LIBYA SITUATION ANALYSIS 30.1.2016

The international community looks with apprehension at GNA fate.

Since agreement signatures on 17th December in Morocco between some members of the political and social life in Libya, are ongoing negotiations for the formation of an executive, with UN mediation.

On January 25 Tobruk Parliament voted against a list of 32 ministers submitted by the Presidential Council led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj, and against an article of the agreement on military leadership (Khalifa Haftar) fate.

The situation on the ground remains fluid and, as explained by a recent report by the American Society of Security Soufan Group,due to uncertainty, political vacuum, collapse of political power, economic and social factors, militias, which altogether create fertile ground for the strengthening of extremist groups like IS and al-Qaeda.

Tobruk Parliament gave to Presidential Council ten days - from January 25 - to present a new list of ministers.

The fragmentation of Libya in political movements and military groups with different interests and conflicting therefore becomes an issue for nearby Europe and for international community.

We offer a brief profile of major players on the field. Their movements have an effect on stability of neighboring countries.

Presidential Council

Morocco Agreement 17.12.2015 created Presidential Council made up of nine members including PM Fayez al-Sarraj.

For security and for militias activities, hostile to international agreement, politicians who compose Presidential Council sit in a hotel in Tunis for a month.

From there it was announced on January 19 a list of 32 ministers, whose names are unknown to most of the international community and also to many Libyans. Tobruk Parliament has however rejected the proposal on January 25 and asked for a list leaner, to be submitted within ten days before the vote.

Tobruk House of Representatives (HoR)

is recognized internationally Parliament. Its HQ is in Tobruk, a few kilometers from Egypt border as in August 2014, its deputies and government were forced to leave the capital by Dawn Libyan militias considered Islamist. HoR President, Agila Saleh does not openly support international agreement. From his rise to politics in 2014, he was always considered the political arm of General Khalifa Haftar.

Khalifa Haftar

Former army general of Muammar Gaddafi, he is perhaps the most controversial official figureat this time in Libya and head of what it was Libyan national army, opposed the international agreement.

Supported by Egypt andUAE, he was presented to international community as a anti-Islamists military force.

In recent weeks, the appointment of Defense of Mahdi al-Barghathi, only not officially considered close to Haftar, and allegations of corruption came on live TV by a former spokesman weakened his figure. At same time,HoR 'no' to the new government and to a particular article of the Moroccan - which undermines the ability of the general to remain the head of the army - tell the east still strong support and above all a fight power around the military leadership and the future role of Haftar.

General National Congress (GNC) Tripoli

also rival government to internationally recognized HoR which sits in Tobruk. It is described as "Islamist" for the presence within it of various religious political groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood. It has a stronghold Tripoli, the city controlled by an alliance of militias, Dawn Libya, in support of local institutions.

An important part of these armed groups is from Misrata. President of GNC, Nouri Abusahman, is contrary to the international agreement. This does not mean - it applies also to HoR in Tobruk - that entire HoR would be against Morocco agreement, limited to individual members of the two parliaments and rival militias.

Misrata

The militias of Misrata - entered into an alliance known as the Libyan Shield - represent a predominant force in Libyan Dawn. Although they are often categorized as "Islamist" for their links with religious groups and movements, not all of these realities are to be considered as such. Since summer 2015, also has important political and military components of the city have begun to approach the idea of ​​a political compromise with the East and, away from the prevailing positions in the institutions of Tripoli, many politicians and commanders signed an agreement December. Important figure in the presidential council of Misrata and instrumental in this change of direction is Ahmed Maiteeq, prominent businessman elite commercial town.

Zintan

Small and dusty town in the western mountains, on the border with Tunisia, its militias like those of Misrata have taken center stage in 2011 for the conquest of the capital Tripoli. They are military forces that are opposed to the alliance Alba Libya and support the institutions of the East.

Jadhran and Guards Petroleum

The self-appointed leaders "federalist" Ibrahim al-Jadhran has its stronghold west of Benghazi, in the town of Ajdabiya and the oil hub of Ras Lanuf, for months in 2011 the front in the war between rebels and regime forces. Jadhran and its so-called "oil guards" get their turns in Libya, drawing power - and money - by the role you are cut out in defense of oil installations in the area. They are hostile to both the general Haftar both Islamist forces. In recent months, they have changed their position against the militias of Misrata who first fought, as they would have under way.

Derna

This eastern Libyan city is considered for long time bastion of Islamist extremist groups in Libya. In 2014 it was formed by Mujahideen Shura Majlis which includes Abu Slim Martyrs Brigades (named after infamous prison in Tripoli where Gaddafi locked up political opponents). Inside there are Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) - veterans of Afghanistan war - with links to al-Qaeda. Main Majlis objective is anti-Islamist forces of General Haftar. In June 2015, however, fierce fighting between factions have led to removal of IS elements from Derna, proving the existence of rivalries and fractures in the Islamist Libyan front.

IS

It is a presence in expansion. Libyans call DAESH (Arab acronym for ISIS). Its numbers in this regard are different and impossible to verify independently. Wall Street Journal in November last year wrote 2,000 IS fighters - including Libyans and foreigners coming from other fronti - recently increased to 5,000. The stronghold is the Libyan coastal town of Sirte, even if the jihadist movement has a presence in Benghazi and around the city of Derna. It is no coincidence that IS leader Abu Khaled al-Anbari was killed Nov. 13 in a US raid in that area.

