forces to Arab countries to fight wars and battles on the ground, the Europeans are looking for local actors in the Middle East and North Africa to engage in the bloodiest of battles against militant radicals such as Daesh.
Haftar appeals to powers in the East and the West who see him as a strongman capable of creating an effective bulwark against violent extremism in Libya. Clearly the LNA’s ousting of militant forces from Libyan cities has been received well in other Arab states, plus Russia and Europe too, where leaders are hedging their bets and not expecting the UN-backed GNA to succeed. Yet with the LNA accused of war crimes, there are certainly moral costs associated with supporting the “renegade general.”
Moreover, if Haftar wages a bloody campaign to usurp control of Tripoli as the next step in establishing a military dictatorship over the entire country, would this actually defuse the threats of radicalism and address the widespread despair that provides terrorist groups with the necessary oxygen to sustain their violence? To say the least, that appears highly doubtful. In devising a comprehensive approach to tackle the numerous challenges that the Libyan conflict poses to Europe, Western governments must consider the implications of Haftar becoming Libya’s next strongman and be careful about their actions’ potential to accelerate such a development.

SEIF E LIBIA?

È intenzione di Saif al-Islam Gheddafi immediatamente assumere la presidenza?

Su Libya against superpowermedia ^[1] un notevole articolo di Richard Galustian era ^[2 pubblicato. Galustian suggerisce ciò che si è verificato dopo il fallimento di tutti i negoziati, si avvicina ad un piano in cinque punti interessanti per la Libia. Una breve versione:

1. Le Nazioni Unite dovrebbero fare le valigie e lasciare il palco libico. Dopo sei anni di loro fallimento, hanno zero credibilità tra i libici.
2. I Fratelli Musulmani deve essere classificato come organizzazione terroristica. i membri del LIFG devono essere esclusi dal diritto di partecipare alla vita politica.
3. L'embargo sulle armi contro la LNA deve essere sollevato per consentire generale Heftar può combattere i jihadisti.
4. Prima di tenere elezioni nel 2018 o 2019 tecnocrati devono essere formati. Come primo ministro, sarebbe Mahmoud Dschibril ^[3] e Abu Zaid Omar Dorda ^[4] in considerazione. I posti ministeriali dovrebbero prendere per persone qualificate dal parlamento a Tobruk.
5. Saif al-Islam dovrebbe essere nominato per il presidente "costituzionale"; come una figura unificante, senza potere esecutivo, bravo nel suo lato consiglieri tecnocratiche. Questo è importante per miteinzubinden le tribù e la popolazione normale. Perché Saif al-Islam popolarità è fuor di dubbio.

I jihadisti devono lasciare il paese per la Turchia, che ha un governo dei Fratelli Musulmani. Aggiungendo se il tutto a causa della debolezza delle Nazioni Unite e l'UE solo con l'aiuto di Donald Trump.

Galustian teme che - la Libia non deve essere stabilizzata presto - questo richiederà un effetto domino catastrofico sui paesi del Nord Africa, probabilmente in Tunisia, hanno prima.

Si Prepara Saif al-Islam Gheddafi ad un'offensiva Tripoli?

Un articolo libyatimes ^[5] è preoccupato con i piani di Saif al-Islam Gheddafi. Si dice che Saif al-Islam Gheddafi si stava preparando a Tripoli offensivo. Saif al-Islam ha avuto campo militare nella zona Wirschefana dove si affollano i combattenti da tutto il paese . Anche all'interno della capitale ha avuto sostenitori, per i quali sarebbe possibile aprirgli porte. Così potrebbe avere successo la cattura incruenta di Tripoli.

Tuttavia, la questione se Saif al-Islam in realtà intende militarmente occupare Tripoli, dal momento che avrebbe potuto vincere qualsiasi elezione facilmente immaginare. Tutti i libici avrebbero rispettato la nuova Libia 'le forze politiche attuali, che hanno la colpa per il disastro in corso, completamente disilluso. Le grandi tribù della Libia sono sostenitori maturati dal vecchio regime - e rappresentano la stragrande maggioranza degli elettori.