Ansar al-Sharia

is the group behind 11 September 2012 attack to US consulate wich killed two Americans, including Ambassador Christopher Stevens. This movement is close to al-Qaeda. In addition to its presence in Benghazi, it is also active in Derna, where its local leader Sufian Ben Qumu was former Guantanamo detainee.

Libya: would military intervention strengthen IS

Discussed for two years by the French officers, British and Italian, their staffs and US disciples of neoconservative ideology of Bush years, the prospect of a second military intervention in Libya is again on the order of the day.

The stated objective is the eradication of IS in Libya, the implementation capacity has limits, however. Relegating to oblivion the crucial question of rebuilding a legitimate and inclusive State, such operation would be likely to pose more problems than it is supposed to solve.

IS Parade in Sirte.

The stated objective would not be this time "protection of civilians" but IS eradication in Libya as part of the "war against terrorism" after the attacks started again Paris from 13 November 2015.

The ideal scenario for intervention on which "are working" British headquarters, French, Italian and American would be upon request for assistance issued by GNA, provided in Agreement signed on December 17 in Skhirat under pressure from Western powers and UN. If GNA is approved in Libya - until now compromised by hostile forces - could not be done quickly, Plan B would be to act without the support of a legitimate local government.            

But beyond official discourse, what do we know the specifics, strengths and weaknesses of the organization of IS in Libya?

If it turns out that because of its presence in Libya a cornerstone of its communication strategy and it does not hide its goal to block them rebuild a state, its capacity for implementation and expansion in this country nevertheless deserves to be analyzed in light of Libyan specificities, which differ markedly from those of Iraq and Syria.  

According to  UN estimates, based themselves on those "certain Member States", IS in Libya would be about 3500 men. The authorities in Tripoli estimate about 2000 men, mainly located in Sirte and Derna/Benghazi neighborhoods.

Geography local rallies

It is only four months after taking Mosul in June 2014 by IS, a local Libyan jihadist group, the Islamic Youth Advisory Council (Shura majliss chabab al-Islam) Derna, officially allegiance to IS.

A month and a half later acknowledges this fact and allegiance of Cyrenaica one of its provinces (wilayat barka) alongside its other provinces of Iraq and Syria. In February 2015, it was the turn of Sirte to fall into IS hands, which proclaims capital of Tripolitania province (wilayat Tarabulus).

In Libya, IS implementation in a city or region responds primarily to specific local considerations which reflect both the diversity and local issues based on cities and regions. From insurgency and civil war of 2011 beginnings, situation in Libya has indeed characterized by extreme geographical fragmentation, with a predominance of local issues on national logic and ideological positions.

Rallies in favor of one side or another therefore meet one or more logic specific to each local situation: alliance with the strongest party able to provide protection to a minority group or arbitration between rival groups the absence of sufficiently powerful local authority or in a context with degraded social fabric of solidarity,  with a members of a family or clan, charisma of a militia leader or preacher and last but not least, predatory logic.

First historical IS enclave in Libya, still presented a year ago as an impregnable stronghold, Derna was conquered by local militias without Libyan National Army embryo support, consisting mainly of traditionally rival tribes opponents of Derna.

In Benghazi, IS fighters have two fronts against General Haftar seven units and local militias under his control.

If circumstancial alliances exist with revolutionary Islamist militias attached to Benghazi Advisory Council revolutionary front against Haftar troops, tensions are still regularly updated between the two factions.

Sirte, regularly described in the Western media of "Libyan Rakka" (referring to Syrian IS capital) is the only city where IS militias took hold.

Both history and sociology of the city provide some explanations.

Former stronghold of Muammar Gaddafi tribe, Sirte has actually hosted the last bastions of resistance of his regime in 2011. Often presented by its inhabitants as the "Libya Dresden", with reference to the destruction caused by 2011 bombing, Sirte was excluded so far in new Libya.

Its tribes were ostracized and its social fabric challenged by population displacement and destruction.

No local militia having any revolutionary legitimacy has also emerged after the fall of the regime and the security order has been carried out by militia from Misrata, perceived as occupation forces and acting as such with local people.

Al-Farouq katiba deployed in Sirte, is also a militia from Misrata, which constitutes the backbone of the military presence of the latter.

It is composed of young people rallied to jihadism initially affiliated to Ansar Al-Sharia group before end of 2014 to pledge allegiance to IS.        

Reigning through terror, intimidation and retribution on local population weakened and requesting order and security, these groups, which were assistants by foreign recruits (including  proved presence of Somalis, Tunisians, Algerians, Mauritanians, Malians and Egyptians) have also taken advantage -  to win - of individual local rallies and divisions among local factions.

Due to geographical location of Sirt - the heart of a desert region located at intersection of the respective zones of influence between two Parliaments of Tobruk and Tripoli, IS has also largely benefited from the conflict between the two rival entities.

All their struggle for national supremacy and their antagonism were to the detriment of common action against IS.

Misrata is itself divided between supporters of the fight against IS and supporters of the defense of the capital Tripoli.

Stir up divisions

The example of Derna, where local armed groups competing successfully repelled those of IS, however, shows that the success of it are not irreversible provided that there is a local or regional alternative.

The example of Sirte where IS manages when no local force is able to resist.

Conscious of its inability to present IS as military conqueror of a wide territorial basis as it has done in Iraq and Syria, IS in Libya now seems to have adopted a strategy to stir up divisions within its enemies in order to prevent at all costs the establishment of GNA.

This strategy results in particular in terrorist actions against symbolic targets of the two camps. IS also seeks to address the oil sites controlled by guards oil installations federalist Ibrahim Jadhran, more in order to make them unusable for national resources dry up than to seize them.

Having failed to significantly expand its hold to east and west since summer 2015, IS appears to seek to develop its action from Sirte to the Sahel by expanding its recruitment policy elements among Tuareg as reflected in its recruitment messages broadcast in their language.

Unanimous condemnation of suicide attacks

The bomb of January 8, 2016 against a police academy in Zliten, which killed at least 65 deaths and suicide attacks against oil sites of Ras Lanuf, however, could announce a shift in the situation to IS detriment.

Ras Lanuf attacks have indeed had the immediate effect to start a tactical cooperation between Misrata militias affiliated to Dawn coalition and oil installations guards led by Ibrahim Jadhran.

This cooperation resulted in particular in joint operations room establishment for medical evacuation of injured oil guards, in the attacks to Misrata hospitals and use of Misrata aircrafts to the benefit of Jadhran troops against IS.

The horror of Zliten prompted a unanimous rejection reaction throughout Libya. The images of "suicide attackers" published by IS  which show young men faces apparently originated in African Sahel or in Horn of Africa, widely broadcasted on Libyan social networks, have also greatly shocked a wide public.

Photo of one of "martyrs", a 15 year old named Abd El-Mounaam Dweïla who had fled a few weeks earlier of his parents' home in Tripoli to join IS in Sirte has also aroused strong emotion in many families. The story of his radicalization, amply publicized, confirms the emergence of a new phenomenon of intergenerational rupture in Libya.

Son of a pious family which was part of a Koranic school affiliated to a Sufi brotherhood, the young man had gradually radicalized in contact with a preacher of the district who has turned away from Sufi path to jihadism.        

The tragedy of Zliten few days after the suicide bombing of the jihadist will thus succeeded for the first time since the fall of the Gaddafi regime, to bring all the warring factions in Libya in a unanimous and unambiguous condemnation of the attack.

The route of the young jihadist Dweïli has also alerted many parents about the risks of radicalization of their children.

A puppet of the West?  

Whether driving or not, at the request of future GNA, a new military intervention in Libya which relegate to oblivion the issue of Libyan sovereignty therefore likely to pose more problems than it is supposed to solve.

If some voices in Libya call for a new foreign intervention, the vast majority of Libyans is indeed hostile to a foreign operation ontheir soil - whether by Western countries or Arab countries.

By distancing the prospect of winning a national Libyan-Libyan alliance exclusively against IS, foreign intervention would also help to legitimize GNA that would appear so clearly as a puppet of the West.

It also would feed the resentment of many Libyans who, without being well disposed towards West, are not less sensitive to the most radical political actors arguments, east and west of Libya, to maintain the plot theories, the most common being the one that IS is a new West creature to intervene in Arab countries.

A new international military intervention in Libya will therefore not - on the contrary - clean political and societal roots from IS presence in Libya, whose prerequisite is the reconstruction of a legitimate Libyan government with all Libyan local politico-military actors included.

LIBYA NEW DEFENSE MINISTER

His name is Mahdi al-Barghathi. He is GNA (Govt National Accord) new defense minister of Libya, the only government (now) legitimate in UN and West eyes, GNA as UN envoy announced Tuesday, January 19 with a tweet of relief.
It remains to be seen whether GNA will remain on paper or be able to actually take possession of former Italian colony, getting that Libyans consensus without which any policy is doomed to fail.
Time is running, IS advances, launches attacks on oil terminals, in order to sabotage the economy run by "impure" governments - Libya had (or still has?) two govts, one in Tripoli, the other in Tobruk - and international community speaks openly of armed intervention against the Caliphate.
UN and Italy stand as a precondition the request for support by GNA(as soon as fully approved, to avoid adding chaos to chaos, other countries, such as France, seem to move more independently, not wanting to depend on the time of the grueling African politics.
GNA is unity government with 32 Ministers, according to list compiled 48 hours later than scheduled deadline.