Ma come potrebbero consentire le potenze occidentali che la Libia restituisce a Gheddafi al potere ? Come potrebbe giustificare il bilancio delle vittime fornito loro nei loro paesi se ora tutto è tornato come una volta? Così Gheddafi potrebbe rimanere l'ultima scelta per far valere la sua pretesa di potere verso l'Occidente con la forza.

In Libia ci sono due movimenti Jamahiriya, anche la nuova fondazione Fronte Popolare per la Liberazione della Libia e il Movimento libico Movimento Nazionale del Popolo , nella maggior parte ha raccolto quelli vecchia guardia'. Saif al-Islam, deve anche essere in grado di tenere insieme questi due movimenti.

Saif al-Islam Gheddafi e il mandato di cattura internazionale

Il quotidiano al-Bayan [6] ha riferito che cercano parti sia internazionali e regionali per convincere il Consiglio di sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite dal lasciare seguire la decisione, Saif al-Islam Gheddafi penalmente ritirarsi. Questo gli avrebbe permesso di partecipare in Libia nel processo politico. Fonti diplomatiche hanno confermato all'unanimità che Saif al-Islam è sostenuto da una maggioranza significativa. Se questo non viene preso in considerazione, ciò porterebbe alla prosecuzione della crisi attuale. La maggior parte dei ceppi sia nel Sud e in Occidente e nella regione centrale così come alcune tribù e membri della legislatura in Oriente hanno promesso Saif al-Islam pubblicamente il loro sostegno.

Solo i gruppi jihadisti sarebbero andati contro Saif al-Islam Gheddafi.

Nel portare la pace in Libia non c'è modo per Saif al-Islam Gheddafi di condurre al passato

Qualora l'Occidente e in particolare l'UE siano in realtà pronti ti a una pacificazione della Libia, non c'è modo di Saif al-Islam Gheddafi per passare davanti. Questa è una pillola amara da ingoiare i neo-colonialisti. Ma sarebbe ancora più amara quando il caos in Libia e la minaccia jihadista destabilizzato non solo i vicini africani della Libia, a non portare l'elevato numero di migranti con gli attacchi islamici quindi i governi europei, l'UE nel suo insieme, a vacillare.

[1] https://libyaagainstsuperpowermedia.org/2017/10/27/the-solution-for-libya/

[2] Richard Galustian è un analista economico e di sicurezza che soggiorna in Libia dal 2011

[3] Mahmoud Jibril : iniziata sotto Fondo di sviluppo economico del Paese di Gheddafi. Combattuto per una liberalizzazione dell'economia libica. Registrato nel 2011 presto gli insorti ed era in transizione ministri degli esteri del Consiglio. Oggi è la festa dell'Alleanza delle forze nazionali prima (Forze Alleanza Nazionale Partito).

[4] Abu Zaid Omar Dorda : sotto Gheddafi ministro degli esteri, il primo ministro 1997-2003 inviato in Libia presso le Nazioni Unite, il presidente della Commissione Infrastrutture e capo dei servizi segreti esteri libico. Dopo l'assassinio di Gheddafi, è stato imprigionato a Tripoli per marzo 2017 prigione di al-Hadba.

[5] http://www.libyatimes.net/news/56-exclusive-saif-s-last-stand

[6] https://rcmlibya.wordpress.com/2017/10/26/saif-al-islam-returns-to-politics-in-libya/

Why Libya Needs a Makeover of Its Peace Deal 31

The currency crisis is undermining Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj’s efforts to unite a country fractured by five years of conflict following the 2011 ouster of Muammar al-Qaddafi.

Photographer: Abdullah Doma/AFP via Getty Images

Libya’s fundamental challenge since the 2011 downfall of Muammar Qaddafi was supposed to have been overcome: competing seats of power acting on their own. But a United Nations-brokered 2015 peace accord created a unity government in name more than in reality, and today Libya is effectively partitioned. So now the UN is having another go, holding talks aimed at an improved agreement. The negotiations will be tortuous. Adding urgency to the search for a deal are a collapsing economy, a resurgence of Islamic State in the country, and the plight of tens of thousands of refugees stuck in Libya or awaiting perilous sea journeys to Europe.