The name of Barghati, "may be the squaring of the circle." Barghati, in fact, is a soldier who has fighted IS in Benghazi, but has distanced himself from general Haftar, main obstacle to the agreement between the two governments (Haftar, who leads the forces of Eastern Libya, is tied to Tobruk and he is detested by Tripoli.
The appointment of Barghati can be the guarantee that Libya will have a real army and not a collection of militias, as requested by Eastern Libya.
At the same time, however, Haftar is linked to Aguila Saleh, Tobruk Parliament, so without its consent about him becomes more difficult for GNA to get a general confidence.
Not impossible, but certainly more complicated.
"Barghati could be squaring the circle: IS has indeed fought in Benghazi, but he has distanced himself from general Haftar, one of the main obstacles to the agreement between the two governments".
Libya roadmap, in fact, expects that now the executive receives approval, within ten days, by Parliament of Tobruk.
It is a decisive step to have full legitimacy. At the same time, to enable GNA effective control of the country, Libyans (with EU military support??) should create the security conditions so that GNA can settle in Tripoli.
Italy urges caution but finds a positive aspect in the choice of the new defense minister, "Resizing or downsizing Haftar could move large part of Tripoli forces in favor of the agreement and allow the entry of GNA in the capital. Everything will depend on signals by GNA"
In the background there is the great bogeyman, IS.
An effective GNA would be the most effective tool against Caliphate, a view that should be the Libyans to fight for it.
The executive comprises could lead to an agreement between the three forces that now confront the IS: oil guards headed by Ibrahim Jadran, for whom IS and Haftar are equally enemies plus Misrata militias.
And those generals who wage war with Islamists in Benghazi, but they are not with Haftar. That is, if GNA would give signals to international community that a coordination among these three forces is possible.
It would change the military intervention dynamics against IS, which not only would become even more likely, but it would take place in advocated manner: aerial coverage by West, boots on the ground by Libyans with West support.
This would be the best option. But there is a more pessimistic about the future of Libya. "If  Tobruk Parliament does not approve GNA, a political problem would be created. International community, to intervene in Libya, should appeal to 'creative solution'. Some, like France, or Britain, would think that form is not worth its substance and unilateral action possibility would have been pushed a little further.
It is unlikely that during these ten days West moves in this direction. The problem is that Libyan deadlines are constantly delayed, so patience may wear down Western.
Next summit in February about IS will probably be turning point. "

LIBYA GNA (Govt National Accord) TAKES OFF TODAY

Forecast

• A Western coalition is preparing to launch an offensive against the Islamic State in Libya.
• Even so, Libya's foreign patrons will continue to support the U.N.-backed political agreement.
• Deeply entrenched differences among Libyan militias will impede political stability.
• Even if an intervention successfully dislodges the Islamic State, it will fail to materially improve the country's security conditions.

Analysis

Though the fight against the Islamic State has many theaters, the front line of the conflict was drawn years ago in Syria and Iraq, devoid as they were of governments that could effectively control the whole of their respective territories. But as the Islamic State loses ground in Syria and Iraq, the group has found a home in another country — a country arguably as bereft of central authority, a country that may, too, be the object of international military intervention in the coming weeks. That country is Libya, which is now home to as many as 5,000 militants loyal to the Islamic State.
In some ways, Libya was a logical place for the militants to end up. After all, eastern Libya has been an important arms exporter to Syrian rebels since the fall of Moammar Gadhafi in 2011. They began to arrive in early 2014, though many were simply returning to their home country after having fought and trained in Syria and Iraq. They arrived in the eastern city of Darnah but have since spread throughout the country, establishing a presence in Nofaliya, Ghardabiya and most noticeably Sirte.
The Islamic State has also encroached on Libya's oil-producing regions. And even though most of the ports in these regions are currently offline, Libyan authorities cannot afford to let their only viable source of revenue fall into the hands of extremists. Without that revenue, they would be unable to fund the social services that would instill the kind of loyalty that keeps their constituents from joining groups like the Islamic State in the first place. Authorities cannot contain the Islamic State on their own, hence the calls for international intervention.

Preparations Are Underway

And it is a call that several countries seem willing to heed. Libya's proximity to Europe makes Islamic State advances a security concern for Western countries, particularly Mediterranean countries. Not only would Libya be ideally suited as a lunching pad for terrorist attacks, greater conflict could produce even more refugees, which Europe has struggled to effectively manage. Moreover, Western countries are concerned that the Islamic State could further destabilize nearby countries such as Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt.
Italy and Spain are particularly concerned about how Libyan insecurity would affect their oil and natural gas interests. Currently, the Islamic State has not infringed on the areas in which Italy and Spain operate, but that could change if the group starts to advance westward. For these reasons, it appears increasingly likely that a military intervention is in the offing, but the exact shape and scope of the intervention would depend on how rapidly the security situation deteriorates and how effectively a national unity government in Libya legitimizes its leadership.

What is clear is that, for now, the military intervention would focus on empowering Libya's indigenous capabilities. As with other Western-led anti-Islamic State operations, the mission would be to train and advise Libyan security forces and to improve intelligence collection. Limited targeted airstrikes and support from special operations units, particularly against high-value targets, can also be expected.
Preparations are already underway. Reports from Jan. 4 indicate that the British Special Air Service will work alongside some 1,000 British troops who would in turn be supported by 6,000 U.S. and European military personnel. Italy would lead the operation. In fact, the Italian air force has already deployed four AMX fighter aircraft and a Predator drone to Sicily's Trapani airport. Increased aerial activity suggests that Italy is enhancing the role it plays in conducting reconnaissance and collecting imagery. On Jan. 18, Germany's defense minister also raised the prospect of participating in a military operation in Libya.
Of course, foreign military aid in Libya is nothing new. In 2015, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates launched airstrikes in support of the Libyan National Army, the powerful militia aligned with the eastern government in Tobruk. In mid-2015, the United States launched two airstrikes in Ajdabiya that killed two Islamic State leaders and one airstrike in Darnah a few months later. But as modestly successful as the airstrikes were, they could not by themselves dislodge the Islamic State, something that would require a functional ground force.
Members of the international coalition understand as much, and the way they create that ground force will be informed by lessons that were learned in Syria and Iraq. It was in this terrain that Western troops most recently fought a costly and inefficient counterinsurgency, which revealed the importance of engaging local actors and empowering domestic security forces. Accordingly, the coalition will try to work with regional partners to collect intelligence on potential targets, but the focus will be on uniting disparate militant groups in a broad anti-Islamic State operation.
If the Western coalition can be expected to act more intelligently in Libya, it can also be expected to act more rapidly. Geopolitically, there are simply fewer impediments to intervention. Unlike in Syria and Iraq, foreign patrons do not see Libya as a theater for a larger proxy war in the Middle East, so the consequences for supporting one group over another are less dire. Geographically, Libya's flat, open terrain lends itself more easily to troop movement and precision airstrikes than the mountainous areas of Syria.

An Example of Disunity

But several things need to happen inside Libya before the coalition can get started. Western countries need a united government that at least theoretically represents the entire country so that there is a group with which the coalition can coordinate its operations. It is little surprise, then, that several countries have supported the acceleration of unity talks between the House of Representatives, the internationally recognized government in eastern Libya, and the General National Congress, the Tripoli-based body that the West believes undermines the authority of the House of Representatives and thus the legitimacy of a military intervention. While the West would prefer a government that effectively consolidates all the political and military forces operating in Libya, it would settle for any entity that enables them to build a security apparatus in which the country's various militias voluntarily participate.
The U.N.-brokered unity government, which will be known as the Government of National Accord, is slated to begin its mandate in late January. Prime Minister Fayez Sarraj will govern with a presidential council that aims to gain buy-in from different regional and tribal factions. Notably, the General National Congress and House of Representatives are supposed to approve Government of National Accord members, casting doubt on the possibility of the government's implementation.
And therein lies the difficulty of cobbling together a cohesive security force in a country as politically diverse as Libya. A successful intervention depends on at least tacit support from Libya's militias, but those militias have different long-term objectives and political orientations. Frequently the only thing they share is a historical hatred for one another. Oil revenues pay militia salaries, so their members tend to fight one another for primacy of oil infrastructure and facilities. Still, most groups understand the long-term threat the Islamic States poses to their financial well-being — an understanding that may well lead to a higher degree of cooperation.
The question of who would lead a unified military perfectly exemplifies Libya's political disunity. The natural choice is Gen. Khalifa Hifter, who heads the Libyan National Army in the east. He is supported by several eastern cities, including Benghazi, Bayda, Tobruk, and Marj, as well in the west, thanks to his strategic alliance with the city of Zentan. More important, he was the military commander under the House of Representatives in Tobruk.

But he is decidedly less popular in other corners of the country. Some in the west believe Hifter is a counter-revolutionary who wants to rule Libya as forcefully as Gadhafi once did. His forces will therefore struggle to work with General National Congress-aligned militias in the west, including collectives such as Libya Dawn and Libya Shield, both of which have been subject to Hifter's anti-Islamist operations; Libya Dawn comprises Islamist and non-Islamist groups and is particularly active in the west, whereas Libya Shield is more active in central and eastern Libya. Though some General National Congress-aligned militias have thrown their support behind the unity government, many have not, and they will have a hard time supporting a government if its military is led by someone they despise.
Hifter is also unpopular among the country's federalists, who, unlike the general, believe Libya should separated into constituent states. This is problematic because a military intervention against the Islamic State would necessarily involve support from the Petroleum Facilities Guard, which protects export terminals around As Sidra, Ras Lanuf, Marsa el Brega and Zueitina. The Petroleum Facilities Guard is led by Ibrahim Jadhran, a staunch federalist who has clashed with Hifter in the past. Jadhran controls Libya's central oil ports and thus determines which of Libya's national oil companies can move their oil to market, giving him considerable political power. Western military support for Petroleum Facilities Guard supporters could give Jadhran even more influence over the unity government's national oil company contracts and its revenue distribution. Put simply, the two leaders will struggle to work together, as will all the other groups that possess a vested interest in Libya's future.

Narrow Parameters

Even if all of Libya's militias were willing to unite, several other factors will prevent them from becoming a viable military. First, foreign resources such as money, equipment and training will necessarily change the country's balance of power. Newly strengthened militias, for example, may choose to battle their traditional rivals. This kind of shake-up could create new bids for power in opposition to the fledgling unity government.
Second, foreign governments will have a hard time deciding which groups they will back, especially when a lot of those groups practice jihadism. While virtually every group in Libya can agree to rid the country of the Islamic State, they cannot agree on the status of al Qaeda-aligned groups such as Ansar al-Sharia, the Mujahideen Shura Council in Darnah and the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council. Granted, these groups have been effective in combating the Islamic State, but the West will nonetheless have a hard time justifying arming and training them. As conflicts in Syria and Afghanistan show, however, arming, training and funding these kinds of groups is, to a degree, inevitable. Backing any group or groups will be an even more daunting task considering Hifter's intransigent view on virtually all Islamist militias. In turn, the political entities these militias back could be forced to withdraw their support from the unity government.
Last, a foreign military operation against the Islamic State will damage Libya's oil and natural gas sector — the government's sole reliable source of revenue. To realize its hydrocarbons potential, Libya needs strong, functional institutions such as major national oil companies and the Central Bank of Libya, and their survival depends largely on the security forces that protect them, namely the Petroleum Facilities Guard. But that introduces the very problem international coalition members want to avoid: inciting a conflict between rival powers.
The prospects of success, even within the narrow parameters of the impending intervention, seem low.