1. What’s different this time?

In essence, the UN’s new plan aspires to be more inclusive. Unveiled by UN envoy to Libya Ghassan Salame in September, it seeks to amend the 2015 pact -- known as the Libyan Political Agreement -- by engaging not just Libya’s two rival legislatures but also armed factions and civil society groups that were marginalized before. A month-long round in Tunis ended Oct. 21 with no date set for the next. If the parties reach a broad agreement, a national conference would be convened to select candidates for reconfigured executive bodies. Salame aims to deliver, within a year, a schedule for a referendum on a new constitution that’s still being drafted, as well as legislative and presidential elections.

2. Why did the first agreement fail?

The deal was intended to merge two rival administrations -- one based in the capital Tripoli, the other to the east in Tobruk -- and rebuild state institutions. But it excluded powerful players, including some of the militias that led the uprising that toppled Qaddafi, and critics said it smacked of a solution imposed by the international community. One of its most contentious components was Article 8, which required all top officials to step down once the agreement came into force. And the pact failed to address the knotty issue of who would lead the national army. The eastern leadership, including influential military commander Khalifa Haftar, who now controls some of Libya’s biggest oil facilities, has refused to endorse it.

3. Did negotiators make progress in Tunis?

Not really. Saad Ben Shrada, a member of the Tripoli legislature, said delegates did agree on scaling down the Presidential Council -- the executive body that is supposed to fulfill the functions of the head of state and which is currently led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj. It will go from nine members to three, one drawn from each of Libya’s main geographical regions. But there was no accord on how they would be selected, he said. Others described a lack of flexibility among key players. Another Tripoli legislator, Omar Bshah, summed up difficulties presented by the expanded participation: “When you satisfy old spoilers, new ones appear.”

4. Where does this leave the unity government?

Sarraj’s Government of National Accord, established in Tripoli in early 2016, has struggled to make much headway. Without armed forces under his direct control, the prime minister has had to rely on allied militias to achieve his few victories -- such as driving Islamic State from the coastal city of Sirte. The militant group has since made inroads elsewhere in Libya, presenting a major security risk for the country and its neighbors. Sarraj has also been widely blamed for a slumping economy. He will probably stay on as the search continues for a new framework, despite disagreements over whether his mandate remains valid.

5. Can Haftar seize power?

The former Qaddafi-era officer shows no signs of backing down. He gained greater political legitimacy after a Paris-brokered meeting with Sarraj in July, and has been working to portray himself as the only man capable of leading a united Libya. The opposition to him is splintered and unlikely to present a comparable challenger. Haftar’s backers have launched a petition in the east promoting him as the future president. However, to win an election, he’d have to win over major parts of Libya’s center and west, home to 70 percent of the population, many of whom despise him for his previous allegiance with the Qaddafi regime. It’s unlikely Haftar could rally the armed forces he’d need to seize control of the country.

6. What’s at stake?

Six years of fighting have exacted a heavy toll on Libya, which sits atop Africa’s largest proven reserves of crude oil, its main source of revenue. In August, the central bank estimated that shutdowns of oil production facilities over the past three years had cost the nation more than $160 billion. Gross domestic product will be around $13.9 billion in 2017, or about 15 percent of its 2012 levels, according to the central bank. Services such as health, education and electricity have been hit, and delays in paying state salaries have fueled anger. Libya’s breakdown has also resonated far beyond its borders, with the chaos enabling a booming smuggling network that trades in people, drugs and weapons.

The Reference Shelf

• The International Crisis Group’s analysis of the ongoing U.N.-backed efforts.
• Security Council Report chronology of key events in Libya.
• Testimony about Libya’s chaos by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace fellow Frederic Wehrey before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
• Bloomberg chart showing Libya oil output fluctuations.
• Guide to the main players in Libya’s political arena.

QuickTake explainer on Libya.