Italian intelligence in Libya - bad & good

The presence in Libya of our intelligence (although this was not then and not called that) was born under an unlucky star. In fact, we made a war in 1911, in the certainty that it would last a few months: the same, fatal illusion cultivated later in 1915, and, even more, in 1940.
For the conquest of what Gaetano Salvemini had called 'a box of sand' we thought, based precisely on the information gathered, that Arabs would raise against the Ottoman Empire and would be deployed in our favor.
It was very wrong and it ended with a so fierce Libyan resistance then brutally defeated by fascism in 1932.
After World War II, ENI Enrico Mattei policy sets the stage for Italian energy supremacy in Libya.
And ENI developped in fact a private intelligence service which, over the years, coordinated with the national one, as confirmed by Prime Minister Matteo Renzi recent statements: "ENI is now a key piece of our energy policy, our foreign policy and our intelligence. "

In 1969, our intelligence, then called SID and Foreign Minister Aldo Moro was involved Gaddafi rise, who was trained by British military academy and overthrew the pro-British monarchy.
Although Italians were expelled, their properties confiscated and oil industry, controlled until then mainly by British, was nationalized and it became, instead, pre-eminent Italian position.
The Seventies, those years of plots, saw the scandal called M.Fo.Biali, tied to new Catholic party and  illegal trade of Libyan oil with scandals revealed by (killed) journalist Mino Pecorelli in his magazine 'OP'.
Even in this case, intelligence, more or less deviated, were heavily involved (likely his murder included). Our foreign policy, distinguished between pro-Israel and pro-Arab by so-called 'equidistance' in Italian First Republic, saw the views expressed above all by Aldo Moro and Giulio Andreotti, both with key roles in foreign policy and with natural and institutional references in top intelligence. With repercussions in Libya and in Middle East.
The same story of aircraft shot down in Ustica which, according to some interpretations, would cover just the unsuccessful attempt of killing the plane on which was supposed to travel Gaddafi, with our intelligence extensively involved in subsequent phases of Court case.

It can be seen in broad terms, that our intelligences presence in Libyan affairs was a tormented presence .

Coming to alleged Second Italian Republic, Silvio Berlusconi had significant relationships, including personal, with Gaddafi, culminated with Treaty of Friendship signatures in 2008, to end decades of 'misunderstandings'.
But center-left Romano Prodi and Massimo D'Alema policies did not neglect intelligence involvement. No coincidence that Libya invested heavily in key industries and banks in Italy, beginning with Fiat, already in 1976. All initiatives followed and monitored by our intelligence.

We come, then, to the 'Arab Spring', including also the 'Jasmine Revolution', which have greatly contributed to both terrible current imbalances and destabilization of whole Mediterranean area, in fact favoring other regions of the planet.
Intervention in Libya was promoted by France, losing positions in Algeria, and intended to win them back right where Italy could express a national industry with companies which promoted national interest, achieving also global prestige like ENI with predominant position in oil economy and more recently Unicredit bank had become a reference point, winning competition with European banking institutions, beginning with French Paribas.
In the background is the reborn Mediterranean centrality, which, with nearly 1,4 billion people, was to become the largest free trade area in the world.
It is known that PM Berlusconi was against military initiative, but in the end Italy was forced to grant the use of its bases for bombing.
A story that will be clearer with time, maybe in few years when we will have access to Italian and Western countries intelligences records.
During 2011 clashes in Libya, our intelligence cooperated with ENI to exfiltrate, i.e. to retract, 300 ENI technicians through Sudan.
Over the years, in fact, our intelligence became reliable for Libyan tribes, so that we did not suffer significant attacks to systems which refers to ENI.
Since then, however, Libya became metaphor for 'Arab revolutions' failure not only for struggles revival which splitted Libya in two parts but also for DAESH arrival which, finding difficulties in both in Syria and Iraq, transferred to Libya 2 or 3,000 followers so that Libya will become new Jihad frontier, especially for oil fields control.
In fact, DAESH needs significant financial resources. Those which, in fact, originate, as well as by Arabian Peninsula Emirs funds, by oil wells exploitation; oil which is then sold to companies which represent a shadow market around the world and in Italy as well.
In this framework matured last July kidnapping of four Italian technicians working for Bonatti as ENI contractor.
ENI staff as well as its contractors, follow precise travel and behavior procedures, prepared and verified by internal ENI intelligence in coordination with national intelligence.
These rules, however, were not followed by kidnapped technicians, this fact is very unclear, however, both Provisional Tobruk Government and Tripoli deny their involvement, even indirect.
It is unlikely they are in DAESH hands, since Western Libya area has less jihadist presence. Probably tribes and their katiba are liable since they enjoy a political representation and they hope to assert their ability to govern the territory and its administration of justice.
An reliable hypothesis is that, when these tribes will have their own representatives in Parliament, that will mark real rebirth of Libyan government, then situation for technicians could unlock, provided that in meantime they have not already been sold to other groups operating in ​​Sirte area.
In this case, DAESH media-video production company or Al Furqan (video) and Al Hayat (monthly 'Dabiq') would send on line videos with prisoners, for a variety of reasons related to DAESH massive understanding capacity of communication rules that fundamentalists know much better than many Westerners.
And yet people do not have sufficient information to understand the true extent of Italian initiative aimed at encouraging recent tests of peace between two opposing governments.
However, there may be an opportunity for Italy to repair damages caused by France and UK after the fall of Gaddafi.
Not surprisingly, Italians are the only ones who organize a corridor of entry and management of 'public affairs' in Libya.
Otherwise chaos will continue for all those who will put their feet on Libyan beaches. By this way, Italy has an excellent opportunity to manage migration, to end black economy for human trafficking, to regain control of (Italian) energy sources.
If we do not succeed, we will have to rethink the whole management of energy resources in Europe, depending predominantly by Emirs.
Ultimately, the role of our intelligence area is historically important, and not just because it was precisely Italy to 'invent' Libya (as nation since it was not a nation but a province of Ottoman Empire before 1934 see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ancient_Libya).
In Libya, more and more shaken by opposing tensions, both ENI and AISE (Agency Information and External Security) have traditionally good relations with tribal leaders.
Other foreign intelligences admit but they are not happy about that.
So we are actually important to promote the peace process, to fight DAESH infiltration and to protect our national interests also.
Reports about  Libyans/Italians personal relations are excellent.
Not by chance when in recent weeks kamikaze fundamentalists stormed seriously injured police trainees, they were transported to Italy.
We need, therefore, strategic actions and media to affirm our role in an international arena increasingly characterized by intelligence needs.

WITHOUT LIBYAN FORCES REQUEST WHY ITALIAN OR EU MILITARY INTERVENTION IN LIBYA WOULD BE WRONG

There are two simultaneous processes going on Libya. One is political dialogue promoted by UN and supported (at least in words) from all countries of the area. His highlights were the international conference in Rome on 13 December 2015 and signatures of a peace agreement between Libyan factions four days later in Morocco.

Those signatures led to the creation of a national unity government led by former architect Faiez Serraj but still does not work in Libya.

Despite some significant progress, 18 January 2016 deadline for political process completion could go without that Libya has both a government recognized by international community and actually governing from the capital Tripoli.

The second parallel process in Libya is parallel IS (DAESH) advance and pressures in Europe and in Italy for EU armed response.

The so-called Islamic State in Libya has been operational for over a year. Initially formed by veterans of the Libyan war in Syria (the brigade "Battar"), Libyan Daesh was installed in Derna from which however was ousted last June by an unprecedented alliance between jihadists anti-IS and local people.

Now IS operates in central Libya, around the city of Sirte and consists of several thousand militants mainly of North African origin. The local population lives Daesh as a foreign occupation.

The expansion of Daesh Libya scares especially for its potential appeal for jihadists in the region which could provide an opportunity for training and military bases much closer to home but also for the possibility that jihadists come to control Libya oil resources and then attack Europe.

More will go up IS offensive level and stronger become reasons for Western air strikes.

UN Resolution 2259 approved in December provides that any form of "assistance" must go through new Libyan government approval, but the risk is that in the absence of progress in the first process (the political one, of course) some countries decide to attack all the same in Libya.

It is likely that in this case Italy will follow France, Britain and US also to have a say in their strategy.

It would be a serious mistake. It is not clear what air strikes could achieve against a force that has not strictly military characteristics but rather a terrorist force that moves from city to city.

Much better would be a ground attack made ​​by Libyan forces assisted by EU in the name of the liberation of the country from foreign occupation.

There are only embryos of this response: oil guards (in favour of Cyrenaica separation) rejected IS offensive on wells in coordination with Misrata air force, previously hostile.

Europe needs to increase the coordination between these forces and help all Libyan forces (municipalities, social forces, tribes) to give a united political response.

In the absence of united political response, Serraj would be delegitimized and armed groups not responsible.

Instead, Libyan unified response can ask, if necessary, for a Western air support.

ITALIAN TRANSLATION

Ci sono due processi simultanei in corso sulla Libia. Uno è il dialogo politico promosso dall’Onu e sostenuto (almeno a parole) da tutti i Paesi dell’area. I suoi punti culminanti sono stati la conferenza internazionale a Roma il 13 dicembre e la firma di un accordo di pace tra le fazioni libiche quattro giorni dopo in Marocco. Quella firma ha portato alla nascita di un governo di unità nazionale con a capo l’ex architetto Faiez Serraj che però ancora non opera in Libia. Nonostante qualche progresso significativo, la scadenza del 17 gennaio per il completamento del processo politico potrebbe passare senza che la Libia abbia allo stesso tempo un governo riconosciuto dalla comunità internazionale ed effettivamente governante dalla capitale Tripoli.

Il secondo processo in atto sulla Libia è l’avanzata in parallelo dell’Isis e delle pressioni, in Europa ed in Italia, per una risposta armata da parte europea. Il cosiddetto Stato Islamico in Libia è operativo da più di un anno. Inizialmente formato dai reduci libici della guerra in Siria (la brigata “Battar”), il Daesh libico si era installato nella città di Derna da cui però è stato cacciato nel giugno scorso da un’inedita alleanza tra jihadisti anti-Isis e popolazione locale. Ora opera nella Libia centrale, attorno alla città di Sirte ed è formato da alcune migliaia di militanti soprattutto di provenienza nordafricana. La popolazione locale vive Daesh come un’occupazione straniera.

L’espansione di Daesh in Libia spaventa soprattutto per il suo potenziale di attrazione per i jihadisti della regione a cui potrebbe offrire un’opportunità di addestramento e di basi militari molto più vicino a casa ma anche per la possibilità che i jihadisti arrivino a controllare le risorse petrolifere libiche e poi ad attaccare l’Europa.

Più salirà il livello dell’offensiva jihadista e più forti si faranno le voci per attacchi aerei occidentali. La risoluzione Onu 2259 approvata a dicembre stabilisce che qualsiasi forma di “assistenza” debba passare per l’approvazione del nuovo governo libico ma il rischio è che in assenza di progressi del primo processo (quello politico, appunto) alcuni paesi decidano di attaccare lo stesso in Libia. è molto probabile che in quel caso l’Italia si accodi a Francia, Gran Bretagna e USA anche per avere una voce in capitolo sulla strategia.

Sarebbe un grave errore. Non è chiaro cosa potrebbero conseguire degli attacchi aerei contro una forza che non ha ancora caratteristiche propriamente militari quanto piuttosto di una forza terroristica che si muove di città in città. Servirebbe piuttosto un contrasto a terra, fatto da forze libiche in nome della liberazione del Paese da un’occupazione straniera. Ci sono solo embrioni di questa risposta: le guardie petrolifere (di tendenza seccessionista della Cirenaica) hanno respinto l’offensiva sui pozzi in coordinamento con l’aviazione della città di Misurata, precedentemente ostile.

L’Europa deve far crescere il coordinamento tra queste forze ed aiutare tutte le forze libiche (comuni, forze sociali, tribù) a dare una risposta politica unitaria. Un intervento occidentale in assenza di ciò delegittimerebbe il governo di Serraj e deresponsabilizzerebbe i gruppi armati libici. Spetterebbe invece alla risposta unitaria libica di cui sopra, eventualmente, chiedere un supporto aereo occidentale.

Europe & Libya: ITALY WOULD HEAD MILITARY COALITION WITHOUT GETTIN...

Europe & Libya: ITALY WOULD HEAD MILITARY COALITION WITHOUT GETTIN...: UN resolution that sanctions the international support to new Government of National Unity (GNU) which must be born by January in Libya do...

ITALY WOULD HEAD MILITARY COALITION WITHOUT GETTING DIRTY ITS HANDS

UN resolution that sanctions the international support to new Government of National Unity (GNU) which must be born by January in Libya does not solve serious military problem that is gripping the former Italian colony.

At best, new government will take office in Tripoli by end of January, but put together the various militias (many of which are fought until recently) and establish them as an army under a single national flag will take several months.

Long time to benefit of al-Qaeda, Ansar al Sharia deployed in Western Cyrenaica and IS militias popping from Sirte towards oil terminals of Sidra, to Misrata and Tripoli in the field of Sabratha.

Down today foreign fighters who came from Syria and Sahel are strengthening the ranks of jihadist fighters with superior experience and tactical skills to Libyan militiamen while the formation of the new government under UN aegis could lead to an environment leading to welding between movements Jihadists, today rivals, uniting under a single Islamic state alliance, Ansar al-Sharia and other minor groups Salafis.

An agreement is justified by position taken by Council of Ulemas Libyan described the agreement signed by government of national reconciliation "contrary to sharia".

To stop jihadists in Libya, the international community, already with dramatic delay, could then be forced to intervene in the short closing gaps Libyan militia.

Many have argued that Italy will take the lead in international mission that will help the new government in the tasks of defense and security but, in the interview published by "Il Mattino" newspaper. stated that Roberta Pinotti, Defense Minister, possibility of air strikes to hit Italian bases Isis in Sirte is currently excluded.

Italy, France, Britain and perhaps even Germany are developing a plan for military support to Libya, non-combat operation that provides the establishment of a safety device that protects the institutional and some strategic sites and care training and advice to Libyan forces.

But the thousands of Libyan recruits in 2013-2014 period have been trained in Italy and Europe have gone missing. Many were driven to abuse and disciplinary problems, a number has not completed its training, some have sought asylum in host countries and of those returned to Libya none of them fought Islamic State while it is not excluded that in several have swelled jihadist groups  ranks.

The training program is also foundered for the unreliability of military Libyans given that none has ever paid $ 600 million bill for the training of 15,000 recruits.

For this reason today  relying on Libyans to stop IS in Libya may be illusory. London, Paris and Washington prepare in fact even military action against Islamic State.

Unconfirmed report that British special forces are already in the country with the reconnaissance and intelligence tasks. Jets of French aircraft carrier de Gaulle carried out reconnaissance of Sirte and Le Figaro quoted military sources for which "military action in the next six months if not before spring is considered indispensable."

US special forces have landed in recent days in al-Wattyah, basic forces loyal to Tobruk south of Tripoli. They were forced to leave because of poor coordination between Libyan forces but their goal seems to have been the basis of Islamic State in Sabratha. The unavailability of Rome to carry out military operations against IS threatens to undermine the Italian leadership in international operations in Libya.

Moreover,UN Libyan ambassador, Ibrahim al-Dabashi, had specified that UN resolution on Libya would open the way for air strikes by Western countries (Italy included) in IS fight.

The risk is that Roma lead a  low profile mission of support and training while other states conducting military actions whose consequences would weigh even on our interests in Libya.

Hard to hold the command without "getting hands dirty" and the war against Gaddafi regime in 2011, triggered by Franco-Anglo-American and then wearily conducted by NATO, has  shown how the initiatives of our "allies" pursue national interests generally hostile to Italian ones.

In this context government's decision not to involve Italy in the fighting, it may make sense in theaters of war increasingly chaotic as Syrian-Iraqi, risks as opposed to limiting the ability to protect our interests in Libya.